German development cooperation in fragile contexts by Wencker, Thomas & Verspohl, Ida
www.ssoar.info
German development cooperation in fragile
contexts
Wencker, Thomas; Verspohl, Ida
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Monographie / monograph
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Wencker, T., & Verspohl, I. (2019). German development cooperation in fragile contexts.. Bonn: Deutsches
Evaluierungsinstitut der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (DEval). https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-
ssoar-66574-1
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-SA Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Weitergebe unter gleichen
Bedingungen) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den
CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-SA Licence
(Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
German Institute for  
Development Evaluation (DEval)
Fritz-Schäffer-Straße 26  
53113 Bonn, Germany
Phone: +49 228 24 99 29-0
E-mail: info@DEval.org 
www.DEval.org
G
er
m
an
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t C
oo
pe
ra
ti
on
 in
 F
ra
gi
le
 C
on
te
xt
s 
   
3/
20
19
   
 D
Ev
al GERMAN DEVELOPMENT 
COOPERATION IN FRAGILE 
CONTEXTS
2019
State fragility is an important challenge for development cooperation. 
Challenges to the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force, a  
limited ability to make and implement binding rules and to deliver basic 
services throughout a state’s territory, as well as lack of belief in the 
rightfulness of a state’s authority among the population, put at risk the 
efforts of development cooperation. At the same time, more than half of 
worldwide Official Development Assistance (ODA) goes to states affected 
by fragility. Consequently, a key policy question is how development 
cooperation can operate successfully in fragile contexts.
This evaluation provides guidance for policymakers to adapt development 
cooperation to fragile contexts. It reviews definitions of fragility to assist 
them in choosing suitable indices for decision-making. An allocation 
analysis then critically examines whether German ODA commitments are 
aligned to strategic decisions and highlights where further action might be 
required. Based on a synthesis of evaluation reports, this report furthermore 
analyses the quality of evaluations in fragile contexts and offers ideas for 
improvements. Finally, an examination of project success across different 
dimensions of fragility provides evidence in respect of factors that relate to 
successful development cooperation in fragile contexts.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Fragility – a central challenge for development cooperation 
State fragility is an important challenge for development cooperation. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development reflects the challenge of development cooperation in fragile contexts: SDG 16 sets out the 
vision to “[p]romote peaceful and inclusive societies […], provide access to justice for all and build effective, 
accountable and inclusive institutions” (UN, 2015, p.14). Beyond the immediate added value of functioning 
regulatory institutions, challenges to the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force, a limited ability 
to make and implement binding rules and to deliver basic services throughout a state’s territory, as well as 
lack of belief in the rightfulness of a state’s authority among the population, put at risk the efforts of 
development cooperation. 
More than half of worldwide Official Development Assistance (ODA) goes to states affected by some 
or all of the mentioned aspects of fragility. German bilateral ODA commitments are no exception. Figure 
1 shows committed grants and loans by type of fragility.1 The largest share of German development 
cooperation goes to countries affected by some type of fragility – specifically low-capacity states, i.e. states 
with a low administrative capacity and limited supply of basic public services. It is for that reason that DEval 
is dedicating a Thematic Report on this topic which will compile the evidence of DEval evaluations and 
external contributions.   
For development cooperation to be successful despite the challenging conditions in fragile contexts, 
the following four conditions should be satisfied: 
1. A precise understanding of state fragility to align development policies to the local context
2. A political process that designs, possibly adapts, and implements strategies of development
cooperation in fragile contexts effectively
3. Suitable procedures for learning what works in fragile contexts and what does not
4. Knowledge of the evidence with regard to which instruments of development cooperation work in
fragile contexts.
The four self-contained chapters in this evaluation deal with the above-mentioned points. The following 
presents a brief summary. 
1 Grävingholt et al. (2018) distinguish six constellations of state fragility based on the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force (authority), 
the ability to provide basic services (capacity) and the recognition of state leadership (legitimacy). Dysfunctional, semi-functional and well-
functioning states emerge from low, middle and high authority, capacity or legitimacy, respectively. States with low authority, capacity or 
legitimacy are characterized by low values in the respective dimension, while having average or high values in the other dimensions.  
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Figure 1 Bilateral ODA commitments (grants and loans) by type of fragility 
Source: own figure based on data from OECD CRS and Grävingholt et al. (2018). 
Subject of this evaluation 
This evaluation provides guidance for policymakers in the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and other donors to adapt development cooperation to the 
context of partner countries with the aim to make it more effective. Each chapter examines one of the 
four above-mentioned conditions. 
Following an introduction, Chapter 2 reviews the definition and measurement, i.e. the 
conceptualization of state fragility. Resulting indices and typologies constitute an integral part of 
decision-making processes in the BMZ and the implementing agencies. This evaluation provides a basis for 
assessing the suitability of available indices for decision-making. Chapter 2 critically compares approaches 
to defining and measuring state fragility. This is essential practical information since concepts influence 
how policymakers perceive current affairs. Resultant typologies classify partner countries, thereby 
influencing decisions about the suitability of certain development policy instruments. Consequently, the 
choice of concepts may influence aid allocation. With different approaches resulting in different 
classifications of states thus having tangible consequences, Chapter 2 speaks to a core issue of strategic 
steering by the BMZ. 
The third chapter investigates policies by analysing strategies of development cooperation and 
allocations. Since 2005, the BMZ has released five major strategies guiding development cooperation in 
fragile states. This evaluation describes continuity and change in Germany’s and the BMZ’s development 
strategy towards fragile states and critically examines whether German ODA commitments are aligned to 
these strategies. The allocation analysis concisely points out which strategic decisions were actually put 
into practice and highlights where further action might be required. 
Chapter 4 analyses the quality of evaluations and thus deals with one of the pivotal procedures for 
learning what works in fragile contexts. The implementing agencies, KfW Development Bank (KfW) and 
the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, have built up a large body of 
evidence on the success of development cooperation. This evidence spans all types of countries and context 
conditions – among them fragile settings in which a lack of security and poor infrastructure can offer 
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challenges in designing and conducting evaluations. Based on an earlier DEval evaluation on sustainability 
in German development cooperation, this evaluation analyses the quality of evaluations depending on the 
fragility of the context. The analysis identifies factors that impede evaluations in fragile contexts and offers 
ideas on how to increase the usefulness of evaluations. 
The fifth chapter gives policymakers insights into which instruments of development cooperation are 
particularly suitable in fragile contexts. A synthesis of evaluation reports examines the correlation 
between context fragility and the evaluation’s assessment of project success. The analysis differentiates 
dimensions of state fragility, sectors, and criteria to measure project success. This allows the identification, 
from the many possible influencing factors, of those that relate to successful development cooperation in 
fragile contexts. 
Methods 
The concept comparison and the strategy analysis are based on an evaluation of academic literature, official 
documents, publicly available socio-economic data, and interviews.  
To delineate the structure and processes of the German bilateral development cooperation system, the 
evaluation team reviewed internal and public documents elaborating on the procedures for decision-
making. The review placed particular emphasis on those steps in the process that relate to strategies on 
development cooperation in fragile contexts or fragility assessments. In order to tailor recommendations to 
the needs of the BMZ, GIZ, and KfW, they refer to the procedures as described in the BMZ’s Joint Procedural 
Reform (GVR).  
The analyses of evaluation quality and project success build on a synthesis of evaluation reports by the GIZ 
and KfW. This synthesis links characteristics of the evaluated project with data on the implementation 
context. To consider subnational variation of state fragility, this evaluation develops an approach to 
automatically retrieve geographical information from evaluation reports in order to locate projects. This 
data is then linked to conflict events to estimate the enforcement of the state’s monopoly on the use of 
force at a subnational level. Moreover, the analysis of evaluation quality draws on evaluation guidelines 
from the GIZ and KfW and existing meta-evaluations. 
The following sections summarize the four main chapters. Each section discusses the relevance, and 
presents the main results and recommendations. 
Defining and measuring state fragility: Results and recommendations 
Context-specific development cooperation requires an understanding of state fragility as a 
multidimensional phenomenon. Given an increased interest in the topic especially after 9/11, the number 
of approaches to measuring fragility has increased considerably. This resulted in more refined concepts of 
fragility that acknowledge its multidimensional nature. Rather than classifying states binarily or assessing 
fragility on a one-dimensional scale, more recent approaches measure fragility based on multiple 
constitutive attributes and derive typologies. 
The increasing availability of sophisticated approaches to measuring state fragility presents 
policymakers with the challenge of assessing the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches. 
This is relevant, since the use of a particular concept has concrete consequences in terms of the: 
The conceptual comparison gives an overview and provides guidance. It compares four concepts: the 
OECD’s States of Fragility (SFR), the Constellations of State Fragility (CSF) developed at the German 
Development Institute, the Crisis Early Warning (CEW) provided by the German Institute of Global and 
• number of states classified as fragile
• ability to distinguish different types of fragility
• accuracy and timeliness of measurement, and
• number of years and countries on which information is available.
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Areas Studies (GIGA) and used by the BMZ,2 and the fragility component of the Catalogue of Criteria (CoC) 
for Assessing Development Orientation overseen by the Governance division of the BMZ.  
The comparison reveals significant variation between concept designs, even for similar definitions. 
These conceptual differences have implications for allocation and programming decisions. The concepts 
differ, for example, in their empirical scope. The BMZs CEW defines fragility focusing very narrowly on 
violent conflict. By contrast, the OECD’s SFR follows a very broad understanding which includes, e.g., 
environmental risks such as exposure to natural hazards. Narrow concepts leave out aspects of statehood 
that may influence the success of development cooperation. Broad concepts, on the other hand, conceive 
state fragility as an overarching term describing a broad range of political, economic, societal, and 
environmental deficiencies and thereby become imprecise and lose analytical value and policy relevance. 
Consequently, focusing on the core state functions of authority, capacity, and legitimacy appears most 
useful. 
Since no single concept on its own fulfils all requirements for supporting strategic policy-making, a 
combination of existing approaches seems to be expedient. Concepts with a large scope, suitable 
extension, and founded on qualitative and quantitative public data and an explicit concept design are readily 
available but usually do not provide timely data.  The latter are, however, available through the existing 
reporting system currently used in the BMZ. As it would be inefficient to develop yet another approach to 
defining and measuring fragility, the challenge lies in combining existing approaches. This requires a 
standardized process of combining and weighting information through mixed- and multi-method 
approaches. For instance, a combination of different sources could increase the precision of measurement, 
give insights into uncertainties, and improve the imputation of missing data. 
Fragility indices are well suited to the strategic management of German bilateral development 
cooperation as they enable comparisons between states on a single, ideally multidimensional scale. 
By contrast, a lack of guidance on what information should be considered relevant, combined with time 
constraints, can lead decision-makers to over-rely on volatile subjective reasoning prone to psychological 
biases, increasing the danger of incorrect judgements. The mandatory use of indices as currently practised 
in the development of country strategies thus promises to improve decision-making. At the same time, 
portfolio management, programming, and implementing development cooperation also requires an 
idiographic, in-depth understanding. In particular, highly aggregated measures that reduce dozens of 
indicators to a binary classification entail the danger of oversimplification. 
One approach to reduce the danger of oversimplification is to present results of indices more 
comprehensively. More specifically, a visual representation of concepts that includes indicators and the 
applied weighting mechanism would convey the wealth of information provided by multidimensional 
concepts and make transparent the influence of individual indicators. Another way to tackle the risks of 
oversimplification is to make clear the uncertainty of measurement. For instance, a country classified as 
non-fragile might change to being classified as fragile one year later because it barely passed a certain 
threshold. Since the underlying measurement is uncertain, such a change in category might be entirely due 
to chance. Moreover, quantitative indicators can convey a certainty that seldom exists. One way to prevent 
policymakers from drawing wrong conclusions from data is to report distributions rather than pseudo-exact 
point estimates.  
Beyond possible improvements in presentation, this evaluation also discusses three ways to improve 
the understanding of fragility. First, taking into account how fragility spreads across borders would allow 
possible spillover effects to be assessed. Second, spatial disaggregation of measures of fragility promises to 
improve our understanding because the level of fragility often varies within states, specifically in developing 
ones. We present one approach to disaggregate state authority subnationally in Chapter 5. Third, applying 
2 The BMZ replaced the CEW with a new system called the Escalation Potential Measurement (ESKA – Eskalationspotentialmessung) at the end of 
2018. 
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the notion of fragility and its constitutive dimensions to the regime, administration, and government of a 
state could further improve the added value of fragility indices in context-sensitive programming.  
In summary, we make the following recommendation: 
Recommendation 1 
Based on a systematic conceptual comparison of four approaches to defining and measuring fragility, this 
evaluation recommends that the BMZ continue to use fragility indices for strategic portfolio management. 
Furthermore, the BMZ should continue to constantly evaluate and possibly improve its definitions and 
measurement of fragility on the basis of clearly defined criteria. This should include an assessment of the 
extent to which existing approaches could be combined. 
As part of the current revision of approaches to measuring fragility, the BMZ should ensure that the results 
of indices are presented to political decision-makers more comprehensively in order to make underlying 
concept designs transparent and to do justice to the multidimensional nature of fragility. To achieve this, 
the BMZ should adopt a visual representation of concepts that includes indicators and the applied 
weighting mechanism. Second, the BMZ should include the uncertainty of classification and measurement 
in presentations of fragility scores. 
Moreover, with a view to possible future revisions, the BMZ should further disaggregate and contextualize 
its measurement of state fragility in order to further increase the value of indices for the context-sensitive 
management of development cooperation. Further disaggregation could be achieved by reporting 
information for lower-level geographical units or more regularly and by differentiating fragility between 
different actors within partner countries. Contextualization could be achieved by taking account of 
possible spillover effects of fragility across borders. 
Strategies and allocation: Results and recommendations 
For development cooperation to be successful, it needs to be aligned to fragile contexts. 
Consequently, it is no surprise that the increasing attention given to fragile contexts has resulted in a 
growing number of strategies on context-sensitive implementation of development cooperation.  
This evaluation examines to what extent strategy papers shape German ODA commitments. 
Strategies provide guiding norms and principles for operations, define policy goals, set action areas, propose 
appropriate instruments, and explicate assumptions underlying development cooperation in fragile 
contexts. Beyond influencing policies and politics, strategy papers signal to the public and partner countries 
the German government’s preferences concerning fragility, state-building, and crisis prevention. However, 
some practitioners and researchers argue that official policies as embodied in strategies have no effect on 
practice. Furness (2014), for instance, argues that, for the EU, development cooperation in fragile states 
reveals a “policy-operations” gap. Practitioners sometimes follow a similar reasoning when they claim that 
strategies are especially hard to implement in fragile contexts. The volatility and complexity of fragile 
contexts clearly impedes the detailed planning of interventions.  
This evaluation uses three steps to investigate whether allocation patterns reflect the content of 
strategies. First, we describe changes and continuities in the BMZ’s strategy towards fragile states. Second, 
we extract testable implications from strategy documents that evolved after critical junctures. And third, 
we test empirically to what extent ODA commitments match these testable implications. 
The analysis identifies important strategic shifts during two critical junctures: the Al-Qaeda attacks 
in 2001 and the “Arab Spring” of 2011–12. With each critical juncture, new discourses emerged on how 
development cooperation can be adapted to the challenges arising from fragility. The 2004 Interministerial 
Action Plan “Civilian crisis prevention, conflict transformation and peace consolidation” can be considered 
Germany’s first joint strategy targeting fragile states. Subsequently, the BMZ released two major strategies 
to operationalize its 161 recommendations. This resulted in two approaches to development cooperation 
supporting crisis prevention in fragile states: peacebuilding and institution-building. In 2012, the Federal 
Government released the “Interdepartmental Guidelines for a Coherent Policy of the German Federal 
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Government in Fragile States”. It was released at a time of disappointing results from liberal state-building 
efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the DRC. Moreover, the five peace- and state-building goals (PSG5) 
concluded in the 2011 “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” served as a reference. The BMZ 
operationalized the guidelines in the strategy “Development for Peace and Security”. In 2017, the Federal 
Government released the interministerial guidelines “Preventing Crises, Managing Conflicts, Building 
Peace”. Efforts to operationalize the guidelines in the BMZ are continuing, with particular attention paid to 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
This evaluation finds that two approaches have emerged in German development cooperation 
towards fragile states: peacebuilding and institution-building. Although we have seen major innovations 
within each of these approaches and, more recently, attempts to integrate them more closely, they have 
both maintained a considerable degree of specialization. This specialization must be considered against the 
background that the foci of peace- and institution-building are distinct but complementary. They are distinct 
because, on the one hand, peacebuilding is about more than building strong and inclusive institutions. For 
instance, it also includes disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. On the other hand, institutions 
affect environmental, economic, and social development and thus go beyond peacebuilding. At the same 
time, peace- and institution-building are themselves complementary. Institutions form the structural 
conditions that shape the incentives for societal, economic, and political actors and thereby influence the 
decision to resort to violence or play by the rules as embodied in institutions. Consequently, peacebuilding 
processes often centre on the question of shaping institutions. But peace and conflict also affect 
institutions: institutional changes due to violent conflict can render obsolete an assessment of governance 
and development orientation. 
In the light of the fact that strategies have been implemented well, the institutional specialization 
within the BMZ seems fit for purpose. At the same time, the scientifically demonstrated mutual influence 
of institutions and political conflict illustrates that development cooperation in fragile states must always 
take into account peace- and institution-building together. Consequently, a close collaboration among the 
responsible organizational units can ensure complementarity. The joint reflection of development 
orientation, the level of governance, and the CEW are a good step in this direction. The current revision of 
the CEW and the measurement of the level of governance provides an opportunity to further deepen the 
cooperation, develop a uniform understanding of fragility, and eliminate possible redundancies by possibly 
integrating existing approaches (see Recommendation 1). On the one hand, this may include more clearly 
defining and demarcating the objectives of both approaches; on the other, joint data collection on shared 
indicators could increase efficiency and thereby improve assessments. 
We thus make the following recommendation: 
Recommendation 2 
Based on a systematic conceptual comparison of approaches to defining and measuring fragility, an 
analysis of strategy documents, a review of the structure and processes of the German bilateral 
development cooperation system, and interviews, this evaluation recommends that the BMZ maintain its 
practice of dealing separately with questions of peace and security, and of governance. At the same time, 
the BMZ should ensure coordination and complementarity between the responsible organizational units 
wherever possible. The BMZ should systematically compare concept designs across both divisions with 
the aim of clearly demarcating approaches in order to avoid duplication and redundancy. Where concept 
designs complement one another, a formal mechanism for sharing indicators and data collection efforts 
should be established. 
The investigation of patterns of commitment shows that bilateral aid allocations broadly follow the 
strategies. After 2005, more aid was committed to conflict transformation and peacebuilding, to countries 
with a German military presence, and to post-conflict countries. For the 2007 and 2009 strategies, more aid 
was committed to the direct delivery of basic services in countries with low governance and deteriorating 
development orientation, to public institutions in countries with low governance and improving 
development orientation, and to the support of government at local level in countries with low governance 
and constant development orientation. After the release of the 2013 strategy, transitional aid commitments 
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to non-partner countries in conflict or transition rose, and conflict-prevention programmes in fragile states 
saw an increase in total and relative commitments. We also find that the more general strategy of exiting 
from budgetary support also applies to fragile states.  
Although these results show that allocation patterns are mostly in line with the policy 
recommendations tested, we also find some strategies to be less well implemented. First, we do not 
find evidence of an increase in commitments to basket funds, an instrument promising greater donor 
coordination and harmonization as well as increased ownership and reduced administrative burden faced 
by partners. Second, we find weak evidence of decreasing support to non-state actors, contrary to strategic 
recommendations. Both findings touch upon the question of whether state or non-state actors are suitable 
partners for development cooperation in fragile contexts. The low level of commitments to non-state actors 
may influence the efficient use of resources and the political regime of the respective country. 
In summary, one of the main challenges lies in the strategic orientation of German development 
cooperation with regard to the question of what channels of delivery – among them the partner 
governments and non-state actors – offer the greatest benefits of development cooperation in fragile 
contexts. The strategies under analysis in this chapter already go a long way in tailoring instruments to the 
local context by making recommendations that are conditional on the fragility, level of governance, and 
development orientation of partner countries. However, in some cases implementation is falling behind.  
We thus make the following recommendation: 
Recommendation 3 
Based on an analysis of strategy documents and commitments, and a screening of the literature, this 
evaluation recommends that the BMZ ensure the implementation of its strategies specifically with regard 
to the support of non-state actors in fragile contexts. The BMZ should also develop a concrete action plan 
to assess and possibly adapt guiding principles on cooperation with non-state actors in fragile contexts 
based on available evidence. 
Moreover, the BMZ should continue the good practice of constantly adapting strategies to the ever-
improving understanding of successful development cooperation in fragile contexts. The existing practice 
of tailoring strategic recommendations to contextual conditions is likely to do justice to the increasing 
analytical precision of scientific research and the validity of scientific explanations that depend on 
particular background conditions. 
Evaluation in fragile contexts: Results and recommendations 
Evaluating development interventions helps us to understand the effects of development cooperation 
and learn lessons for future activities. Fragile contexts can influence the quality of evaluation due, for 
example, to security concerns, poor infrastructure, or lack of mutual trust. Since evaluation reports are 
crucial for understanding what works in fragile contexts, a negative impact of fragility on evaluation quality 
would impede better knowledge about aid effectiveness. 
A quantitative analysis shows no correlation between fragility and evaluation quality, but finds an 
indirect relation through reduced mobility in low-capacity states. On the one hand, we therefore 
conclude that evaluators generally succeed in maintaining evaluation quality – operationalized through the 
quality criteria developed by Noltze et al. (2018c) – at the usual level, even under difficult circumstances. 
On the other hand, a more detailed analysis shows that low state capacity is associated with reduced 
mobility and thus indirectly with a lower quality of evaluation. 
In a complementary qualitative analysis, experts identified reduced mobility and poor project M&E 
capacities as the main challenges. The experts mentioned travel restrictions and poor infrastructure as 
causes for the limited mobility. Project M&E is related to various factors such as resource questions – in 
terms of budget as well as availability and competence of staff – leading to lacking or poor-quality indicators 
and other project data available for external evaluators. 
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In summary, the mobility of evaluators and M&E at the project level are central concerns for 
increasing evaluation quality in fragile contexts. Consequently, a critical review of M&E systems could 
be useful to identify potential to improve data quality and availability. Approaches to improve M&E systems 
could include reserving sufficient resources for M&E tasks at project/programme level, incentives such as 
M&E-capacity-related annual objectives for leadership personnel, and sensitization training specifically for 
leadership personnel. Moreover, the evaluation capacity of local partners could be improved by creating a 
sustainable pool of evaluation experts in partner countries.  
Additional approaches to increase M&E capacity are budgeting and project planning. Separate budgets 
for project implementation on the one hand and M&E on the other should limit competition for resources. 
This has already been recently implemented with regard to evaluations. For instance, the GIZ has a separate 
budget for financing evaluations. Under the recent GIZ evaluation reform, project evaluations will now be 
more centralized, being commissioned by the evaluation department of the GIZ headquarters. With regard 
to project monitoring, module proposals (Modulvorschläge) for technical development cooperation do not 
separately report monitoring costs. However, separate reporting of costs could improve the BMZ’s steering 
capacity in respect of the quality of monitoring and evaluation. 
Mobility challenges can be addressed through further strengthening the capacity of conducting 
remote monitoring and evaluation. Suitable approaches to data collection include remote sensing, digital 
data collection using hand-held devices, and remote surveys. To make use of these new types of digital data 
in decision-making processes, it is moreover important to strengthen the capacity to apply and process data. 
We thus make the following recommendation: 
Recommendation 4 
Based on qualitative interviews, observational evidence from an evaluation synthesis, and a screening of 
the literature, this evaluation recommends that the BMZ, GIZ, and KfW address mobility restrictions on 
evaluators in fragile contexts and improve M&E at the project level. 
First, we recommend that the BMZ require the GIZ and the KfW to further separate out budgets for project 
implementation on the one hand, and project monitoring and evaluation on the other, to further 
strengthen the prevention of fungibility and competition for resources. 
Second, this evaluation recommends that the GIZ and the KfW address mobility challenges in fragile 
contexts through the increased use of innovative data-collection methods. This includes strengthening 
capacity in conducting remote evaluation and monitoring using, e.g., geospatial methods, remote surveys, 
and digital data collection. 
Development interventions in fragile contexts: Results and recommendation 
This evaluation sheds new light on the nexus between fragility and project success by synthesizing 
the results of 471 digitized evaluation reports on GIZ and KfW projects in 85 countries between 2006 
and 2016. As a rather broad phenomenon, state fragility is linked to many factors that have been discussed 
in terms of the success of development cooperation.  
Two innovative features of this evaluation promise to improve our understanding of the role of state 
fragility. First, a multidimensional yet state-based concept of fragility measures the authority, capacity, and 
legitimacy of partner countries. Second, this evaluation presents a subnational measure of fragility based 
on violent events in the vicinity of georeferenced locations. Since the level of fragility often varies within 
states, the use of national fragility scores might be insufficient. Consequently, we retrieve information on 
project locations from evaluation reports through natural language processing and assign coordinates to 
each extracted location. This assessment of challenges to the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force provides a more realistic picture of the context in which development cooperation takes place.  
The synthesis shows no evidence that fragility of context correlates with project success as measured 
by evaluation ratings. We find no evidence of project success differing among most types of national 
fragility, or of varying project success conditional on conflict events near project sites. The causal 
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mechanism behind this perhaps surprising result is not clear. It might be that projects are well adapted to 
fragility in terms of programming and design. The fact that this evaluation finds strategies on fragility to be 
well implemented in German development cooperation seems to point in this direction. It could also be that 
the goals of interventions in fragile contexts are set lower, which makes them easier to achieve. However, 
interventions in highly fragile contexts usually have a dual objective in that they additionally aim at 
stabilization. A second possible explanation is that any negative effect of fragility is offset by greater 
benefits of projects due to the possibly low initial level of development. It could also be that evaluators take 
into account the fragility of the context in their ratings, which would lead to spurious results.  
A closer look at the dimensions of fragility shows that projects in countries with higher levels of 
capacity are, on average, more successful. The results indicate that the extent to which development 
interventions achieve their objectives inducing sustainable positive change depends on the capacity of 
partner countries. By contrast, whether interventions do so in cost- and time-efficient ways and whether 
they are well adapted to the target group seems to depend less on capacity. This finding supports the results 
of an earlier evaluation by Noltze et al. (2018b), which finds the role of partner countries to be particularly 
important in rating sustainability. 
Correlations between state capacity and project ratings are particularly noticeable in the health 
sector. This resonates with existing findings that interventions aimed at improving health require efficient 
and independent bureaucracies as well as an efficient infrastructure of service provision across the whole 
country (Brieba, 2018). However, we should be cautious with these results as health outcomes are also 
included in the measurement of state capacity. 
The relation between fragility and project success turns out to be context-, sector-, and outcome-
specific. Tailoring development cooperation to fragile contexts requires a deeper understanding of the 
complex mechanisms that determine project success in different sectors across different contexts. Although 
further research and better data are needed, strengthening state capacity seems to be crucial in order to 
create a context for successful development cooperation. Consequently, it seems advisable to continue, and 
possibly to extend, the good practice of assessing state capacity in the management of bilateral 
development cooperation. Differentiating fragility profiles and a detailed Peace and Conflict Assessment 
are important steps in this direction. The capacity-related risk assessment could also draw on the successor 
to the Governance Criteria Catalogue as well as monitoring and evaluations of similar interventions in 
similar contexts.  
Moreover, measures of state capacity could be further improved by disaggregating capacity among different 
actors and by taking into account subnational variations in state capacity (also see Recommendation 1). 
Furthermore, a higher standardization of evaluations should improve the comparability of evaluation 
reports. From an evaluator’s point of view, the validity of indicators with regard to project goals as well as 
comparability of indicators across different projects are of primary importance. Current efforts by the BMZ, 
GIZ, and KfW in the joint working group “AG Evaluierung” are aimed in this direction and hence should 
improve the quality of observational data analysis across different contexts. 
We thus make the following recommendation: 
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Recommendation 5 
Based on weak observational evidence from an evaluation synthesis, a screening of research and 
evaluations, and a review of the structure and processes of the German bilateral development cooperation 
system, this evaluation recommends that the BMZ systematically assess the risks emanating from a lack 
of capacity of partner countries for the success of development projects even more than has hitherto been 
the case. This should include a detailed assessment in module proposals of implementation risks in low-
capacity states. 
Moreover, the analysis points to the added value of improving the quality of, and standardizing, 
monitoring and evaluation. Consequently, the joint BMZ-GIZ-KfW working group “AG Evaluierung” 
should strive to increase comparability across evaluations with a view to enhancing the validity of 
evaluation syntheses and thereby facilitate joint learning. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Fragile Staatlichkeit als Herausforderung für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit 
Fragile Staatlichkeit ist eine der zentralen Herausforderungen für die Entwicklungspolitik. Die Agenda 
2030 für nachhaltige Entwicklung spiegelt dies wider. So lautet Ziel 16: „Friedliche und inklusive 
Gesellschaften im Sinne einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung fördern, allen Menschen Zugang zur Justiz 
ermöglichen und effektive, rechenschaftspflichtige und inklusive Institutionen auf allen Ebenen aufbauen“. 
Funktionierende regulierende staatliche Institutionen haben nicht nur einen direkten Mehrwert wie die 
Bereitstellung von Kollektivgütern; wenn das legitime staatliche Gewaltmonopol angefochten wird, wenn 
die gesamtgesellschaftlich verbindliche Regelsetzungs- und -durchsetzungskompetenz eingeschränkt ist 
und/oder wenn die Bevölkerung die staatliche Herrschaft nicht anerkennt, gefährdet dies ebenfalls den 
Erfolg von Entwicklungszusammenarbeit.  
Der größte Teil der öffentlichen EZ kommt Staaten zugute, die von einigen oder allen der genannten 
Merkmale fragiler Staatlichkeit betroffen sind. Die deutschen bilateralen Zusagen bilden dabei keine 
Ausnahme. Abbildung 1 differenziert die zugesagten Zuschüsse und Darlehen nach Art der Fragilität der 
betroffenen Länder.3 Es wird deutlich, dass der größte Teil der deutschen EZ mit und in fragilen Ländern 
durchgeführt wird. Dies betrifft insbesondere Staaten mit eingeschränkter Kapazität, d. h. solche, in denen 
die Verwaltung schwach ist und Grundversorgungsleistungen nur eingeschränkt bereitgestellt werden. Aus 
diesem Grund widmet das DEval dem Thema Fragilität einen Schwerpunkt, der Ergebnisse unterschiedlicher 
DEval Evaluierungen zusammenfasst und mit externen Beiträgen zur EZ in fragilen Kontexten kombiniert.  
Damit die EZ trotz widriger Rahmenbedingungen in fragilen Staaten erfolgreich arbeiten kann, sollten 
vier Voraussetzungen erfüllt sein: 
1. Ein geeignetes Verständnis des Begriffs staatlicher Fragilität, um die EZ gut auf den jeweiligen
lokalen Kontext abzustimmen;
2. Prozesse der Politikformulierung und -durchsetzung, in deren Rahmen die entwicklungspolitischen
Strategien zum Umgang mit fragiler Staatlichkeit effektiv konzipiert, ggf. angepasst und umgesetzt
werden;
3. geeignete Verfahren, um aus vergangenen Erfahrungen zu lernen und zu ermitteln, welche Ansätze
und Lösungen in fragilen Kontexten funktionieren und welche nicht;
4. Kenntnis der Evidenz bezüglich des Erfolgs bestimmter entwicklungspolitischer Ansätze in fragilen
Kontexten.
Diese vier Voraussetzungen bilden den Untersuchungsgegenstand des vorliegenden Evaluierungsberichts 
und werden im Folgenden kurz vorgestellt.  
3 Grävingholt et al. (2018) unterscheiden anhand des Gewaltmonopols (Autorität), der Fähigkeit zur Bereitstellung von Grundversorgungsleistungen 
(Kapazität) und der Anerkennung staatlicher Herrschaft durch die Bevölkerung (Legitimität) sechs Konstellationen staatlicher Fragilität. 
Dysfunktionale, mäßig funktionierende und gut funktionierende Staaten zeichnen sich durch niedrige, mittlere bzw. hohe Autorität, Kapazität 
oder Legitimität aus. Staaten niedriger Autorität, Kapazität und Legitimität sind durch niedrige Werte der jeweils benannten Dimension 
charakterisiert, während sie in den jeweils anderen Dimensionen mittlere oder hohe Werte aufweisen.  
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Quelle: Selbst erstellte Abbildung auf der Grundlage von Daten des OECD-Creditor Reporting System und Grävingholt et al. (2019).   
Gegenstand der vorliegenden Evaluierung 
Diese Evaluierung soll Entscheidungsträger aus Politik und Durchführungspraxis dabei unterstützen, 
die EZ an die Ausgangsbedingungen in fragilen Ländern anzupassen, um die beabsichtigten 
Wirkungen zu erzielen. Dabei wird in den Hauptkapiteln (Kapitel 2-5) jeweils eine der vier genannten 
Voraussetzungen für das Gelingen von EZ in fragilen Staaten untersucht.  
Das erste Hauptkapitel widmet sich der Definition und Messung fragiler Staatlichkeit, d.h. der 
Konzeptualisierung des Phänomens. Hieraus resultierende Indizes und Typologien sind mittlerweile ein 
fester Bestandteil der Entscheidungsprozesse des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit 
und Entwicklung (BMZ) und seiner Durchführungsorganisationen (DO). Dieser Teil der Evaluierung bietet 
eine Grundlage, um die Eignung verwendeter und verfügbarer Indizes für Prozesse der 
Entscheidungsfindung zu bewerten. Dies ist wesentlich, da die jeweiligen Indizes durch die Wahl und die 
Art der Kombination bestimmter Indikatoren die Wahrnehmung der Wirklichkeit strukturieren. 
Resultierende Typologien gruppieren Länder in Klassen und beeinflussen so Entscheidungen über die 
Eignung bestimmter entwicklungspolitischer Instrumente. Da verschiedene Konzeptionen die Fragilität von 
Ländern sehr unterschiedlich einschätzen können, hat die Wahl eines bestimmten Ansatzes gemeinhin auch 
konkrete Auswirkungen auf Allokationsentscheidungen. Insofern ist der konzeptionelle Vergleich in diesem 
Kapitel von großer Bedeutung für die strategische Steuerung des BMZ-Portfolios. 
Das zweite Hauptkapitel behandelt Prozesse der Politikformulierung und -umsetzung. Es basiert auf 
einer Analyse entwicklungspolitischer Strategien zum Umgang mit fragiler Staatlichkeit sowie einer 
Allokationsanalyse. Das BMZ hat seit 2005 fünf zentrale Strategien zur Steuerung der EZ in fragilen Staaten 
aufgelegt. Die Evaluierung zeichnet entsprechende Kontinuitäten sowie den Wandel der deutschen 
Entwicklungsstrategien im Allgemeinen und des BMZ im Besonderen nach. Darüber hinaus zeigt die 
Allokationsanalyse anhand zugesagter Mittel der EZ (ODA-Verpflichtungen) auf, welche der strategischen 
Empfehlungen des BMZ tatsächlich umgesetzt wurden und wo weiterer Handlungsbedarf besteht. 
Das dritte Hauptkapitel widmet sich der Qualität von Evaluierungen. Damit behandelt es eines der 
zentralen Verfahren, um aus Erfahrungen für zukünftige entwicklungspolitische Vorhaben in fragilen 
Kontexten zu lernen. Die Evaluierungsberichte der beiden größten deutschen 
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Durchführungsorganisationen – der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) und 
der KfW Entwicklungsbank (KfW) – bergen eine Vielzahl von Erkenntnissen über Faktoren, die den Erfolg 
von EZ beeinflussen. Diese Erkenntnisse decken Länder mit Ausgangsbedingungen aller Art ab − darunter 
auch fragile Staaten, in denen schlechte Sicherheitsbedingungen und mangelnde Infrastruktur die Arbeit 
von Evaluierenden erschweren können. Die vorliegende Evaluierung analysiert in Anknüpfung an eine 
frühere DEval-Evaluierung zur Nachhaltigkeit in der deutschen EZ die Qualität von Evaluierungen in 
Abhängigkeit der Fragilität des Kontextes. Dabei werden Faktoren identifiziert, welche die Durchführung 
von Evaluierungen erschweren, und daraus Ansatzpunkte abgeleitet, um die Nützlichkeit von Evaluierungen 
zu erhöhen.  
Das vierte Hauptkapitel soll politischen Entscheidungsträgern Einblicke geben, welche 
entwicklungspolitischen Ansätze in fragilen Kontexten besonders geeignet sind. Eine Synthese von 
Evaluierungsberichten zeigt, inwiefern die Fragilität des Kontextes mit der Bewertung des Projekterfolgs 
korreliert. Die Analyse differenziert dabei nach Dimensionen staatlicher Fragilität, unterschiedlichen 
Sektoren sowie unterschiedlichen Bewertungskriterien für den Projekterfolg. Dies erlaubt es, aus dem 
komplexen Zusammenspiel zahlreicher Faktoren spezifische Einsichten in mögliche Erfolgsfaktoren für EZ 
in fragilen Kontexten herauszuarbeiten.  
Angewandte Methoden 
Der Konzeptvergleich sowie die Strategieanalyse fußen auf einer Auswertung wissenschaftlicher 
Fachliteratur, offizieller Dokumente, öffentlicher verfügbarer sozioökonomischer Daten und von Interviews. 
Strukturen und Prozesse der deutschen bilateralen EZ wurden auf Basis interner und öffentlicher 
Dokumente mit Blick auf Verfahren der Entscheidungsfindung analysiert. Besonderes Augenmerk galt dabei 
jenen Verfahren, in denen Strategien zur EZ in fragilen Kontexten oder Fragilitätsindizes eine Rolle spielen. 
Um die Nützlichkeit der Empfehlungen für BMZ, GIZ und KfW zu erhöhen, beziehen sich die jeweiligen 
Empfehlungen auf Prozesse nach der Gemeinsamen Verfahrensreform (GVR).   
Die Analysen der Evaluierungsqualität und des Projekterfolgs in fragilen Kontexten basieren auf einer 
Synthese von Evaluierungsberichten der GIZ und der KfW. Diese Synthese verknüpft Merkmale des 
evaluierten Vorhabens und der Evaluierung mit Daten zum Implementierungskontext. Darüber hinaus 
wurde im Rahmen dieser Evaluierung ein Verfahren entwickelt, das automatisiert geographische 
Informationen aus den Evaluierungsberichten extrahiert und so die evaluierten Vorhaben verortet. Diese 
Daten können mit Informationen über das lokale Konfliktgeschehen verknüpft werden, um die 
Durchsetzung des staatlichen Gewaltmonopols geographisch disaggregiert zu erfassen. Für die Analyse der 
Evaluierungsqualität wurden zudem Evaluierungsleitfäden der GIZ und der KfW sowie existierende Meta-
Evaluierungen herangezogen. 
Die folgenden Abschnitte fassen die vier Hauptkapitel zusammen. Sie diskutieren jeweils die Relevanz des 
Gegenstands und stellen die zentralen Ergebnisse sowie die hieraus abgeleiteten Empfehlungen dar.   
Definition und Messung staatlicher Fragilität: Ergebnisse und Empfehlungen 
Kontextspezifische EZ setzt voraus, dass staatliche Fragilität als multidimensionales Phänomen 
verstanden wird. Insbesondere nach den Anschlägen vom 11. September 2001 hat sich die Anzahl der 
Ansätze zur Definition und Messung staatlicher Fragilität erhöht. Dabei hat sich die Erkenntnis 
durchgesetzt, dass Fragilität zahlreiche Dimensionen hat. Anstatt Staaten binär als fragil oder nicht fragil zu 
klassifizieren oder auf einer eindimensionalen Skala zu bewerten, messen jüngere Ansätze Fragilität anhand 
von mehreren konstitutiven Eigenschaften und leiten hieraus Typologien ab. 
Das breite Angebot komplexer Ansätze der Fragilitätsmessung stellt politische Entscheidungsträger 
vor die Herausforderung, die Stärken und Schwächen unterschiedlicher Ansätze zu bewerten. Dies ist 
relevant, da die Nutzung eines bestimmten Konzepts konkrete Folgen hat bezüglich 
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Der Konzeptvergleich dient als Überblick und Orientierungshilfe. Er umfasst vier Ansätze: States of 
Fragility (SFR) der OECD, den am Deutschen Institut für Entwicklungspolitik erarbeiteten Ansatz 
Constellations of State Fragility (CSF), die Krisenfrühwarnung (vom Referat Frieden und Sicherheit des BMZ 
betreut4) und die Fragilitätskomponente des Kriterienkatalogs zur Beurteilung der Governance-Niveaus 
und der Entwicklungsorientierung, der von der Governance-Abteilung des BMZ betreut wird.  
Der Vergleich zeigt, dass ähnliche Definitionen von Fragilität auf sehr unterschiedlichen Konzepten 
beruhen können. Diese konzeptionellen Unterschiede haben konkrete Implikationen für 
Allokationsentscheidungen und die Programmierung von EZ. Ein Beispiel: Die Krisenfrühwarnung des BMZ 
folgt einem engen, auf das Gewaltmonopol bezogenen Verständnis von Fragilität. Die OECD hingegen 
definiert Fragilität so breit, dass beispielsweise auch Umweltrisiken wie die Gefährdung durch 
Naturkatastrophen darunterfallen. Zu enge Definitionen blenden bedeutende Faktoren aus, die den Erfolg 
von EZ beeinflussen können. Wird Fragilität hingegen als Oberbegriff für ein breites Spektrum 
unterschiedlicher Defizite in den Bereichen Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Umwelt verstanden, 
verliert der Begriff seine Trennschärfe und seinen analytischen und politikpraktischen Nutzen. Es erscheint 
daher ratsam, einen Mittelweg zu verfolgen. Dieser sollte sich auf die staatlichen Kernfunktionen Autorität, 
Kapazität und Legitimität konzentrieren.  
Da keiner der verglichenen Ansätze für sich genommen alle Anforderungen für die strategische 
Steuerung im BMZ erfüllt, erscheint eine Kombination geeigneter Ansätze zielführend. So sind 
Konzepte verfügbar, die auf methodisch nachvollziehbare Weise qualitative und quantitative Daten auf 
Basis einer geeigneten Definition für eine große Anzahl von Länderjahren zur Verfügung stellen. Allerdings 
sind diese Daten meist nicht so aktuell wie diejenigen, die über die Berichterstattung des BMZ und der 
Durchführungsorganisationen bereitgestellt werden. Da es ineffizient wäre, einen gänzlich neuen Ansatz zu 
entwickeln, liegt die Herausforderung in der Verknüpfung bestehender Ansätze. Dies wiederum verlangt 
nach einem standardisierten Prozess, um die vorhandenen Informationen sinnvoll zu kombinieren und zu 
gewichten. Durch eine solche Kombination unterschiedlicher Quellen kann die Präzision von 
Einschätzungen erhöht werden. Zudem können mögliche Unsicherheiten abgebildet und fehlende Daten 
vervollständigt werden. 
Fragilitätsindizes eignen sich für die strategische Steuerung bilateraler EZ, da sie Ländervergleiche 
auf Basis einer einzigen, idealerweise multidimensionalen Skala erlauben. Fehlen in Situationen mit 
hohem Zeitdruck klare Kriterien zur Beurteilung, welche Informationen als relevant anzusehen sind, kann 
dies dazu führen, dass Entscheidungsträger gänzlich auf volatile subjektive Kriterien zurückgreifen. Dies 
erhöht die Anfälligkeit für kognitive Verzerrungen und fehlerhafte Urteile. Mit dem verbindlichen Einsatz 
von Indizes und Typologien in der strategischen Steuerung, wie er momentan beispielsweise bei der 
Erstellung von Länderstrategien praktiziert wird, können Entscheidungsprozesse verbessert werden. 
Zugleich ist für das Portfoliomanagement sowie für die Programmierung und die Implementierung 
entwicklungspolitischer Vorhaben ein tiefgehendes Verständnis der Gegebenheiten nötig. Insbesondere 
Konzepte, die eine Vielzahl von Indikatoren auf eine binäre Klassifizierung von Fragilität reduzieren, bergen 
die Gefahr übermäßiger Vereinfachung.  
Um der Gefahr übermäßiger Vereinfachung zu begegnen, bietet sich eine umfängliche Visualisierung 
der genutzten Konzeptionen an. Vor allem eine Darstellung der zugrunde liegenden Indikatoren und ihrer 
Gewichtung würde die Mehrebenenstruktur von Konzepten transparent machen, die Fülle der 
Informationen multidimensionaler Konzepte verdeutlichen und den Einfluss einzelner Indikatoren 
4
• der Anzahl der als fragil klassifizierten Länder,
• der Möglichkeit, unterschiedliche Typen von Fragilität zu differenzieren,
• der Präzision und Aktualität der Messung und
• der Anzahl und Jahre, für die Informationen zur Verfügung stehen.
Das BMZ hat die Krisenfrühwarnung Ende 2018 durch ein neues System namens Eskalationspotenzialmessung (ESKA) ersetzt.
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nachvollziehbar darstellen. Auch die transparente Darstellung von Unsicherheit hilft, übermäßiger 
Vereinfachung entgegenzuwirken. Oft ist die Zuweisung von Fällen zu Typen nicht eindeutig. So kann etwa 
ein Land durch das knappe Überschreiten eines Schwellenwertes im Gegensatz zum Vorjahr als „fragil“ 
eingestuft werden. Da die zugrunde liegenden Messungen immer mit Unsicherheit behaftet sind, kann ein 
solcher Kategorienwechsel allein durch Zufall begründet sein. Zudem vermitteln quantitative Indikatoren 
oft eine Exaktheit, die in der Realität nicht gegeben ist. Werden statt vermeintlich exakter konkreter Werte 
beispielsweise Verteilungen dargestellt, kann Fehlschlüssen entgegengewirkt werden. 
Über mögliche Verbesserungen in der Darstellung hinaus diskutiert diese Evaluierung auch drei 
mögliche Weiterentwicklungen, mit denen das Verständnis von Fragilität verbessert werden könnte. 
So kann eine Betrachtung der Ausbreitung von Fragilität über Ländergrenzen hinweg mögliche 
Ansteckungseffekte besser erfassen. Auch die räumliche Disaggregation der Fragilitätsmessung erlaubt ein 
besseres Verständnis des Phänomens, da insbesondere in Entwicklungsländern Fragilität innerhalb von 
Staaten variiert. In Kapitel 5 dieser Evaluierung wird eine Möglichkeit vorgestellt, die Durchsetzung des 
staatlichen Gewaltmonopols räumlich disaggregiert zu erfassen. Um den Nutzen von Indizes in der 
kontextsensitiven Programmierung von EZ zu vergrößern, erscheint es zudem sinnvoll, das Phänomen der 
Fragilität und seiner konstitutiven Attribute auf das politische Regime, die Administration und die 
Regierung eines Staates zu beziehen (Mazzuca, 2017). 
Aus diesen Schlussfolgerungen leiten wir folgende Empfehlung ab: 
Empfehlung 1 
Basierend auf einem systematischen Vergleich von vier Ansätzen der Fragilitätsdefinition und -messung 
empfiehlt diese Evaluierung dem BMZ, im Rahmen der strategischen Portfoliosteuerung weiterhin 
Fragilitätsindizes zu verwenden. Darüber hinaus sollte das BMZ die verwendete Definition und Messung 
von Fragilität auf der Basis klar definierter Kriterien weiterhin kontinuierlich evaluieren und ggf. 
verbessern. Dies sollte auch eine Einschätzung dazu beinhalten, inwiefern bestehende Ansätze 
miteinander kombiniert werden können. 
Im Zuge der aktuellen Überarbeitung der Ansätze zur Fragilitätsmessung sollte das BMZ intern eine 
umfassendere Darstellung der Indizes sicherstellen, um die zugrunde liegenden Konzeptualisierungen 
transparent zu machen und der Multidimensionalität des Phänomens gerecht zu werden. Dies kann durch 
eine visuelle Darstellung der verwendeten Indikatoren sowie ihrer Gewichtung erreicht werden. 
Unsicherheiten in der Klassifikation und der Messung sollten zudem im Zuge der Präsentation von 
Fragilitätswerten verdeutlicht werden. 
Mit Blick auf mögliche zukünftige Überarbeitungen sollte das BMZ die Messung von Fragilität stärker 
disaggregieren und kontextualisieren, um den Nutzen der Indizes für eine kontextsensitive Steuerung der 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit weiter zu steigern. Eine weitere Disaggregation kann dadurch erreicht 
werden, dass einerseits Werte öfter und für kleinere geographische Einheiten erfasst werden und 
andererseits die Fragilität unterschiedlicher Akteure in Partnerländern differenziert betrachtet wird. Eine 
Kontextualisierung kann erreicht werden, indem die mögliche Verbreitung von Fragilität über 
Ländergrenzen hinweg stärker in den Blick genommen wird. 
Strategien und Allokationen: Ergebnisse und Empfehlungen 
Um den Erfolg von EZ sicherzustellen, muss diese an fragile Kontexte angepasst werden. Folglich hat 
sich die vermehrte Beschäftigung entwicklungspolitischer Akteure mit staatlicher Fragilität in einer 
zunehmenden Zahl von Strategien niedergeschlagen, welche die kontextsensitive Implementierung von EZ 
zum Gegenstand haben.  
Diese Evaluierung untersucht, inwiefern sich Strategiepapiere in Zusagen für EZ niederschlagen. 
Strategien geben handlungsleitende Normen und Prinzipien für Verfahren vor, definieren Politikziele und 
Handlungsfelder, empfehlen angemessene Instrumente und machen Annahmen, die der EZ in fragilen 
Staaten zugrunde liegen, deutlich. Über die Beeinflussung von Politikinhalten und -prozessen hinaus 
signalisieren Strategiepapiere der Öffentlichkeit und den betreffenden Ländern die Präferenzen deutscher 
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Politik mit Blick auf Fragilität, den Aufbau und die Förderung staatlicher Strukturen sowie die 
Krisenprävention. Es ist jedoch unklar, ob strategische Politikempfehlungen Effekte auf die 
Entwicklungspolitik haben. So attestiert beispielsweise Furness (2014) der EU mit Blick auf die EZ eine Lücke 
zwischen den in Strategiepapieren ausgedrückten Politikpräferenzen und der Umsetzung vor Ort. Auch 
Praktiker in der EZ argumentieren nicht selten, dass die Volatilität und Komplexität fragiler Kontexte die 
Umsetzung strategischer Empfehlungen erschwert.  
Diese Evaluierung untersucht den Zusammenhang zwischen Allokationsmustern und Strategien in 
drei Schritten. Zunächst arbeitet sie die Kontinuität und den Wandel strategischer Empfehlungen heraus. 
In einem zweiten Schritt werden aus den Strategien überprüfbare Implikationen abgeleitet. Abschließend 
werden diese Implikationen anhand von Entwicklungszusagen empirisch überprüft.  
Die Analyse hat bedeutende strategische Änderungen in Zusammenhang mit zwei einschneidenden 
Situationen (critical junctures) herausgearbeitet: den Anschlägen durch Al-Qaida im Jahr 2001 und 
dem „Arabischen Frühling“ im Jahr 2012. Insbesondere im Zuge dieser Ereignisse ist ein Diskurs darüber 
entstanden, wie EZ an die Herausforderungen in fragilen Kontexten angepasst werden kann. Der 
ressortübergreifende Aktionsplan 2004 „Zivile Krisenprävention, Konfliktlösung und 
Friedenskonsolidierung“ mit seinen 161 Empfehlungen kann als erste gemeinsame Strategie Deutschlands 
für fragile Staaten angesehen werden. Das BMZ hat auf den Aktionsplan mit Umsetzungsstrategien reagiert: 
dem „Übersektoralen Konzept zur Krisenprävention, Konfliktbearbeitung und Friedensförderung in der 
deutschen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit“ (2005), dem Konzept „Entwicklungsorientierte Transformation 
bei fragiler Staatlichkeit und schlechter Regierungsführung“ (2007) und dem Strategiepapier „Die 
Förderung konstruktiver Staat-Gesellschaft-Beziehungen – Legitimität, Transparenz, Rechenschaft“ (2010). 
Im Jahr 2012 veröffentlichte die Bundesregierung die ressortübergreifenden Leitlinien „Für eine kohärente 
Politik der Bundesregierung gegenüber fragilen Staaten“. Die Veröffentlichung fiel in einen Zeitraum, in 
dem die Bemühungen um den Aufbau liberaler Staaten in Afghanistan, dem Irak und der Demokratischen 
Republik Kongo ernüchternde Ergebnisse zeigten. Darüber hinaus dienten der Bundesregierung die im “New 
Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” vereinbarten fünf Ziele zur Friedenskonsolidierung und 
Staatsbildung (PSG5) als Referenz.5 Die Leitlinien hat das BMZ in seinen Strategiepapieren „Entwicklung für 
Frieden und Sicherheit“ (2013) und „Strategie der  entwicklungsfördernden und strukturbildenden 
Übergangshilfe (ESÜH)“ operationalisiert. Schließlich veröffentlichte die Bundesregierung 2017 die 
Leitlinien „Krisen verhindern, Konflikte bewältigen, Frieden fördern“. Diese werden derzeit im BMZ 
operationalisiert, wobei die Agenda 2030 für nachhaltige Entwicklung den Rahmen setzt. 
Die vorliegende Evaluierung hat zwei Ansätze in der deutschen EZ mit fragilen Staaten identifiziert: 
die Friedensförderung und den Aufbau staatlicher Institutionen. Beide Ansätze haben – trotz 
zahlreicher Neuerungen und jüngerer Bestrebungen nach einer engeren Verzahnung – ein gewisses Maß an 
Spezialisierung beibehalten und verfolgen unterschiedliche, jedoch komplementäre Ziele. Einerseits geht 
Friedensförderung über die Bildung starker und inklusiver Institutionen hinaus und umfasst beispielsweise 
die Entwaffnung, Demobilisierung und Wiedereingliederung von Kämpferinnen und Kämpfern. Andererseits 
beeinflussen staatliche Institutionen die ökologische, ökonomische und soziale Entwicklung und gehen 
somit über Friedensförderung hinaus. Zugleich stehen Friedensförderung und Institutionenaufbau 
komplementär zueinander. Institutionen prägen als Teil der strukturellen Rahmenbedingungen die 
Anreizstruktur für soziale, ökonomische und politische Akteure. Damit beeinflussen sie deren Entscheidung, 
im Sinne der institutionalisierten Regeln oder gewaltsam zu handeln. Die Gestaltung staatlicher 
Institutionen ist somit ein zentrales Element der Friedensförderung. Andererseits kann ein durch politische 
Konflikte hervorgerufener institutioneller Wandel die Einschätzungen der Regierungsführung und der 
Entwicklungsorientierung schnell obsolet werden lassen. 
5 Der New Deal wurde im Jahr 2011 von 44 Staaten und internationalen Organisationen im Rahmen des „4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness“ 
in Busan unterzeichnet. Er fordert legitime Politik, die Herstellung individueller Sicherheit, Gerechtigkeit, die Verbesserung wirtschaftlicher 
Grundlagen und die Verwaltung staatlicher Einnahmen sowie den Kapazitätsaufbau für die Erbringung von Dienstleistungen.  
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Die institutionelle Spezialisierung im BMZ erscheint auch vor dem Hintergrund einer guten 
Implementierung von Strategien angemessen. Zugleich zeigt die wissenschaftlich nachgewiesene 
wechselseitige Beeinflussung von Institutionen und politischen Konflikten, dass Friedensförderung und 
Institutionenbildung immer zusammen zu berücksichtigen sind. Eine enge Kooperation der zuständigen 
Organisationseinheiten kann die Komplementarität beider Ansätze sicherstellen. Die gemeinsame 
Betrachtung der Entwicklungsorientierung, des Governance-Niveaus und des Krisenpräventionsbedarfs ist 
ein Schritt in diese Richtung. Die momentane Überarbeitung der Krisenfrühwarnung sowie der Messung des 
Governance-Niveaus stellt eine Möglichkeit dar, die Kooperation weiter zu vertiefen, ein einheitliches 
Verständnis von Fragilität zu entwickeln und eventuelle Redundanzen durch die Kombination von Ansätzen 
zu beseitigen (siehe Empfehlung 1). Dies ermöglicht einerseits, die Zielsetzung beider Ansätze genau 
voneinander abzugrenzen; andererseits kann eine gemeinsame Datenerhebung zu möglicherweise geteilten 
Indikatoren die Effizienz und Qualität der Einschätzungen erhöhen. 
Zusammenfassend leiten wir somit die folgende Empfehlung ab: 
Empfehlung 2 
Auf Basis eines systematischen Konzeptvergleichs, einer Analyse von Strategiedokumenten und 
Interviews sowie einer Betrachtung der Strukturen und Prozesse der deutschen bilateralen 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit empfiehlt diese Evaluierung dem BMZ, die Spezialisierung auf die Themen 
Frieden und Sicherheit einerseits und auf Governance andererseits beizubehalten. Zugleich sollte das 
BMZ die Koordination und Komplementarität der mit diesen Themen befassten Organisationseinheiten 
sicherstellen. Dabei sollten die in den betrauten Organisationseinheiten verwendeten Definitionen und 
Indikatoren miteinander verglichen werden, um Doppelungen und Redundanzen zu vermeiden. Für den 
Fall, dass sich Definitionen und Indikatoren überschneiden, sollte ein formaler Mechanismus entwickelt 
werden, der die gemeinsame Nutzung von Indikatoren und eine gemeinsame Datenerhebung sicherstellt. 
Die Analyse bilateraler Zusagen hat ergeben, dass die Mittelallokation weitgehend den Strategien 
folgt. Bilaterale Zusagen für die Konflikttransformation und Friedensförderung an Länder mit deutscher 
Militärpräsenz sowie an Länder in der Übergangsphase nach einem Konflikt haben nach 2005 zugenommen. 
Im Hinblick auf die Strategien von 2007 und 2009 lässt sich ein Anstieg der Mittel für die Erbringung von 
Basisdienstleistungen in Ländern mit geringem Governance-Niveau und einer sich verschlechternden 
Entwicklungsorientierung nachweisen. Zudem steigt die Unterstützung öffentlicher Institutionen in 
Ländern mit schwach entwickelter Governance und einer sich verbessernden Entwicklungsorientierung 
sowie von Lokalregierungen in Ländern mit geringem Governance-Niveau und konstanter 
Entwicklungsorientierung. Nach der Verabschiedung der Strategie 2013 stiegen die Verpflichtungen an 
Nicht-Partnerländer in Konflikt- oder Übergangssituationen. Auch bei Programmen zur Konfliktprävention 
in fragilen Staaten nahmen die Verpflichtungen zu. Darüber hinaus wurde der Ausstieg aus der Budgethilfe 
auch in fragilen Staaten umgesetzt. 
Auch wenn Allokationsmuster größtenteils den getesteten Politikempfehlungen folgen, wurden 
einige Strategien weniger gut implementiert. So findet sich keine Evidenz für eine Zunahme der 
Hilfszusagen für Korbfinanzierungen. Dieses Instrument verspricht eine bessere Koordination und 
Harmonisierung der Geberaktivitäten sowie eine größere Eigenverantwortung bei zugleich geringerem 
Administrationsaufwand der Empfängerländer. Für einen Rückgang der Unterstützung nichtstaatlicher 
Akteure – entgegen strategischer Empfehlungen – gab es eine geringe Evidenz. Dies berührt die Frage, 
inwiefern staatliche oder nichtstaatliche Akteure geeignete Partner für die EZ in fragilen Kontexten sind. 
Die vergleichsweise geringen Zusagen an nicht-staatliche Akteure in fragilen Kontexten haben vermutlich 
negative Auswirkungen auf die effiziente Nutzung der verausgabten Mittel und beeinflussen das politische 
Regime des betroffenen Landes.   
Zusammenfassend lässt sich festhalten, dass eine der zentralen Herausforderungen der strategischen 
Ausrichtung deutscher EZ darin liegt, geeignete lokale Partner – darunter Regierungen und 
nichtstaatliche Akteure – für eine erfolgreiche EZ in fragilen Kontexten zu identifizieren. Die 
Strategien des BMZ bilden bereits eine geeignete Grundlage kontextsensitiver EZ, da sie 
Politikempfehlungen in Abhängigkeit der Fragilität, der Regierungsführung und der 
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Entwicklungsorientierung von Partnerländern formulieren. Die Implementierung in Form einer Anpassung 
der Allokationen hinkt diesen Empfehlungen in wenigen Fällen jedoch hinterher.   
Zusammenfassend leiten wir somit die folgende Empfehlung ab: 
Empfehlung 3 
Auf Basis einer Analyse von Strategiedokumenten und Allokationszusagen sowie einer 
Literaturrecherche, empfiehlt die Evaluierung dem BMZ die Implementierung der Strategien 
insbesondere bezüglich der Unterstützung nichtstaatlicher Akteure in fragilen Kontexten sicherzustellen. 
Auch sollte ein konkreter Maßnahmenplan erstellt werden, um bestehende handlungsleitende Prinzipien 
für den Umgang mit nichtstaatlichen Akteuren in fragilen Kontexten zu prüfen und auf Basis vorliegender 
Erkenntnisse ggf. anzupassen. 
Darüber hinaus sollte das BMZ seine gute Praxis fortführen, Strategien kontinuierlich an das zunehmende 
Wissen zu erfolgreicher Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in fragilen Kontexten anzupassen. Die bestehende 
Praxis, strategische Empfehlungen auf Kontextbedingungen zuzuschneiden, ist geeignet, der 
zunehmenden analytischen Präzision wissenschaftlicher Untersuchungen und der Tatsache, dass die 
Gültigkeit wissenschaftlicher Erklärungen je nach geltenden Hintergrundbedingungen variiert, gerecht zu 
werden. 
Evaluierung in fragilen Kontexten: Ergebnisse und Empfehlungen 
Die Evaluierung von Entwicklungsmaßnahmen soll dazu beitragen, die Auswirkungen der EZ besser zu 
verstehen, um daraus Schlussfolgerungen für die Gestaltung künftiger Vorhaben zu ziehen. 
Evaluierungsberichte stellen somit eine wesentliche Grundlage für das Verständnis geeigneter 
entwicklungspolitischer Ansätze dar. Fragile Kontexte können Evaluierungen erschweren, beispielsweise 
aufgrund von Sicherheitsbedenken, schlechter Infrastruktur oder eines geringen Vertrauens in der 
Bevölkerung. Ein entsprechender negativer Einfluss von Fragilität auf die Evaluierungsqualität würde auch 
ein besseres Verständnis der Wirksamkeit von EZ erschweren. 
Eine quantitative Analyse hat keine direkte Korrelation zwischen Fragilität und Evaluierungsqualität 
ergeben; allerdings wurde ein indirekter Zusammenhang deutlich. So hat sich gezeigt, dass es den 
Evaluierenden generell auch unter schwierigen Umständen gelingt, die Evaluierungsqualität – gemessen 
anhand der von Noltze et al. (2018b) entwickelten Qualitätskriterien – auf üblichem Niveau zu halten. 
Andererseits zeigte eine detailliertere Analyse, dass sich eine geringe staatliche Kapazität von 
Partnerländern negativ auf die Mobilität der Evaluatoren auswirkt. Somit  hängt die Fragilität indirekt mit 
einer geringeren Evaluierungsqualität zusammen. 
Im Rahmen der qualitativen Analyse identifizierten Expertinnen und Experten als Herausforderungen 
insbesondere eine eingeschränkte Mobilität sowie schwache Monitoring- und Entwicklungs(M&E)-
Systeme auf Ebene der Vorhaben. Als zentrale Ursachen fehlender Mobilität wurden 
Reisebeschränkungen und eine schlechte Infrastruktur genannt. Zur Erklärung schwacher M&E-Systeme auf 
Projektebene wurden mehrere mögliche Ursachen angegeben, darunter begrenzte Budgets und die 
eingeschränkte Verfügbarkeit und Kompetenz des Personals. Beides kann dazu führen, dass Indikatoren und 
Projektdaten nicht oder nur eingeschränkt verwertet werden können.  
In der Gesamtbetrachtung erweisen sich die Mobilität von Evaluatoren sowie die Qualität der M&E-
Systeme auf Ebene der Vorhaben als zentrale Ansatzpunkte, um die Evaluierungsqualität in fragilen 
Kontexten weiter zu verbessern. Es erscheint somit geboten, bestehende Monitoring-Systeme kritisch zu 
beleuchten, um Verbesserungspotenzial bei Datenqualität und -verfügbarkeit zu identifizieren. Denkbare 
Verbesserungen auf Modul- und Programmebene umfassen die Bereitstellung hinreichender Mittel für die 
Durchführung von M&E, die Formulierung konkreter M&E-bezogener Zielsetzungen für das 
Führungspersonal sowie Sensibilisierungstrainings insbesondere für das Führungspersonal. Ferner kann die 
Evaluierungskapazität lokaler Partner gestärkt werden, indem etwa ein Pool lokaler Expertinnen und 
Experten in den Partnerländern aufgebaut wird. 
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Weitere mögliche Ansätze zur Stärkung der M&E-Kapazität betreffen die Budgetierung und die 
Projektplanung. So könnte einer Konkurrenz um Ressourcen durch eine getrennte Budgetierung von 
Implementierung und M&E vorgebeugt werden. Die GIZ hat beispielsweise ein eigenes Budget für die 
Finanzierung von Evaluierungen. Projektevaluierungen werden seit der jüngsten Reform des 
Evaluierungssystems zentralisiert durch die Evaluierungsabteilung der GIZ in Auftrag gegeben. Beim 
Projektmonitoring hingegen verlangen Modulvorschläge für die technische Zusammenarbeit bisher keine 
getrennte Budgetierung. Eine separate Aufstellung der Kosten könnte jedoch die Steuerungskapazität des 
BMZ bezüglich der zu erwartenden Qualität von M&E stärken.   
Den Herausforderungen eingeschränkter Mobilität kann durch eine Stärkung der Kapazitäten in der 
Durchführung von Remote Monitoring and Evaluation begegnet werden. Geeignete Ansätze umfassen 
die Fernerkundung, die digitale Datenerfassung durch tragbare Geräte und remote surveys. Die Nutzung 
der in diesem Zusammenhang gesammelten Daten in Entscheidungsprozessen erfordert ferner eine 
Stärkung der Kapazität in der Datenverarbeitung. 
Zusammenfassend leiten wir somit die folgende Empfehlung ab: 
Empfehlung 4 
Auf der Grundlage qualitativer Interviews, einer Auswertung von Beobachtungsdaten aus einer 
Evaluierungssynthese und einer Literaturrecherche empfiehlt die Evaluierung dem BMZ, der GIZ und der 
KfW, insbesondere Mobilitätsbeschränkungen von Evaluierenden in fragilen Kontexten anzugehen. 
Zudem sollten die M&E-Systeme auf Ebene der Vorhaben verbessert werden. 
Das BMZ sollte von der GIZ und der KfW eine noch stärker gesonderte Budgetierung für die (a) 
Implementierung und (b) das Monitoring und die Evaluierung verlangen. So kann einer Konkurrenz um die 
Finanzierung vorgebeugt werden.  Auch sollten GIZ und KfW vermehrt innovative Methoden der 
Datenerhebung nutzen, um den Herausforderungen zu begegnen, die sich in fragilen Kontexten durch 
Mobilitätsbeschränkungen ergeben. Dies betrifft etwa die Stärkung der Kapazitäten in der Durchführung 
von Remote Monitoring and Evaluation, beispielsweise durch Fernerkundung, remote surveys und digitale 
Methoden der Datenerhebung. 
Diese Evaluierung hat den Zusammenhang zwischen Fragilität und dem Erfolg entwicklungspolitscher 
Vorhaben untersucht. Hierfür wurden die Ergebnisse von 471 digitalisierten Evaluierungsberichten 
von GIZ und KfW zu Vorhaben in 85 Ländern, die zwischen 2006 und 2016 durchgeführt wurden, 
synthetisiert. Als relativ umfassendes Phänomen betrifft Fragilität viele der in der Literatur diskutierten 
möglichen Erfolgsfaktoren entwicklungspolitischer Vorhaben. Ein Einfluss des Phänomens auf den Erfolg 
entwicklungspolitischer Vorhaben ist daher wahrscheinlich. 
Zwei innovative Merkmale der Untersuchung ermöglichen ein verbessertes Verständnis von 
Fragilität. Zum einen greift die Evaluierung auf ein multidimensionales, aber zugleich staatsbezogenes 
Verständnis von Fragilität zurück, um die Autorität, Kapazität und Legitimität von Partnerländern zu 
unterscheiden. Zum anderen wurde im Rahmen der Evaluierung ein geographisch disaggregiertes 
Fragilitätsmaß entwickelt, das auf Konfliktereignissen in der Nähe von Vorhaben beruht. Da  das Ausmaß 
von Fragilität insbesondere in Entwicklungsländern innerhalb von Staaten variiert, ist die alleinige Messung 
auf Ebene des Staates unzureichend. Im Rahmen der Evaluierung wurden daher Ortsangaben durch 
Verfahren der linguistischen Datenverarbeitung aus vorliegenden Evaluierungsberichten extrahiert, 
qualitätsgeprüft und automatisiert mit Koordinaten versehen. Die hierdurch ermöglichte Erfassung lokaler 
Einschränkungen in der Durchsetzung des staatlichen Gewaltmonopols vermittelt ein realistischeres Bild 
des Kontextes, in dem entwicklungspolitische Vorhaben implementiert werden.  
Die Synthese liefert auf den ersten Blick keine Hinweise dafür, dass die Fragilität des Kontextes mit 
dem Erfolg entwicklungspolitischer Vorhaben – gemessen anhand der Bewertungen aus 
Evaluierungsberichten – korreliert. Dies gilt sowohl für eine Betrachtung unterschiedlicher Typen von 
Fragilität als auch für das neu entwickelte Messinstrument der subnationalen staatlichen Autorität. Der 
Grund für diesen überraschenden Befund ist unklar. Es könnte sein, dass Vorhaben gut an fragile Kontexte 
angepasst werden. Darauf deutet die Tatsache hin, dass sich strategische Empfehlungen in Allokationen 
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niederschlagen – wie in dieser Evaluierung ermittelt. Weiterhin könnten Ziele von Vorhaben in fragilen 
Kontexten weniger ambitioniert formuliert und daher leichter zu erreichen sein. Allerdings haben Vorhaben 
in fragilen Kontexten teilweise eine duale Zielsetzung, da sie zugleich auf Stabilisierung zielen. Eine weitere 
mögliche Erklärung lautet, dass ein möglicher negativer Einfluss des fragilen Kontextes auf den 
Projekterfolg durch einen höheren Nutzen von Vorhaben bei niedrigem Ausgangsniveau ausgeglichen wird. 
Ferner könnten Evaluierende die Fragilität des Kontextes bei ihrer Bewertung berücksichtigen, was 
allerdings die Vergleichbarkeit der Berichte einschränken und Ergebnisse verfälschen würde. 
Bei genauerer Betrachtung der einzelnen Dimensionen von Fragilität zeigt sich, dass Projekte in 
Staaten mit höherer staatlicher Kapazität durchschnittlich erfolgreicher sind. Insbesondere das 
Ausmaß, in dem Vorhaben ihre Ziele erreichen und dabei nachhaltig positive Veränderungen erwirken, 
korreliert mit der Kapazität der Länder, in denen die Vorhaben implementiert werden. Im Gegensatz dazu 
scheinen die Effizienz und die Relevanz von Projekten nicht mit der staatlichen Kapazität zu korrelieren. 
Diese Ergebnisse stützen die Erkenntnisse einer früheren Evaluierung durch Noltze et al. (2018a). Diese 
hatte die Kapazität von Partnerländern als besonders bedeutend für die Bewertung der Nachhaltigkeit von 
Vorhaben identifiziert.  
Die Korrelation zwischen staatlicher Kapazität und Projekterfolg ist im Gesundheitssektor besonders 
ausgeprägt. Dies steht im Einklang mit dem Befund, dass Interventionen, die eine Verbesserung der 
Gesundheit zum Ziel haben, effiziente und unabhängige Bürokratien sowie eine effiziente Infrastruktur zur 
Dienstleistungserbringung im gesamten Staatsgebiet voraussetzen (Brieba, 2018). Dabei muss jedoch 
berücksichtigt werden, dass Kennzahlen der Gesundheitsversorgung zugleich einen Teilindikator staatlicher 
Kapazität darstellen. 
Die Beziehung zwischen Fragilität und Projekterfolg erweist sich somit als kontext-, sektor- und 
ergebnisspezifisch. Die Anpassung entwicklungspolitischer Vorhaben an fragile Kontexte erfordert ein 
tieferes Verständnis der Mechanismen, die unterschiedliche Arten des Projekterfolgs in unterschiedlichen 
Sektoren und Kontexten erklären. Auch wenn es weiterer Forschung und einer besseren Datenlage bedarf, 
erscheint die Stärkung staatlicher Kapazität als wesentlich, um den Erfolg entwicklungspolitischer Vorhaben 
sicherzustellen. Es erscheint daher sinnvoll, im Rahmen der strategischen Planung und Steuerung die gute 
Praxis einer detaillierten Einschätzung staatlicher Kapazität durch das BMZ und die DO beizubehalten und  
ggf. auszubauen. Die Differenzierung von Fragilitätsprofilen und ein detailliertes Peace and Conflict 
Assessment sind wichtige Schritte in diese Richtung. Die kapazitätsbezogene Risikoeinschätzung könnte 
ebenfalls auf die Ergebnisse des Nachfolgers des Governance-Kriterienkatalogs sowie auf Monitoring- und 
Evaluierungsberichte ähnlicher Vorhaben in ähnlichen Kontexten zurückgreifen. Durch die Aufschlüsselung 
der Daten zu staatlicher Kapazität nach unterschiedlichen Akteuren sowie bezüglich der räumlichen 
Verteilung innerhalb von Staaten kann die Präzision der getroffenen Einschätzungen weiter erhöht werden 
(siehe auch Empfehlung 1).  
Eine höhere Standardisierung von Evaluierungsberichten kann für eine bessere Vergleichbarkeit 
sorgen. Aus Evaluierungsperspektive ist neben der Validität insbesondere die Vergleichbarkeit von 
Indikatoren zwischen Vorhaben von Bedeutung. Laufende Anstrengungen des BMZ, der GIZ und der KfW 
im Rahmen der AG Evaluierung zielen auf eine höhere Standardisierung ab. Diese kann für eine bessere 
Belastbarkeit von Analysen auf Basis von Beobachtungsdaten über unterschiedliche Kontexte hinweg 
sorgen. 
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Zusammenfassend leiten wir somit folgende Empfehlung ab: 
Empfehlung 5 
Auf Grundlage einer Auswertung von Beobachtungsdaten aus einer Evaluierungssynthese, einer 
Durchsicht der Fachliteratur und von Evaluierungen sowie einer Betrachtung der Strukturen und Prozesse 
der deutschen bilateralen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit empfiehlt diese Evaluierung dem BMZ, die durch 
schwache staatliche Kapazität von Partnerländern bedingten Risiken für den Erfolg 
entwicklungspolitischer Vorhaben noch stärker als bisher in Entscheidungsprozessen zu berücksichtigen. 
Hierfür sollte unter anderem eine detaillierte Analyse der Implementationsrisiken in Partnerländern mit 
niedriger staatlicher Kapazität im Rahmen der Modulvorschläge durchgeführt werden. 
Darüber hinaus weist die Analyse auf den Mehrwert einer Qualitätssteigerung und Standardisierung von 
Monitoring und Evaluierung hin. 2017 wurde unter Federführung des BMZ die „Arbeitsgruppe 
Evaluierung“ ins Leben gerufen. Die daran beteiligten Parteien BMZ, GIZ und KfW sollten den Austausch 
nutzen, um eine bessere Vergleichbarkeit von Evaluierungen herzustellen. Dadurch kann die Validität von 
Evaluierungssynthesen verbessert und somit gemeinsames Lernen erleichtert werden. 
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Peace- and statebuilding and conflict prevention are widely acknowledged goals of development 
cooperation. In the light of the challenges posed by fragility, in 2011 over 40 states and organizations signed 
the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. This acknowledges stable political, judicial, and economic 
institutions as foundations for development, calls for whole-of-government approaches and nationally 
owned policies towards clearly defined goals, and commits members to effective and aligned use of 
development cooperation (see Hearn, 2016). The g7+, a voluntary association of self-declared fragile states, 
the OECD’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility, and the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding 
and Statebuilding together advance the implementation of the New Deal. The 2016 Stockholm Declaration 
recommitted members to the New Deal principles (OECD, 2016).  
State fragility puts at risk the efforts of development cooperation in achieving the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) (UN, 2015). The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development reflects the challenge of 
development cooperation in fragile contexts: SDG 16 sets out the vision to “[p]romote peaceful and inclusive 
societies […], provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions” (UN, 
2015, p.14).  
Spending patterns of development cooperation underline the importance of state fragility. Between 2011 
and 2014, 64% of worldwide official development assistance (ODA) excluding debt relief went to contexts 
considered fragile, according to the OECD (2016, p.111). Figure 2 shows the top 20 cooperation recipients in 
terms of ODA per capita in constant 2014 USD and their level of fragility according to the OECD. Only six 
recipients are considered non-fragile states.  
Figure 2 ODA excluding debt relief by level of fragility according to OECD States of Fragility 
German development cooperation is no exception. According to the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ) (2013a), more than half the countries in which German development 
cooperation is active are affected by conflict, fragility, and violence. In 2015, Germany spent some 4.2 billion 
euro of ODA in fragile states (BMZ, 2017a, p.109). Consequently, a key policy question is how development 
cooperation can operate successfully in fragile contexts. 
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The high prevalence of fragility, the extent of its impact, and the large amounts of money spent by Germany 
and other national and international donors in fragile contexts make evaluations necessary to provide a 
sound foundation for future decision-making. While the New Deal provides evidence that the international 
community is clear about the broader aims and core strategies, there is no comparative assessment of 
development cooperation in fragile contexts.  
This evaluation contributes to a better understanding of German development cooperation in fragile 
contexts. It does so by reviewing the concepts and strategies underlying the German approach to fragile 
partner countries (portfolio analysis) and by examining the impact of fragility on project success and project 
evaluation (evaluation synthesis). 
1.1 Evaluation questions 
This evaluation consists of two complementary studies: 
• A portfolio analysis examines the approach of the BMZ to dealing with fragile contexts. It combines a 
comparative assessment of the German approach to defining and measuring state fragility, an 
analysis of continuity and change in German strategy towards fragile states, and a description of 
allocation patterns towards fragile states. 
• An evaluation synthesis systematically integrates evaluation reports by the GIZ and the KfW to 
identify the influence of fragility on the evaluation and success of development cooperation 
interventions. It draws on evaluation reports from 2006 to 2016. A first step examines the influence 
of fragility on the quality of evaluation reports; a second investigates the success of German 
bilateral development cooperation interventions according to the fragility of the contexts. 
The two parts of the evaluation address four questions. 
Portfolio analysis 
1. Which concepts of state fragility are suitable for the management of German development
cooperation?
2. What are the continuities of German strategy towards fragile contexts and where were major
changes seen? To what extent do allocation patterns reflect strategic recommendations?
Evaluation synthesis 
3. How do fragile contexts affect the quality of evaluation?
4. How do project ratings differ according to the fragility of contexts?
1.2 Methods
The portfolio review draws on academic literature, official documents, publicly available data, and interviews 
to analyse concepts, strategies, and allocation patterns. The evaluation synthesis combines 
multidimensional data on state fragility, geographically disaggregated data on state authority, and 
qualitative data to assess the quality of evaluations and project ratings from evaluation reports. Table 1 gives 
a summary of the methods applied. 
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Table 1 Methods by evaluation question 
Aspect of analysis Method of analysis Data 
Concept of state fragility Literature review, comparative 
conceptual analysis 
Academic literature, 
publications and directives of 
aid agencies, interviews 
Strategies and allocation 
structure 
Qualitative analysis of critical 
junctures, quantitative 
description of allocation 
Academic literature, 
publications and directives of 
aid agencies, interviews, OECD 
DAC CRS 
Quality of evaluation reports Literature review, statistical 
analysis, interviews 
Publicly available secondary 
data, sample of KfW and GIZ 
evaluation reports 
Success of development 
cooperation interventions 
Literature review, statistical 
analysis, text mining 
Publicly available secondary 
data, sample of KfW and GIZ 
evaluation reports 
Development cooperation interventions are often confined to specific regions at subnational level. 
Consequently, valid measurement of fragility and success should focus on subnational dynamics. Data on 
German development cooperation, however, is mostly confined to the national level. Although satellite 
imagery and the increased availability of geographically disaggregated data have recently improved data 
quality, there remains a substantial gap with regard to precise data.  
This is even more true in respect of the present evaluation, since data collection in fragile contexts is more 
complicated than in non-fragile ones. In particular, rigorous impact evaluations are rare (for an exception, 
see Blattman et al., 2014).  
To tackle issues of data quality and availability, we use text mining to derive precise data evaluation reports 
provided by the GIZ and the KfW and link them to publicly available geographically disaggregated data on 
fragility and other contextual factors of interest. 
As this is an evaluation synthesis, the OECD DAC evaluation criteria were only of limited applicability: while 
the question of relevance was crucial for the chapters on concepts (2) and strategies (3), we looked at 
effectiveness in the chapters on evaluation quality (4) and project success (5). Analysing in detail efficiency, 
sustainability, and impact was neither intended nor feasible within the framework of this study. 
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2. DEFINING AND
MEASURING FRAGILITY
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2.1 Introduction 
The concept of state fragility is high on the international development agenda. At the same time, its 
meaning is disputed among policymakers, think-tanks, and academics (Bueger and Bethke, 2014; Faust et 
al., 2013). There is no international agreement on which definition should be used (BMZ, no date), which is 
the source of some confusion among international actors (Putzel and Di John, 2012).  
It thus comes as no surprise that we can also find different understandings of fragility within the BMZ. On 
the one hand, the BMZ follows a narrow understanding of fragility as including those states that have a high 
or acute potential for the violent escalation of conflict (BMZ, no date). Countries at risk of violent escalation 
are derived from the Crisis Early Warning (CEW). On the other hand, the BMZ puts forward a wider definition 
of fragility, including deficiencies in core attributes of statehood but also low levels of governance and 
development orientation, as well as political conflict (ibid.). Since 2016, indicators in the Catalogue of 
Criteria for Assessing Development Orientation (CoC) have been rearranged to measure fragility based on 
a state’s capacity, legitimacy, and authority.  
To be of use, concepts and derived typologies should adequately describe, structure, and classify real-world 
cases. However, even semantically similar concepts can vary fundamentally in their design. For instance, the 
measurement of fragility within the CoC and the Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik’s (DIE) 
Constellations of State Fragility (CSF) builds on the same definition of fragility, based on the attributes of 
authority, capacity, and legitimacy. At the same time, the concept designs differ fundamentally in respect 
of the indicators and the way indicator values are aggregated to the overall measure of fragility.  
Different concept designs, however, convey a different understanding of real-world phenomena and can 
thus lead to different lists of fragile states. Table 2 exemplifies the consequences of selecting a certain 
definition of fragility by comparing classifications by the CSF project and the OECD’s States of Fragility 
(SFR) for the year 2015.6 As the table illustrates, the classification of states differs between concepts. 
Concepts of state fragility are widely used in policy-making processes (BMZ, 2017a). It is thus reasonable to 
assume that the choice of concepts in decision-making processes influences development policies. 
Policymakers and practitioners should thus be aware of concept designs. 
Concepts of state fragility are under continuous development. In 2016, the OECD introduced a new 
methodology to measure state fragility (OECD, 2016). In 2018, the DIE presented the data for a new concept 
of state fragility (Grävingholt et al., 2018). Moreover, the BMZ updated its concepts for Crisis Early Warning 
at the end of 2018 through the Escalation Potential Analysis (ESKA), which focuses on consideration of the 
security aspect of fragility. The BMZ also plans to update its concepts for assessing the level of governance 
and development orientation. 
This chapter compares four concepts of state fragility. We show that a lack of agreement on definitions has 
very real empirical consequences. By comparing concepts and demonstrating their empirical implications, 
this chapter helps policymakers to choose suitable definitions and data. 
6 Data from Crisis Early Warning and the CoC had to be excluded because they are confidential. 
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Table 2 Fragility classification for different concepts 
CSF SFR CSF SFR 
Afghanistan Madagascar 
Albania Malawi 
Algeria Mali 
Armenia Mauritania 
Azerbaijan Mexico 
Bangladesh Moldova 
Belarus Mongolia 
Benin Montenegro 
Bolivia Morocco 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Mozambique 
Brazil Myanmar 
Burkina Faso Namibia 
Burundi Nepal 
Cambodia Nicaragua 
Cameroon Niger 
Central African Republic Nigeria 
Colombia Pakistan 
Congo, DR Palestinian Territories 
Costa Rica Paraguay 
Cote dIvoire  Peru 
Cuba Philippines 
Dominican Republic Rwanda 
Ecuador Senegal 
Egypt Serbia 
El Salvador Sierra Leone 
Ethiopia Somalia 
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Georgia South Africa 
Ghana South Sudan 
Guatemala Sri Lanka 
Guinea Sudan 
Haiti Syria 
Honduras Tajikistan 
India Tanzania 
Indonesia Timor Leste 
Jordan Togo 
Kazakhstan Tunisia 
Kenya Turkmenistan 
Kosovo Uganda 
Kyrgyz Republic Ukraine 
Laos Uzbekistan 
Lebanon Vietnam 
Liberia Yemen 
Macedonia Zambia 
Dysfunctional (CSF) and Extreme Fragility (SFR) 
low-legitimacy, low-capacity or low-authority (CSF) and Fragile (SFR) 
semi-functional or well-functioning (CSF) and Rest of the World (SFR) 
missing data 
Source: own table based on CSF and SFR data for 2015.  
(white)
CSF SFR CSF SFR 
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2.2 Statehood and fragility 
Given its wide use, great empirical extension, and considerable variability of forms, a straightforward 
definition of the concept of fragility is elusive. The following aims to clarify the concept of fragility by 
relating it to other concepts. We first introduce our concept of fragility before proceeding to a comparison 
with other concepts.  
Fragility and the continuum between state collapse and consolidated statehood 
A dominant approach is to relate fragility to statehood. One can think of fragility as lying on the spectrum 
between state collapse and consolidated statehood (see Lambach et al., 2015). The continuum systematically 
maps and structures a conceptual space with ideal types at the positive and negative ends of the continuum 
(Goertz, 2006).7 
Ideal types are not well suited to inform policy-making. Clearly, a policy that uses an ideal type as a measure 
of success is doomed to fail. For example, German engagement in Afghanistan has clearly illustrated the 
limits of an intervention that set out to “fix a failed state” (Rotmann et al., 2014). Transferring this idea to 
the domain of concepts, Eriksen (2011, p.235) argues that “[i]nstead of using the extreme case as the 
standard, we need concepts which are closer to empirical reality”.  
However, it is not advisable to get rid of ideal types in developing a useful concept of statehood and fragility. 
On the contrary, from a conceptual point of view it makes sense to construct ideal types as extreme cases 
that rarely or even never reflect empirical cases (Goertz, 2006). Ideal types merely form the ends of a 
continuum. Put simply, we should use not the ends but the continuum as a yardstick to set realistic 
expectations of policies. 
Core attributes of statehood 
As a point of departure for defining statehood we draw on Weber’s definition of “state” as a “human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory” (Weber, 1946, p.78, emphasis original). The Weberian concept of state remains the most influential 
definition and many current disparate strands of the literature draw on it (Hay and Lister, 2006). The 
definition stands out in that it recurs to the means rather than the ends of the state (Weber, 1978). Although 
Weber acknowledges that states do have aims, he does not include in his definition a justification for why 
individuals should consent to the authority of the state or a certain purpose of the state. Rather than putting 
forward a moral or contractualist argument, Weber provides a description of the state free of normative 
implications. This makes his approach particularly useful in the empirical-analytical tradition. 
Broadly following Weber and the recent discussion on the conceptualization of state fragility, statehood can 
be defined via the monopoly of the legitimate use of force, legitimacy, and rule-making powers. The 
following paragraphs briefly introduce these three attributes. 
7 Ideal types are mental constructions that isolate the essential defining characteristics of a phenomenon without necessarily having a counterpart 
in reality. Empirical types, by contrast, are existing instances of a phenomenon such as specific states at specific points in time. Ideal types play 
an important role in typologies. For instance, if we defined “consolidated statehood” based on two attributes and measured each attribute on an 
ordinal binary scale, we could differentiate and rank four types of statehood. An empirical case fulfilling both attributes would be located near the 
positive end of the continuum. The definitional attributes of ideal types thus determine how we categorize cases. Ideal types are also theoretically 
important. Explicating the defining characteristics of statehood allows theoretical expectations to be derived about how it affects development 
cooperation. If, for example, we define consolidated statehood in terms of a well-developed infrastructure, we could hypothesize how accessibility 
affects the success of development cooperation. Theoretical arguments are ultimately founded on well-defined concepts. 
State collapse Consolidated statehood 
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Monopoly of the legitimate use of force 
At its core, the possession of the monopoly of the legitimate use 
of physical force within a certain territory characterizes 
statehood. This includes the exercise of violence through state 
agents, the exclusive right to authorize the use of violence, and 
the protection of individuals and populations from illegitimate 
violence. In contrast to other types of authority, state authority 
is sovereign, i.e. the supreme and sole authority at the state level 
(Schliesky, 2004).8 
If a state’s monopoly of the legitimate use of force is challenged by non-state actors – such as secessionist 
movements, tribal authorities, rebel groups, drug cartels, or criminal gangs – statehood is challenged. 
Clearly, such challenges may vary in terms of their severity (from civil disobedience to criminal violence and 
civil war) and their spatial distribution. 
Rule-making 
The second element of statehood is the ability to make and implement rules. In this context, Migdal (1988, 
p.18) defines a state as an organization “that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding
rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given
territory, using force if necessary to have its way”. This requires the ability to draft rules as well as the
administrative capacity to enforce them. States unable to protect property rights, uphold the rule of law,
and enforce contracts are thus considered fragile.
Legitimacy 
As a third definitional attribute, states are characterized by empirical legitimacy, i.e. a shared belief in the 
right of the state to use violence and to make and implement rules. The powers of a state have their roots 
in the population’s belief in the rightfulness of a given authority and willingness to abide by state orders.9 If 
(parts of) the population cease to consent to the state’s sovereignty and instead is loyal to non-state actors, 
statehood is deficient.  
Alternative approaches to defining fragility 
Before turning to the conceptual comparison, the following briefly reviews current debates on the definition 
of statehood and fragility.  
States as service providers 
The Weberian concept of statehood focuses on institutions. Another approach is to define states as service 
providers (Brinkerhoff et al., 2018). Rotberg (2004), for instance, categorizes states based on their ability to 
deliver basic public services such as healthcare, education, and the rule of law.  
Including service delivery as a defining attribute of statehood broadens the view beyond the provision of 
protection through monopolizing the use of violence. In this view, states should contribute to liberties, 
opportunities, and human well-being. If the public perceives the state as effective and fair, this contributes 
to public consent for the state and increases stability.   
However, defining statehood via service delivery also has three drawbacks. First, it is unclear what 
constitutes an adequate level of basic services. For instance, proponents of a minimal state argue that 
8 This discussion focuses on internal sovereignty and does not discuss external sovereignty, i.e. freedom from external interference (see Krasner, 
2007). 
9 Lambach et al. (2015) argue against using legitimacy as an attribute of statehood because it is difficult to measure and hardly any empirical cases 
could be considered fully legitimate. Legitimacy is indeed hard to measure. However, from a methodological perspective, ideal types need no 
empirical counterpart to be useful.  
Statehood
Monopoly of 
the 
legitimate 
use of force
Rule-making 
power Legitimacy
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property rights are so central that the state should not interfere with them (e.g. Nozick, 1974). In this view, 
taxation amounts to forced labour. Others attribute to the state a much stronger role. Rawls (2005), for 
instance, argues that states should ensure equal opportunities and redistribute services such as education, 
income, and healthcare. Making service delivery an attribute of statehood thus leads to (normative) 
discussions on distributive justice.  
Second, including service delivery as a concept can lead to “conceptual stretching” (Sartori, 1970). Including 
the provision of services in a definition of statehood brings the concept of statehood closer to questions of 
governance (Börzel and Risse, 2018).  
Third, indicators of good service delivery are at the same time indicators of development. Hence, making 
service delivery a constitutive attribute of statehood can lead to endogeneity in analyses of the relationship 
between fragility and development. Underdevelopment would be linked to fragility by definition. Empirical 
evidence shows, however, that even states with high poverty levels can be relatively peaceful (Putzel et al., 
2012).  
Elites, settlements, and the state 
Another strand of literature takes a more dynamic and actor-oriented view of the phenomenon of state 
fragility. One approach in this strand of research has investigated how political elites shape institutions in 
order to govern. North et al. (2012) develop a theoretical framework to explain how the interplay between 
political, economic, and social actors can be organized as a limited access order to discourage the use of 
violence and foster cooperation in a society.  
In a similar vein, Putzel and Di John (2012) regard the state as a political settlement. Conflict, contention, 
and bargaining between and among elite as well as non-elite groups form a set of power relations that is 
argued to be more important for development outcomes than formal institutions.  
A related, more abstract approach by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) differentiates political regimes 
according to the size of the selectorate, i.e. those who are formally entitled to choose the political leader(s), 
and the size of the winning coalition, i.e. those whose support is necessary for a leader to survive in office. 
They argue that leaders with larger winning coalitions concentrate on the provision of public rather than 
private services. The theory allows implications to be drawn on how interventions might foster political 
stability, economic growth, and democratization as well as on the effects of military intervention. 
All these approaches share the view that there is a need to look beyond formal institutions to understand 
the drivers of fragility. They do not constitute a contradiction to the Weberian concepts of the state but, 
rather, widen the view taking into account societal groups and elites and their power relations.  
Fragility as vulnerability 
The understanding of fragility in development increasingly broadens the view to take into account 
multifaceted causes and symptoms of fragility. This includes non-political factors such as remoteness, 
natural disasters, and lack of market access. Moreover, the understanding has been extended to go beyond 
domestic factors and take into account the neighbourhood of countries (Mcloughlin and Idris, 2016). This 
broadening has increasingly detached fragility from the notion of state as described above. Rather, it takes 
into account a large range of factors that might negatively affect the socio-economic, environmental, and 
political functioning of a country.  
It is certainly true that non-political and non-domestic factors can affect the ability of a government to make 
and enforce rules on its territory. It is also true that a malfunctioning state has consequences that go beyond 
the political. However, acknowledging this causal embeddedness is different from including it in a definition. 
When discussing approaches that go beyond a narrow Weberian understanding of state fragility, it remains 
crucial to distinguish clearly between the causes, attributes, and consequences of fragility (Cammack et al., 
2006).  
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Summary 
Fragility manifests itself in many ways, making a multidimensional concept of fragility necessary 
(Grävingholt et al., 2015; Gould and Pate, 2016; for an overview see Ferreira (2016)). We can consider state 
fragility as lying on the continuum between state collapse, i.e. the absence of a state, and consolidated 
statehood. Broadly following the Weberian understanding of state, fragile states can thus be characterized 
by a lack of upholding the monopoly of the legitimate use of force, limited rule-making ability, and restricted 
legitimacy.  
Wider concepts of fragility also take into account the ability of the state to provide basic services as well as 
broadening the view to look beyond domestic factors. Attempts to further disaggregate the concept of 
fragility take into account subnational variations as well as power relations between elites and non-elites. 
2.3 Method 
The conceptual comparison involves two steps. First, we retrieve the design of the concepts under analysis. 
As illustrated in Figure 3, a concept involves three distinct levels (Goertz, 2006): the term describes the 
phenomenon to be defined. The attributes describe the constitutive essential properties of the object. The 
indicators operationalize the attributes. Appendix A includes graphic representations of the concepts.  
Figure 3 Concept design 
Source: author’s illustration based on Goertz (2006) 
In a second step, we evaluate the concepts against seven criteria described in Table 3 (Goertz, 2006; Mata 
and Ziaja, 2009).  
Table 3 Criteria for conceptual comparison 
Criterion Description 
Scope the population of cases to which the concept can be applied 
Extension the range of empirical phenomena to be included in the concept 
Multidimensionality the number of attributes used to define fragility 
Aggregation the procedure to aggregate from the level of measurement to the overall 
assessment 
Typologies the number of empirical types derived from the concept 
Predictive vs. status quo whether a concept is predictive or captures the status quo 
Data sources the type and number of sources used for measurement 
Source: own table partly based on Goertz (2006). 
Term
Attribute 
1
Attribute 
2
Attribute 
3
Indicator Indicator Indicator
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2.4 Concept comparison 
This section compares four approaches to measuring state fragility using systematic criteria to facilitate the 
selection of suitable concepts: 
Concepts of fragility 
States of Fragility 
The OECD (2016, p.21) defines fragility as “the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping 
capacity of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks”. It identifies 
five dimensions of fragility: economic, environmental, political, security, and societal (OECD, 2016, p.22–25, 
73, 152–159). Each dimension is defined by the two attributes “risks” and “coping capacities”. There are 51 
indicators (OECD, 2016, p.265–270), which operationalize the attributes and are based on publicly available 
data. 
In each dimension, the indicator scores are aggregated to two non-correlated principal components.11 
Aggregating to principal components leads to a data-driven weighting procedure. Each indicator is weighted 
according to the amount of new information it adds to the data. The two principal components in each 
dimension form a two-dimensional space. Each country in the sample is situated in this space, with countries 
similarly affected by fragility having similar positions. Emerging clusters of countries constitute specific 
types of fragility and are described qualitatively.12  
The ten principal components (two in each of the five dimensions) are then aggregated by means of a second 
principal component analysis leading to another two-dimensional space. This second step identifies the 
most fragile countries and classifies them as “extremely fragile” or “fragile” based on two arbitrary 
thresholds. 
Constellations of State Fragility 
While the OECD’s concept of fragility is comparatively wide, Grävingholt et al. (2018) focus more closely on 
statehood. They distinguish three dimensions of fragility, based on types of state-society relations: 
authority, capacity, and legitimacy. The dimensions are operationalized with a total of ten indicators based 
on publicly available data and indices. 
Grävingholt et al. (2015) employ finite mixture modelling to derive types from typical empirical 
constellations of the attributes of state fragility.13 To aggregate the indicators in each of the dimensions, 
10 The conceptual comparison draws on the most recent methodology available. While the overall methodological approaches of the concepts under 
comparison were developed a few years ago, all concepts under analysis have since then been slightly adjusted. We incorporated all recent changes 
to the best of our knowledge. 
11 Principal component analysis is a procedure to reduce a set of correlated variables to a smaller number of non-correlated components. For instance, 
in the political dimension, the first principal component is mainly determined by the following indicators: voice and accountability, judicial 
constraints on executive power, perception of corruption, legislative constraints on executive power, and political terror. The second principal 
component of the political dimension is mostly influenced by the indicators of regime persistence and decentralized elections. 
12 For example, there are five types of fragility in the the political dimension: extreme political fragility, centralized state leadership fragility, high 
political fragility, moderate political fragility, and low political fragility (OECD, 2016, p.168). 
13 Finite mixture modelling is a procedure to identify unobserved subgroups from a mixed distribution. 
• States of Fragility (SFR) provided by the OECD
• Constellations of State Fragility (CSF) provided by the DIE
• Crisis Early Warning (CEW) overseen by the Peace and Security division of the BMZ
• the fragility concept in the Catalogue of Criteria for Assessing Development Orientation (CoC)
overseen by the Governance division of the BMZ.10
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they apply a weakest link approach (see Goertz, 2006). This procedure results in scores for authority, 
capacity, and legitimacy in any given country-year within the sample. 
After pooling all country-years in the sample, the authors apply mixture model clustering to derive 
constellations of state fragility from the data. The model specifications result in six constellations of state 
fragility: dysfunctional, low-authority, low-capacity, low-legitimacy, semi-functional, and well-functioning.  
Crisis Early Warning 
The BMZ’s CEW, provided by GIGA, aims to detect emerging crises in order to allow the BMZ to take early 
action and thereby to mitigate the risk of further escalation of violence. It should make predictions of the 
tendency for violence and the phase of violent conflict, and is thus a predictive concept. The approach was 
updated at the end of 2018 through the Escalation Potential Analysis (ESKA) and we do not yet have precise 
information on the revised methodology.  
The tendency for violence is defined using three dimensions: structural conflict factors, conflict-enhancing 
processes, and strategies of conflict resolution and the use of force. These three dimensions are each 
differentiated into three analysis sectors.14 These nine sectors each draw on between three and six multiple-
choice questions to give an overall total of 35 indicators. Besides these nine analysis sectors, the violent 
conflict phase constitutes a tenth, and two more questions assess fragility in post-conflict situations. 
Country experts answer the multiple-choice questions. The responses are mostly binary and totalled in each 
of the nine analysis sectors. These nine values are then weighted and again added up to derive the overall 
violence tendency. The potential for violent conflict, by contrast, is directly retrieved. Three broader 
categories for the violence tendency and four categories of potential conflict lead to 12 possible 
constellations, of which ten are eventually aggregated, resulting in a ternary typology of countries. 
The results of CEW have concrete implications for the process of policy-making in the BMZ. If states are 
classified as “yellow” or “red” in CEW, peace and conflict assessments become compulsory for all bilateral 
assistance. Following this assessment, country portfolios must be adjusted to the security situation in a 
partner country. This includes an analysis of conflict dynamics, and an assessment of relevance and possible 
risks, as well as of the potential of development cooperation to do harm in fragile states. 
Fragility index in the Catalogue of Criteria for Assessing Development Orientation 
The CoC is used to assess the level of governance and development orientation. However, since 2016 some 
of the indicators have been used to measure state fragility. Since our focus is on state fragility rather than 
governance or development orientation, we focus on this newly developed measure.  
The fragility index in the CoC conceptualises statehood, not fragility. The three dimensions of statehood 
are, in accordance with Grävingholt et al. (2015), authority, capacity and legitimacy. Each statehood-
dimension draws on four to eight questions answered by the ministry employee responsible for the 
respective country (LänderbearbeiterIn). In total, there are 35 questions serving as indicators. The approach 
is currently being revised, and we do not yet have information on the revised methodology. 
The questions are answered on a scale from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). For every attribute, the mean of the answers’ 
values is calculated to achieve one aggregated score per dimension. To answer the questions as accurately 
as possible, the person responding is asked to take into account a list of public sources provided by the 
ministry. However, the use of the indices is neither compulsory nor systematically tracked. 
14 The three analysis sectors defining structural conflict factors are: structural disparities, forms of settling conflict, and efficiency and legitimacy of 
political institutions. The three analysis sectors defining conflict-enhancing processes are: transformation and modernization processes, external 
influences, and collective perception of threat and experiences of violence. The three analysis sectors defining strategies of conflict solution and 
use of force are: tendencies to internal social polarisation, changes in the political strategies of single actors, and increasing use of force and 
violence. 
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If a country’s mean is below 2.5 within any dimension, this dimension is considered a country’s weakness. If 
all three dimensions score below 2.5 on average, the country is considered “a most fragile country”. In 
internal documents, ratings by CEW and the level of governance and development orientation are included 
in an integrated display that allow the classifications provided by the two approaches to be compared.  
Table 4 Overview of concepts of fragility 
Indices of fragility 
DIE – Constellations of 
State Fragility 
OECD – States of 
Fragility 
BMZ – Fragility 
index in 
Catalogue of 
Criteria for 
Assessing 
Development 
Orientation 
BMZ – Crisis Early 
Warning 
Scope Nation-states Nation-states Nation-states Nation-states 
Population World 
2005–2015 
World 
2016–2018 
Partner countries 
2016–2018 
Partner countries 
2001–2018 
Attributes 3 5 3 3 (+2) 
Indicators 10 50 (2016) 
51 (2018) 
1715 35 (Violence 
tendency) 
2 (Potential for 
violent conflict) 
2 (Fragility in post-
conflict situations) 
Aggregation (1) Weakest link
(2) Finite mixture
modelling
(1 & 2) Two-stage 
principal 
component 
analysis 
(3) Threshold
(1) Mean of
indicators
(2) Threshold
(1) Sum
(2) Weighted sum
(3) Threshold
Sources Publicly available data Publicly available 
data 
Experts Experts 
Weighting Predefined Determined by 
statistical model 
Predefined Predefined 
Classification Data driven (finite 
mixture modelling) 
Data driven 
(Principal 
Component 
Analysis) 
Previously 
determined 
Previously 
determined 
Number of 
resulting 
types of 
fragility 
6 2 on aggregate 
level 
3 to 5 in each 
dimension 
1 on aggregate 
level 
2 
Source: own table. 
15 The table shows only the indicators in the CoC relevant to measuring the statehood dimension, not all indicators of the CoC.
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Conceptual comparison 
The following compares the concepts under analysis in terms of their scope, extension, multidimensionality, 
aggregation, typologies, data sources, and focus (Goertz, 2006). The comparison systematically carves out 
similarities and differences among concepts. It also includes a discussion of advantages and disadvantages. 
Table 4 summarizes the results. 
Scope of application 
The scope describes the population of observations to which the concept can be applied. Ideally, all cases 
to which a concept applies are also coded with data (Goertz, 2006). 
CSF and SFR observe around 170 countries worldwide. The fragility measure in the CoC and CEW only look 
at the BMZ’s partner countries in bilateral development cooperation. In addition, CEW takes into account 
countries of special interest for the BMZ when asked to do so. CSF is available for the period 2005 to 2015, 
SFR for 2016–2018, the fragility component in the CoC for 2016–2018, and CEW from 2001 to 2018.  
In all concepts, the unit of observation is the nation-state. The concepts do not explicitly assess subnational 
variance in respect of fragility or spillover effects. The OECD (2018, p.87), for instance, explicitly 
acknowledges that “the framework is unable to capture […] subnational and micro-level drivers that indicate 
pockets of fragility within borders”. However, the degree of fragility can vary greatly within countries.  
As some types of development cooperation are locally confined, a national measure of fragility might be of 
only limited use. However, limited public data are available on the subnational and regional level, especially 
in areas with limited statehood (Stollenwerk, 2017, p.9). Although there is a broad trend of data 
disaggregation in the social sciences, there are as yet no global data on the subnational variance of fragility. 
The most encompassing attempt to date is by Lee and Zhang (2016). Moreover, there are some approaches 
for similar phenomena such as conflict (Raleigh et al., 2010; Sundberg and Melander, 2013; Trinn and 
Wencker, 2018) or risk (De Groeve et al., 2015).  
Extension: narrow vs. wide concepts 
The concepts under analysis have different empirical extensions. On the one hand, concepts should be broad 
enough to cover all empirical phenomena that are instances of fragility. On the other, concepts that are too 
broad are of only limited use in causal analysis due to possible endogeneity. The causal relationship between 
state fragility and intrastate conflict, for instance, cannot be investigated if intrastate conflict is a 
constitutive attribute of fragility (see Vreeland, 2008). The same might apply to analyses on the link between 
fragility and development in cases where both concepts draw on the provision of basic services. 
Consequently, excessively broad concepts make it difficult to study relationships between phenomena.  
SFR is the broadest concept in the analysis because it does not exclusively cover attributes pertaining to 
statehood. For instance, it includes environmental risks such as exposure to natural hazards. The CEW is the 
narrowest concept due to its exclusive focus on violence. 
Some uses of SFR suffer from endogeneity. For instance, the OECD’s fragility measure has been linked to 
the achievement of SDGs (OECD, 2018; UN Foundation, 2018). However, both concepts share indicators. 
Hence, it is no surprise that fragile contexts fare poorly with regard to SDG achievement. Moreover, the 
endogeneity of both concepts precludes an analysis of causal influence of fragility, as understood by SFR, 
and SDG achievement. This affects dimensions of sustainable development such as poverty, (gender) 
inequality, governance, education, health, violence, and the effects of disaster. Hence, if it is argued that 
more must be done on fragility to achieve the SDGs, this is not only because fragility negatively affects 
SDGs but also because both concepts partly refer to the same things. Consequently, causal analyses 
investigating the effect of fragility on SDG achievement can benefit from narrower concepts of fragility such 
as those based on a Weberian understanding.  
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One- vs. multidimensional concepts 
We have seen that concepts should be broad enough to cover all empirical phenomena that are instances 
of the definiendum. At the same time, however, they should be sufficiently differentiated not to blur 
important differences between various types of fragility. Multidimensional concepts offer a solution as they 
can combine a sufficiently large extension while mapping differences through internal differentiation.16 
All concepts rely on more than one defining attribute. SFR uses five, while all other concepts draw on three.17 
SFR is thus the broadest and most multidimensional concept. It is also the only one that uses the same 
indicators in multiple dimensions. This is not inherently problematic, especially since the resultant double 
weighting of indicators is statistically controlled for (OECD, 2018, p.267). However, when comparing the 
risks and coping capacities in different dimensions of fragility, it must be kept in mind that some are related 
by design. 
Aggregation 
Multidimensionality can mitigate the fuzziness of broad concepts. All multidimensional concepts need to 
be aggregated to derive the overall value of state fragility. While taking the arithmetical mean of indicators 
is a popular and common choice of aggregation, other methods such as the weakest link, the best shot, or 
logical combinations are possible (Goertz, 2006). Table 5 illustrates three methods of aggregation for 
hypothetical values.  
More recently, statistical approaches to aggregation have grown in popularity. Here, the empirical 
distribution of values determines the weighting of the individual indicators and/or the final classification. 
Table 5 Methods of aggregation 
Mean Weakest link Best shot 
30 5 60 
60 5 25 60 5 25 60 5 25 
Source: own table. 
We find that all concepts use different approaches to aggregation. CSF combines the weakest link with a 
data-driven approach. In each of the three dimensions, the indicator with the lowest value represents the 
aggregated score. Consequently, indicators within a dimension cannot act as substitutes. Countries scoring 
low in one indicator also score low in this dimension, even though they might possibly have high ratings for 
other indicators in the same dimension. In a second step of aggregation, CSF applies finite mixture 
modelling to identify six empirical constellations of fragility.  
SFR applies a purely data-driven approach to aggregation. It applies two principal component analyses to 
aggregate from indicator to attribute level and from attribute level to the final fragility index. The first stage 
16 Multidimensionality and extension are not the same. CEW, for instance, is narrow as it focuses on conflict escalation but uses three attributes for 
measurement, namely structural conflict factors, conflict-enhancing processes, and strategies of conflict resolution and use of force. 
17 The CEW has two more dimensions that do not, however, contribute to the measurement of the violence tendency.
Narrow Wide
SFRCSFCEW
CoC
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results in three to five types of fragility per dimension. At its highest level of aggregation, SFR puts forward 
a one-dimensional scale of “levels of fragility” using an arbitrary threshold to differentiate extreme fragility 
from fragile states and the rest of the world. Even though SFR depicts a one-dimensional scale of fragility 
on its highest level, the OECD advocates against its use (OECD, 2018, p.82). 
CEW and the CoC do not use data-driven aggregation. CEW uses weighted sums to arrive at an overall value 
for violence tendency. The CoC takes the mean of all indicators for each dimension to result in one value 
per dimension.  
The choice of a method of aggregation should be derived from the understanding of the underlying 
phenomenon. Since all concepts in our comparison refer to similar phenomena, it is surprising that they 
make use of very different approaches of aggregation. The weakest link approach, for instance, implies that 
each indicator is a necessary condition for the respective dimension. More specifically, it implies that, for 
example, access to drinking water and protection from disease cannot compensate for a lack of primary 
school enrolment. As an example, in 2015 the United States was classified as semi-functional due to low 
scoring of single indicators in all three dimensions. 
Table 6 provides a further illustration. The weakest link approach causes Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa to 
score low on the authority level due to a large number of homicides. All three are classified as low-authority 
countries. This rating does not take into account the fact that there were no deaths due to armed conflict 
and that the monopoly of violence rating of Brazil and South Africa is in the mid-range compared to the 
other countries included in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). 
Table 6 Illustration of weakest link approach to aggregation 
Authority Battle-related 
deaths 
Homicides Monopoly of vio-
lence (BTI) 
Brazil 0.26 1.00 0.26 0.70 
Mexico 0.36 1.00 0.36 0.50 
South Africa 0.21 1.00 0.21 0.70 
Source: own table based on 2015 data from Grävingholt et al. (2018). 
Using the mean or sum, on the other hand, allows for substitution across indicators. The CoC, for instance, 
uses the very same definitional attributes of authority, capacity, and legitimacy as the CSF, but aggregates 
indicators based on their arithmetical mean. Thus, although both concepts are semantically equivalent on 
the level of attributes, they reflect a fundamentally different understanding of fragility.  
The use of statistical methods of aggregation has the practical consequence that a change in or addition of 
data can affect the whole classification because the weights and/or classes are a function of the distribution 
of all indicators. As a practical consequence, countries might be classified differently although the 
underlying indicator values do not change. When new data are added, this might also happen 
retrospectively. One possibility for arriving at a stable classification, however, is to fix parameter values at 
a value determined for one specific sample.  
Data-driven classifications thus adjust to the empirical reality. This could be seen as an advantage, as data-
driven approaches reduce the empirical complexity of multidimensional data to a manageable level while 
preserving as much information from the data as possible. However, data-driven aggregation procedures 
are often less transparent than the use of thresholds. Perhaps even more importantly, the weights change 
with the data and are not derived from theoretical reasoning. It can be difficult for practicioners to retrace 
the steps in aggregation and the relative importance of the underlying indicators. 
Where no statistical methods are used, classification often draws on thresholds. This is the case in the two 
concepts used by the BMZ. The categories are predefined and thresholds are chosen quite arbitrarily. 
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Typologies 
While all concepts are multidimensional in drawing on multiple attributes, only CSF and SFR explicitly derive 
types from their concept. SFR stands out in that it combines a data-driven approach with qualitative 
reasoning by experts. The results of clustering within the first stage are qualitatively described in respect of 
their most distinctive features and ranked on a six-level scale (OECD, 2018, p.272–278). With regard to the 
overall level of fragility, the OECD applies two arbitrary thresholds to distinguish three levels of fragility on 
a one-dimensional scale. 
Typologies using thresholds usually divide the empirical space into mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
categories. This means that any one country can only belong to one category at a single point in time and 
that all countries belong to one (and only one) category. CSF uses non-exclusive categories by providing a 
probability of membership for different categories. SFR offers a middle way in providing the position of 
cases in a multidimensional space. These, however, are then coded nominally (by their predominant 
qualities) and ordinally (by level of fragility) by experts into mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories.   
The types of concept are as follows: 
Table 7 Types of fragility 
DIE – Constellations 
of State Fragility 
OECD – States of 
Fragility 
BMZ – Fragility index 
in Catalogue of 
Criteria 
BMZ – Crisis Early 
Warning 
Dysfunctional 
Low-authority 
Low-capacity 
Low-legitimacy 
Semi-functional 
Well-functioning 
Extreme fragility 
Fragile 
3–5 qualitative types 
based on clustering in 
each dimension 
Most fragile states Low violence tendency 
(green) 
Heightened violence 
tendency (yellow) 
Acute violence 
tendency (red) 
Source: own table. 
Predictive concepts vs. concepts focusing on the status quo 
A concept can either focus on the status quo or be predictive. The former assesses a country’s state of 
fragility in a given year. Predictive indices, on the other hand, try to assess the likelihood of future events.  
CSF and the CoC are status-quo oriented. They aim to measure the actual level of fragility understood as an 
actual state, rather than the likelihood of a future state. By contrast, CEW is explicitly directed at identifying 
the risk of escalation of political conflict and is thus clearly predictive.  
The SFR approach is ambiguous. The notions of high risk and low coping capacity refer to an unrealized 
reaction to external or domestic shocks. In line with this, the authors argue that each indicator represents 
“an increased likelihood or impact of a negative event” (OECD, 2016, p.150). The framework explicitly selects 
indicators that “alter […] likelihood or impact ex ante” (ibid., p.151). On the other hand, the authors state that 
“the fragility framework should not be interpreted as predictive” (ibid., p.74). This leads to an understanding 
of fragility as a vulnerability or a possibility rather than something that has occurred. It is in this way that 
the definition of fragility by SFR departs significantly from the Weberian notion of statehood.   
Data sources 
The concepts under analysis draw on different types of data. CSF and SFR rely on publicly available sources 
such as indices. CEW relies on multiple-choice questions answered by one expert per country. These answers 
are assigned values according to their contribution to violence tendencies. The CoC similarly relies on 
questions answered by country experts. Each question is rated on a scale of 1 to 5. Comments on each rating 
substantiate the assessments. Thus, while CSF and SFR rely on quantitative data from publicly available 
data, the BMZ approaches rely on quantitative and qualitative data based on expert codings.  
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In addition, if expert coding is commissioned by the data user, the timeliness of the data is usually better. 
The timeliness of publicly available data, by contrast, is subject to those who provide them. Although 
extrapolation of data is possible, the validity of the generated data is highly questionable. 
2.5 Results and recommendations 
Our conceptual comparison has shown that no two concepts are alike. Even semantically similar definitions 
can have diverse concept designs. This has concrete empirical implications in terms of which countries are 
considered fragile. This is crucial since country classifications influence allocation and programming 
decisions (see Chapter 3). The examination of concepts of fragility in this evaluation is hence not an exercise 
for some abstract academic research interest, but linked to one of the most important questions in 
development cooperation and policy-making in general: on what basis are scarce resources distributed? 
We summarize the conceptual comparison as follows. First, we sum up the conceptual comparison. Second, 
we discuss how the current use of concepts can be improved in the short term. Third, we provide some ideas 
on possible improvements in the longer term. Finally, the main points are summarized in a single 
recommendation.  
Summary of conceptual comparison 
Among the concepts in our comparison, there is no single concept that we would endorse unequivocally. 
Based on our comparison criteria, however, we consider that Constellations of State Fragility (CSF) is of 
greatest use when combined with more timely data.  
One advantage that CSF shares with the OECD’s States of Fragility over the BMZ’s Catalogue of Criteria 
and Crisis Early Warning is that it relies on publicly available data. This makes CSF (and SFR) more 
transparent and less dependent on the assessment of individual experts. Public availability puts data under 
public scrutiny, ultimately contributing to greater measurement equivalence across countries and years. 
This is not to say that concepts should exclusively be founded on quantitative indicators rather than expert 
codings. On the contrary, it is problematic to measure some phenomena by numbers alone. For instance, 
state legitimacy – the intersubjective belief in the rightfulness of a given order – is a highly complex and 
subjective feature of statehood that is difficult to put into numbers. Moreover, concepts such as lack of 
state authority might be empirically instantiated in myriad manifestations such as riots, terrorist events, 
intrastate conflict, crime or a coup d’état. The changing nature of social reality might not be captured by a 
predefined set of quantitative indicators. In addition, if expert coding is commissioned by the data user, the 
timeliness of the data can be much better than of publicly available data. Although extrapolation of data is 
possible, the validity of the generated data is highly questionable. Consequently, the solution is not to 
entirely remove judgemental elements from the measurement of state fragility but, rather, to ensure their 
reliability and validity. A mix of quantitative and qualitative indicators appears best for concepts on political 
phenomena such as fragility. While both CSF and SFR draw on a mix of qualitative and quantitative 
indicators, CEW and the CoC rely on expert coding.18 
A second advantage of CSF and SFR over the CoC and CEW is that, while the latter two mostly focus on 
partner countries, the former include worldwide data. This might appear to be less important for decision-
making on German development cooperation. However, a view beyond partner countries allows results to 
be put in a broader context, facilitates comparison with other (e.g. potential future or past partner) 
countries, and increases the number of cases for analytical use. For instance, worldwide data coverage 
allows global trends to be discerned from trends that only affect partner countries. This, in turn, allows the 
effects of development cooperation to be more precisely estimated by comparing countries with German 
development cooperation to those without it. Consequently, even though collection of data on non-partner 
18 A more experimental approach to retrieving timely data is to quickly process data from public sources through, e.g., text-mining (Brandt et al., 
2011; Chadefaux, 2014; Chiba et al., 2017; Schrodt and Gerner, 2000). 
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countries might not be of core interest to political decision-makers in the BMZ, particularly in the light of 
limited resources, such data could improve our understanding of fragility.  
Our conclusion regarding the primacy of a certain method of aggregation is not so clear cut. The data-driven 
methods of aggregation and classification by CSF and SFR provide a means to optimally reduce empirical 
complexity to a manageable typology while preserving as much information as possible. On the other hand, 
statistical properties might be less transparent to practitioners than clear-cut criteria such as thresholds. 
Moreover, aggregation based on constant and predefined criteria ensures the stability of resulting types. 
When it comes to deciding between CSF and SFR, our greatest reservation over the latter is its very wide 
empirical scope. Broad concepts of fragility face the danger of becoming “catch-all” terms (see Lindemann, 
2014). If we conceive state fragility to be an overarching term describing a broad range of diverse 
deficiencies in the political, economic, societal, environmental, and possibly other dimensions, the term 
loses analytical value. Clearly, the question of what constitutes “too broad” is an empirical question up for 
debate. Few would question the pivotal role of personal security in defining fragility. The role of service 
delivery, however, is already disputed, with proponents of a minimal state advocating a very restricted set 
of state functions and contemporary liberalism endorsing redistributive state intervention. Greatly 
extending the scope beyond statehood, however, leads to catch-all terms. Obviously, state fragility is not 
the only phenomenon of interest for programming and project design. And SFR looks at dimensions that 
are certainly important for the success of development cooperation. However, it remains doubtful whether 
all need to be lumped together in a single concept of fragility that finally aggregates to a ternary scale. CSF, 
with its narrower extension than SFR, allows the role of statehood to be taken specifically into account. It 
allows for a greater number of phenomena to be investigated vis-à-vis fragility. This includes, for instance, 
many indicators underlying the SDGs. Attributes or indicators that are part of a concept cannot be studied 
in a causal analysis including the concept due to endogeneity. Consequently, broader concepts restrict the 
analytical potential. 
In summary, no single concept fulfils all criteria of our conceptual comparison. Concepts with a wide scope 
and suitable extension, and founded on qualitative and quantitative public data and explicit concept design, 
are readily available but usually do not provide timely data. Timely data are, however, available through the 
existing reporting system currently used in the BMZ. As it would be inefficient to develop yet another 
approach to defining and measuring fragility, the challenge lies in combining existing approaches. This 
requires a standardized process of combining and weighting information through mixed- and multi-method 
approaches (Gibler, 2017). For instance, quantitative and qualitative assessments of similar phenomena 
could be systematically compared across approaches to identify whether or not they agree. As a step further, 
data from different sources could be combined, for example to increase the precision of imputed 
quantitative data by incorporating evidence based on more timely expert assessments. In summary, rather 
than developing a new approach from scratch, a combination of approaches seems to be expedient in order 
to exploit the potential of existing approaches. 
How to improve the use of concepts for policy-making 
Every country is unique. Policy-making in development cooperation requires heuristics to cope with this 
empirical complexity. In particular, political decision-makers need to assess state fragility without delving 
into the complexities of individual cases. In the end, uniqueness should not preclude meaningful 
comparisons between countries.  
Indices of state fragility provide a means to reduce empirical complexity. They allow comparisons between 
states on a single, possibly multidimensional scale. Without well-crafted heuristics, a lack of guidance on 
what information should be considered relevant combined with time constraints might lead decision-
makers to over-rely on volatile subjective reasoning. The alternative would be to rely on ad hoc criteria that 
are prone to psychological biases (Kahneman, 2012; Koehler, 2007; Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). 
Consequently, concepts such as those under review in this chapter provide useful heuristics to be 
systematically integrated in strategic management. The mandatory use of indices as currently practised in 
the development of country strategies thus promises to improve decision-making. At the same time, policy 
decisions should not be exclusively based on the results of indices. Portfolio management, programming, 
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and implementing development cooperation requires expert knowledge on countries and sectors. An 
idiographic, in-depth understanding complements the more generalized comparative approach provided by 
indices and typologies. 
With reduced complexity comes the danger of oversimplification. Most of the concepts presented above 
provide an easily manageable number of resultant types and scales to assess and compare states. The 
OECD’s States of Fragility, for instance, aggregates 49 indicators into a one-dimensional ternary scale. In a 
similar vein, the BMZ’s CEW makes use of 35 indicators in order to come up with a ternary measure of 
escalation potential. Such highly aggregated measures are easy to apply. Moreover, clear-cut typologies 
that assign cases to a single category greatly simplify our view of differences between states. However, it is 
doubtful that highly aggregated scales and clear-cut typologies adequately reflect the underlying empirical 
complexity in fragile states (see also Wagner and Sattelberger, 2017) . 
One approach to reduce the danger of oversimplification is to present results of indices more 
comprehensively. This would put to use the wealth of information provided by multidimensional concepts 
rather than drawing on the highest level of aggregation for the sake of practical value. The use of arbitrary 
thresholds, for instance, conceals the continuous nature of (most) underlying criteria. A presentation that 
takes into account the multilevel nature of concepts, i.e. one that includes indicators and overall results, 
would allow for a differentiated yet focused view. One possible way to present such results concisely is by 
a visual representation. This could include the individual indicators and the applied weighting mechanism. 
It would be even better to present data interactively, allowing users to specify component indicators, 
weights, and methods of aggregation. This would allow the impact of concept design on the classification 
of cases to be assessed.  
Moreover, in many cases, assigning cases to types is not as clear-cut as typologies convey. For instance, a 
country classified as non-fragile might change to being classified as fragile one year later because it barely 
passed a certain threshold. Since the underlying measurement is uncertain, this change in category might 
be entirely due to chance. The arbitrariness that arises from selecting clear-cut thresholds for continuous 
phenomena can be mitigated by explicitly modelling and presenting the uncertainty of assigning certain 
cases. Instead of using crisp sets in which cases are either in or outside a certain category, fuzzy sets assign 
cases a probability of membership. Such data are readily available in existing indices such as CSF and SFR 
and can be useful in understanding state fragility.  
Moreover, the uncertainty of measurement should be explicitly modelled. Quantitative indicators convey a 
certainty that seldom exists. In fact, measurement is never perfect. King et al. (2004) provide methods for 
estimating the uncertainty of indicators. Coppedge et al. (2016) explicitly model and report uncertainty for 
a concept of democracy. One way to take account of the uncertainty of measurement is to rely on 
distributions rather than pseudo-exact point estimates. Reporting of confidence intervals or posterior 
densities allows policymakers to visually assess the certainty of an assessment and could be used to decide 
on further data collection on a certain case. 
How to improve existing concepts 
As shown above, recent improvements in concept designs allow for adaptations in practice that can be 
realised in the short term. The following proposes three improvements that could be implemented in the 
longer term. 
First, taking into account how fragility spreads across borders could improve the understanding of fragility. 
Conflict, and thus instability, spreads among countries (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008; Gleditsch, 2002; 
Grechyna, 2018). Moreover, there is evidence that mechanisms of diffusion are conditional on state capacity 
(Braithwaite, 2010). The concepts under review do not – except for a single indicator in CEW – take account 
of the role of the fragility of neighbouring countries. DFID (2016), for instance, explicitly mentions the 
instability of neighbouring states in its fragile states methodology. Based on existing evidence on the spatial 
effects of political instability, measures of fragility would benefit from taking into account processes of 
spatial diffusion. Consequently, country assessments could widen the view beyond the nation-state to 
specifically take account of how fragility spreads across borders. 
2.  |  Defining and measuring fragility    23
Second, spatial disaggregation of measures of fragility should improve our understanding because the level 
of fragility often varies within states, specifically in developing states. The recent developments in 
measuring fragility have either broadened the view to consider more and more dimensions (as in SFR) or 
disaggregated the concept along its constitutive dimensions (as in CSF). In Chapter 5, we present one 
approach to making use of geographically disaggregated data to study state authority on a subnational 
basis. 
A third approach is to apply the notion of fragility and its constitutive dimensions to the regime, 
administration, and government of a state. This “third generation of state theory” (Mazzuca, 2017) could 
further enhance the added value of fragility indices in context-sensitive programming.  
In summary, we make the following recommendation: 
Recommendation 1 
Based on a systematic conceptual comparison of four approaches to defining and measuring fragility, this 
evaluation recommends that the BMZ continue to use fragility indices for strategic portfolio management. 
Furthermore, the BMZ should continue to constantly evaluate and possibly improve its definitions and 
measurement of fragility on the basis of clearly defined criteria. This should include an assessment of the 
extent to which existing approaches could be combined. 
As part of the current revision of approaches to measuring fragility, the BMZ should ensure that the results 
of indices are presented to political decision-makers more comprehensively in order to make underlying 
concept designs transparent and to do justice to the multidimensional nature of fragility. To achieve this, 
the BMZ should adopt a visual representation of concepts that includes indicators and the applied 
weighting mechanism. Second, the BMZ should include the uncertainty of classification and measurement 
in presentations of fragility scores. 
Moreover, with a view to possible future revisions, the BMZ should further disaggregate and contextualize 
its measurement of state fragility in order to further increase the value of indices for the context-sensitive 
management of development cooperation. Further disaggregation could be achieved by reporting 
information for lower-level geographical units or more regularly and by differentiating fragility between 
different actors within partner countries. Contextualization could be achieved by taking account of 
possible spillover effects of fragility across borders. 
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3. STRATEGIES
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3.1 Introduction 
Development cooperation in fragile states is considered a key tool of German civil crisis prevention 
(Bundesregierung, 2004, 2012, 2017). Consequently, it is no surprise that the increasing attention given to 
fragile contexts has found expression in a growing number of guidelines on context-sensitive 
implementation of development cooperation. This chapter examines whether strategy papers released by 
the BMZ since 2000 have repercussions on German ODA commitments. 
For development cooperation to be successful, it needs to be aligned to fragile contexts (Manning and 
Trzeciak-Duval, 2010; Zoellick, 2008). Strategy papers contribute to this alignment by providing an 
operational framework for policymakers to adapt development cooperation in fragile contexts. They provide 
guiding norms and principles for operations, define policy goals, set action areas, propose appropriate 
instruments, and explicate assumptions underlying development cooperation in fragile contexts. Beyond 
influencing policies and politics, strategy papers signal to the public and partner countries the German 
government’s preferences concerning fragility, state-building, and crisis prevention.  
Strategies can also help to reduce fragmentation between donors and instruments by supporting policy 
coordination, complementarity, and coherence. Fragmentation can be particularly problematic in fragile 
contexts because of the limited coordinating capacity of partner countries.  
However, some practitioners and researchers argue that official policies as embodied in strategies have no 
effect on practice. Furness (2014) argues that, for the EU, development cooperation in fragile states reveals 
a “policy-operations” gap, i.e. differences between written policies and development cooperation on the 
ground. He argues that rapidly changing conditions require greater flexibility to adjust to local contexts, 
whereas strategies were long term and vague. Practitioners follow a similar reasoning when they claim that 
strategies are especially hard to implement in fragile contexts. The volatility and complexity of fragile 
contexts clearly impedes the detailed planning of interventions.  
We use three steps to investigate whether allocation patterns reflect the content of strategies. First, we 
describe changes and continuities in the BMZ’s strategy towards fragile states. Second, we extract testable 
implications from strategy documents that evolved after critical junctures. And third, we test empirically to 
what extent ODA commitments19 match these testable implications. 
The analysis contributes to the transparency of German development cooperation. It responds to the 
criticism voiced by the non-governmental Advisory Board for Civilian Crisis Prevention (Beirat für zivile 
Krisenprävention) that the Federal Government’s crisis-prevention policy lacks transparency and strategic 
communication (Beirat Zivile Krisenprävention, 2008, 2014; Nachtwei, 2010). In a similar vein, an analysis of 
spending patterns contributes to implementing the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), of which 
Germany was a founding member in 2008. Last but not least, since the BMZ devotes considerable resources 
to the formulation of strategies, it has a legitimate interest in understanding to what extent changes in 
strategy have tangible consequences. This is particularly important in the complex institutional set-up of 
German development cooperation, with a specialized ministry and implementing agencies, while foreign 
policy and humanitarian assistance sit in a different ministry. To the best of our knowledge, there is no other 
study that investigates the empirical implications of strategies. Hence, this study provides relevant 
information for all BMZ staff working in the field of fragility as well as on relevant country desks. 
19 Commitments up to 2017 data are defined by the OECD DAC as “those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and 
to multilateral institutions which are: i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. 
each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main 
objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent)” 
(OECD, n.d.). 
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3.2 Method 
The description of the evolution of Germany’s strategy towards fragile states is organized using critical 
junctures that provided the opportunity for development policy change. To trace strategic and 
organizational developments in the fragile states agenda, we draw on eight key strategy papers published 
between 2004 and 2017 by the German Federal Government and the BMZ (see Table 8). In our empirical 
analysis, we focus on the 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2013 strategies, which operationalize the more abstract 
guidelines published by the Federal Government. While strategies released by the Federal Government 
provide an abstract and interministerial regulatory framework, BMZ strategies more specifically detail 
concrete policies for development cooperation. To assess whether allocations match strategies, we derive 
empirical implications from the papers, operationalize them based on commitments as recorded in data 
from the OECD DAC’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS), and finally test them empirically.20 Hence, we use 
allocations as a proxy for changing priorities in German development cooperation. We classify countries as 
fragile based on CEW as this is the classification used by the BMZ.21  
Table 8 Key strategy papers relating to state fragility published by the German Federal Government 
and the BMZ, 2004–2017 
Year Fed. Government BMZ Peace and Security division BMZ Governance division 
2004 2004 “Civilian 
crisis prevention, 
conflict 
transformation 
and peace 
consolidation” 
2005 2005 “Cross-Sectoral Strategy for Crisis 
Prevention, Conflict Transformation 
and Peace Building in German 
Development Cooperation” 
2006 
2007 2007 “Development-Oriented 
Transformation in Conditions 
of Fragile Statehood and Poor 
Government Performance”22 
2009 “Promoting Resilient 
States and Constructive 
State-Society Relations: 
Legitimacy, Transparency and 
Accountability” 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 2012 
“Interministerial 
Guidelines for a 
Coherent Policy of 
the German 
Federal 
Government in 
Fragile States” 
2013 2013 “Development for Peace and 
Security. Development Policy in the 
Context of Conflict, Fragility and 
Violence” 
2013 “Strategy on Transitional 
Development Assistance: 
Strengthening Resilience – Shaping 
Transition” 
2014 
2015 
2016 
2017 2017 Guidelines “Preventing Crisis, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace” 
Source: own table. 
20 For the full list of sources see the online appendix.
21 Since the data are only available for the years after 2006, we impute values for the years 2004 to 2006 using UCDP data on armed conflict as well 
as CSF data (see online appendix for more details). 
22 The 2009 document “Promotion of Good Governance in German Development Policy” is another comprehensive strategy paper by the BMZ, 
which is valid for all countries. Since it refers to the 2007 paper regarding fragility issues mentioned here, it is not listed in Table 8. 
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Critical junctures 
Germany’s development policy adapts to international and domestic developments and is subject to 
constant change. The opportunity for substantial policy changes, however, is greatest during critical 
junctures, i.e. “relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability 
that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest’’ (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007, p.348). Critical 
junctures allow for the establishment of new institutional arrangements in moments of uncertainty (Collier 
and Munck, 2017). Uncertainty stems from external events or shocks that increase the demand for or reveal 
the incapacity of the existing institutional framework to deal with changed conditions. In line with this 
reasoning, Faust et al. (2013, p.14) state that “the important steps forward towards an agreed-upon 
international agenda for addressing state fragility have become possible in the immediate aftermath of 
severe crises”.  
In the following, critical junctures function as a heuristic device. Based on the above reasoning, we can 
assume that it is most likely to be during critical junctures that policymakers revise strategies, alter policy-
making processes, and adapt aid allocation patterns towards fragile states. By contrast, path dependency, 
i.e. the influence of past policy decisions on current and future policy, governs the comparatively longer
periods between critical junctures.
Although critical junctures following international crises provide leeway for change, policy-making does not 
happen in a vacuum. Preceding conditions, most importantly existing domestic institutions and the 
international fragile states agenda, and policymakers’ individual preferences, influence policy-making and 
implementation processes (Capoccia, 2016; Collier and Munck, 2017). Consequently, the following 
discussion sheds light on the domestic and international environment preceding critical junctures. 
Empirical analysis 
To evaluate the coherence between strategies and country portfolios, we first derive empirical implications 
from analysed documents. Subsequently, we test these empirical implications based on German bilateral 
aid commitments. Commitments reflect decisions better than disbursements (Berthelemy, 2006; Boussalis 
and Peiffer, 2011). To operationalize strategy implementation, we identify the type of development 
cooperation mentioned in the strategy by identifying the closest possible match in the CRS (e.g. a certain 
sector and/or recipient). We restrict our data to committed grants and loans. The online appendix provides 
a detailed summary of all operationalizations.  
To test strategy implementation, we combine a descriptive and an inferential approach. The descriptive 
analysis compares, for each empirical implication separately, whether total or relative allocations to fragile 
countries changed after the implementation of the respective strategy. The analytical approach applies a 
fixed-effect regression analysis on the panel data to rule out alternative explanations for changes in 
allocations (see online appendix for more information). We assume an implementation gap of two years for 
TC and four years for FC.23 
We then combine the results qualitatively, taking into account the descriptive and inferential evidence. A 
team of researchers at DEval rated the empirical results using the Likert scale (see Table 9). We then 
aggregated the evidence for each critical juncture to come to an overall assessment.  
23 Due to data constraints, we only apply an implementation gap of one year for the 2013 strategy. 
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Table 9 Evidence aggregation 
Strong evidence 
of allocation 
patterns 
opposite to 
implication 
Weak evidence of 
allocation 
patterns 
opposite to 
implication 
No clear 
evidence 
Weak evidence of 
allocation 
patterns in line 
with implication 
Strong evidence 
of allocation 
patterns in line 
with implication 
- - - 0 + + + 
Source: own table. 
Structure of the German development cooperation system 
To delineate the structure and processes of the German bilateral development cooperation system, the 
evaluation team reviewed internal and public documents describing the decision-making procedures. The 
review placed particular emphasis on those steps in the process that resort to strategies on development 
cooperation in fragile contexts or fragility assessments. In order to tailor recommendations to the needs of 
the BMZ, GIZ, and KfW, our suggestions refer to procedures as described in the BMZ’s Joint Procedural 
Reform (GVR).  
3.3 Germany’s strategy towards fragile states 
Germany strives to align its development strategy in fragile contexts to the international development 
agenda as laid out in the Fragile State Principles (OECD and OECD DAC, 2007) and the New Deal for 
International Engagement in Fragile States (Bundesregierung, 2012, p.3; International Dialogue on 
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 2011). Although harmonization of donor activities in fragile contexts has 
not yet been fully achieved (OECD DAC, 2011), it is high on the international development agenda (High 
Level Forum, 2005). In order to do justice to the fact that Germany develops its strategy as part of the 
international community and based on the insight that the agenda on state fragility probably changed most 
significantly following serious international crises, we structure the following discussion based on two 
critical junctures of international importance: the aftermath of the Al-Qaeda attacks in 2001 and the “Arab 
Spring” of 2012.  
3.3.1 The post-9/11 juncture: 2004 Action Plan 
The 2004 Interministerial Action Plan “Civilian crisis prevention, conflict transformation and peace 
consolidation” can be considered Germany’s first joined-up strategy targeting a distinct group of “fragile 
states”, even though the notion of fragility is absent from the report. Germany formulated this strategy 
relatively late compared to other Western donor countries, e.g. the US and the UK (Cammack et al., 2006).  
The 2004 Interministerial Action Plan is one expression of fundamental institutional and policy change after 
2001. The Al-Qaeda attacks on 11 September were a “critical turning point” (Klotzle, 2006), linking state 
fragility and international security. The attacks raised domestic security demands to address the perceived 
terrorist threat emanating from failed states in the “Global South” (François and Sud, 2006; Furness, 2014). 
Considered a national security issue, failed or fragile states became a geopolitical priority for Western states 
after 9/11 (Rotberg, 2002).24 After this, it was discussed by almost all major development agencies (Bueger 
and Bethke, 2014). In a similar vein, Putzel and Di John (2012, p.5) state that “[s]ince the attacks on the World 
Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, the problems of weak states […] have been a growing concern among 
international development agencies”.  
24 In February 2002, German chancellor Gerhard Schröder stated: "Security promotes development, but development also promotes security. The
beginning of the 21st century has been overshadowed by a horrible tragedy, the destruction of the Twin Towers. But I think that a new international 
awareness and, as such, new international cooperation has arisen out of the ruins of ground zero" (Schröder, 2002). 
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Responding to the institutional vacuum in Germany after 9/11, the Action Plan established a distinct 
architecture for implementing preventive policies in fragile states. In particular, the strategy attempts to 
anchor crisis prevention as a cross-cutting task, coordinating different ministries in this policy area, 
strengthening collaboration with non-state actors, and developing specific structures for crisis prevention 
(Bundesregierung, 2004). Two newly created bodies monitor and assist the implementation of the Action 
Plan: the interministerial steering group for crisis prevention (Ressortkreis zivile Krisenprävention) and a 
non-governmental Advisory Board (Beirat für zivile Krisenprävention).  
Contextual factors 
Two developments at the national and international level influenced institutional and policy changes after 
2001, among them the 2004 Action Plan: a renewed focus on intrastate conflict after the end of the Cold 
War and the transformation of the Bundeswehr (Federal Armed Forces) into an operational army.25 
With German reunification in 1990, foreign and development policies became less and less influenced by 
the ideologies of the Cold War era. With this came an increased focus on intrastate conflicts and discussions 
about the causes of political violence in the post-ideological era (Fukuyama, 1989).26 One outcome of these 
discussions was the recognition that societal transformation and national development carry the potential 
to produce conflict. 
This led state actors to question their role in and methods of conflict engagement. The challenges posed by 
intrastate conflicts eroding the core functions of statehood required new policy responses beyond 
traditional peace-making (Kaldor, 2013). In particular, development cooperation was tasked with the design 
of new instruments for preventing the violent escalation of conflicts and for post-conflict reconstruction, 
e.g. through civilian crisis prevention and conflict transformation measures. Furthermore, new principles for
conflict-sensitive cooperation in fragile states such as “do no harm” emerged (Kirschner, 2007).27
The academic discourse on “new wars” influenced policymakers’ perceptions of fragile states. Unlike their 
Anglo-Saxon colleagues, German scholars emphasized state decay in the age of globalization as the main 
cause of “new wars” (Brzoska, 2004; Münkler, 2003). Accordingly, the 2004 Action Plan states that “the 
breeding ground for most domestic conflicts is the merely formal or rudimentary existence of state 
structures or the failure of the state as such” (Bundesregierung, 2004, p.7). Thus, the German government 
considered fragile states as a major concern in the prevention of violent conflict and regional instability.  
As a second contextual factor, following a Constitutional Court judgment in 1994, the Bundeswehr 
progressively transformed from an army of deterrence (“Abschreckungsarmee”) to a parliament-controlled 
operational army (“Einsatzarmee”). If authorized by a parliamentary majority, Germany’s participation in 
“out-of-area” NATO- and UN-led military missions was now no longer a breach of the German Constitution. 
This sparked a debate about the nature of Germany’s engagement in armed conflicts (Dames, 2015). The 
mandate authorizing German troops to participate in the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan (International 
Security Assistance Force, ISAF) and the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom in the Horn of Africa finally 
required the development of a civilian strategy in response to crisis situations alongside military means.  
At the same time, policymakers developed an interest in promoting the civilian component of interventions 
abroad. The mandates for the Bundeswehr missions were adopted by a left-wing parliamentary majority and 
under the Schröder coalition government between the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens. While the 
25 Most notably, in the left-wing government’s decision to intervene militarily in Kosovo.
26 A prominent discussion revolved around the concept of so-called “new wars”. The term predominantly refers to intrastate conflicts. “New wars” 
are characterized by the involvement of regular and irregular conflict actors. They are not financed by the state through taxes but through war 
economies and external sources. Motives are less ideological but revolve around identity politics. “New wars” are not fought for particular policies. 
Rather, the goal is political mobilization, i.e. to gain support and achieve political control through war and terror against the “outgroup”, potentially 
involving displacement of and violence against civilians (Kaldor, 1999; Münkler, 2003).  
27 Projects “do no harm” if they avoid producing unintended consequences such as increasing incentives for state capture by rebel groups 
(Grossman, 1992). 
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wider German public moved from post-World War II anti-militarism to indifference (Fleckenstein, 2005), 
left-wing voters in particular remained sceptical of military intervention in the early 1990s (Baumann and 
Hellmann, 2001).28 Policymakers emphasized the civilian dimension of crisis prevention as a legitimizing 
factor for foreign interventions, hoping to avoid further alienation of left-wing voters. 
Two approaches: peacebuilding and institution-building 
Following the publication of the 2004 Action Plan, the BMZ released two major strategies to operationalize 
its 161 recommendations: the Peace and Security division primarily focused on the peacebuilding component 
while the Governance division was concerned with long-term institution-building. This resulted in two 
approaches to development cooperation in fragile states throughout the first decade of the 21st century: 
peacebuilding and institution-building. 
Although the foci of the two approaches are complementary, they have not always been seen as well 
integrated in the organizational framework of development cooperation in Germany. For example, in 2006 
Cammack et al. considered that “[a]t the federal government level, interaction is not particularly 
coordinated because of tensions between the various ministries, and within the BMZ, because of the 
fragmentation of development actors. At field level, there is also evidence of lack of coherence and 
coordination” (2006, p.57).  
Peacebuilding approaches  
The 2005 “Cross-Sectoral Concept in Crisis Prevention, Conflict Transformation and Peace Consolidation in 
German Development Cooperation” established the peacebuilding approach in the BMZ. It defines “binding 
standards and recommendations for the design, implementation, and steering of German official 
development cooperation” (BMZ, 2005, p.8) in states at risk as defined in the BMZ’s annual CEW (see 
Chapter 2).  
Overall, the 2005 strategy aims to improve the BMZ’s contribution to civilian crisis management. The BMZ’s 
country portfolios and country strategies now required the systematic integration of crisis prevention, 
conflict transformation, and peace consolidation in fragile and conflict-affected states. Germany’s changing 
engagement in armed conflicts lent particular importance to the strategy as the BMZ sought to take over 
primary responsibility for civilian reconstruction in Afghanistan, but faced resistance from the German 
foreign ministry (Auswärtiges Amt, AA) (Hofmann, 2007). 
Empirical implications of the 2005 strategy 
The 2005 BMZ cross-sectoral concept suggested integrating four major types of intervention into the 
country portfolios of fragile states, based on a Peace and Conflict Needs Assessment.  
28 In 1990 and 1991 the majority of Germans disagreed with Helmut Kohl’s proposition to amend the Basic Law to legalize Germany’s military 
participation in UN missions (1990: 53% in former East and 66% in former West Germany; 1991: 49% in former East and 66% in former West 
Germany). Paradoxically, at the same time Germany contributed DM 18 billion to fund military interventions by its allies in the Gulf War. It also 
provided personnel and logistic support in other crises (Namibia, Bosnia, Macedonia) (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001). 
• Technical cooperation at the regional and national levels, e.g. in the field of early warning, to
strengthen institutional capacities and staff competences
• Financial development cooperation for rebuilding infrastructure and implementing employment
programmes, especially in post-conflict countries
• Development-oriented emergency and transitional aid to close the gap between humanitarian
assistance and long-term approaches, e.g. by reintegrating ex-combatants
• Non-governmental support to states where official assistance is difficult due to political sensitivities
or limited capability of ODA in terms of funding, staff, and methods of engagement, e.g. in security
sector reform. The Civil Peace Service is a BMZ-funded instrument to link non-governmental and
governmental organisations which can be deployed at a local level (Ziviler Friedensdienst, 2017).
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Civil Peace Service staff implement non-violent conflict-resolution activities in the field of media 
assistance, conflict and human rights monitoring, victim support and reconciliation, peace 
education, and training of local partners. The strategy makes clear that development cooperation is 
always of a civilian character and can only support peace processes, not resolve conflicts. 
The scale of aid allocation is expected to change if a country is identified as being at risk of or in a crisis 
situation. This implies that country portfolios of crisis-affected and at-risk countries had to be re-evaluated 
after 2005. The 2005 strategy outlines this process as follows. After an in-depth conflict analysis, the 
relevant country department (Länderreferate) re-evaluates country portfolios, reformulates development 
objectives, translates these objectives into a country strategy, and realigns the country portfolio. In conflict-
affected countries this process takes place more regularly, and independently from negotiations with the 
partner government. BMZ country teams coordinate with other ministries, local partners, and non-
governmental organizations in this process.  
In addition, the strategy prescribes specific conflict-sensitive methods for engagement in countries 
identified by CEW. For example, Post Conflict Needs Assessments and participatory processes for poverty-
reduction strategies, which include various conflict parties, are considered crucial in conflict-affected 
contexts. Further, donors should take into account partners’ different absorption capacities depending on 
the stage of a conflict and link fast-impact projects with long-term measures.  
Beyond BMZ-specific instruments, the ministry also participates in the interministerial crisis-prevention 
steering group. This group promotes the development of interdepartmental country strategies in crisis-
affected situations by country working groups (Ländergesprächskreise). It is also responsible for ensuring a 
common interministerial understanding of practices, methods and indicators related to crisis prevention, 
especially Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments and “do no harm”. For this purpose, the former GTZ was 
tasked with the development of these methods, including the awareness of staff members of the ‘do no 
harm’ principle.29  
To sum up, during the first decade of the 21st century German development policy introduced its first 
systematic concept to deal with fragile states. If the integration of civilian crisis prevention and fragility 
expressed in the 2005 strategy had implications for development policy on the ground, we expect to observe 
the following empirical implications.30 
Implication 
1 More aid is committed to conflict transformation and peacebuilding 
2 Countries with a German military presence receive more aid on average 
3 Financial development cooperation for reconstruction increases in post-conflict countries 
Institution-building approaches  
In 2007 the Governance, Democracy and Rule of Law division (“Governance division”) of the BMZ 
established the process of institution-building approaches as embodied in the “Development-Oriented 
Transformation in Conditions of Fragile Statehood and Poor Government Performance” strategy. The 
division aspired to contribute to “sustainable stabilization” through “the creation of reliable state structures 
in the field of the rule of law, democracy, human rights security and strengthening civil society” (BMZ, 2007, 
29 “Sektorvorhaben Krisenprävention und Konfliktbearbeitung”. The GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit) became part of 
the GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) in 2011. 
30 The provisions of the Action Plan should have two more observable implications. First, information-sharing and joint conflict assessments 
between different ministries should improve. Second, conflict-sensitive methods should be systematically integrated into development 
cooperation. Although we cannot test these two implications based on allocation patterns, we mention them here for possible future qualitative 
analysis. 
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p.12). Constituting “a strategic entry point for tackling crisis prevention” (ibid.), these activities were aimed
at complementing the BMZ’s 2005 strategy, which was limited to conflict-affected and post-conflict
countries where development and military actors worked together (ibid., p.6–7).
The main innovation of the 2007 strategy was to assess the performance of partner countries in governance 
in terms of not only effectiveness but also legitimacy. This echoes the OECD DAC’s recognition in the 2005 
Paris Declaration that ownership is crucial for aid effectiveness and reflects the idea that donors can 
influence domestic political processes through strategically and well-designed aid. In particular, aid 
conditionality is considered a means for rewarding or sanctioning partner governments’ willingness to 
implement governance reforms (BMZ, 2007).  
The 2007 strategy proposed six fields of action to strengthen the legitimacy of partner governments and to 
enhance the capacity for non-violent change:  
The strategy recommends designing interventions in each of these action fields depending on the the 
governance level (low, medium, high) and the trend of development orientation (deteriorating, constant, 
improving). 
Influenced by the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, the BMZ’s Governance division later extended the concept 
of recipient “ownership” to include the wider population. While the 2007 strategy is centred on the state, 
the 2009 Special “Promoting Resilient States and Constructive State-Society Relations: Legitimacy, 
Transparency and Accountability”37 referred to the OECD concept of state-building as an endogenous and 
political process (BMZ, 2009), and extended governance support beyond technical cooperation for state 
institutions to “build or strengthen resilient democratic state structures” (BMZ, 2009, p. 15). As these 
31 Activities include strengthening national parliaments, civil society, pluralistic media, and political participation of marginalized groups as well as 
supporting political-administrative decentralization and good governance initiatives at regional level. 
32 Activities include adapting partner countries’ legal practice to international human rights standards, promoting and supporting the prosecution 
of war crimes through technical assistance and capacity-building of the judiciary, and strengthening independent, non-discriminatory, and 
efficient justice and legal systems to facilitate non-violent conflict resolution. 
33 The aim of security sector reform is to increase constitutional, parliamentary, and civilian oversight. Activities include strengthening authorities 
to investigate and sanction human rights abuses by security forces, promoting access to marginalized groups, improving policing, community-
level prevention work, and combating cross-border crime. 
34 Activities include strengthening transparency and accountability of the executive in public resource spending and compliance with state action, 
technical assistance for capacity and organizational development in public administrations, strengthening the fiscal base, transparent public 
finance systems and public participation in budget planning, promoting institutions to combat corruption (e.g. African Peer Review Mechanism), 
and the accountable and responsible use of natural resource revenues, as well as cooperating with local actors and international initiatives to 
monitor extractive industries. 
35 Interventions aim to promote basic health services, strengthen cooperation between governmental and non-governmental actors in the health 
sector, promote community-based schooling and safe places for learning and education that are culturally sensitive through curriculum reform, 
and improve decentralized infrastructure. 
36 Activities in this area aim to build institutional capacity to combat criminal economies, improve access to markets and employment for poor 
households, promote sustainable resource management and land distribution/rights for both sexes as well as training and job opportunities for 
vulnerable young people, and strengthen regional economic integration and border controls. 
37 In German, the paper was published as: BMZ Strategiepapier 01-2010, „Die Förderung konstruktiver Staat-Gesellschaft-Beziehungen – Legitimität, 
Transparenz, Rechenschaft.“ 
http://www.bmz.de/de/mediathek/publikationen/archiv/reihen/strategiepapiere/Strategiepapier298_01_2010_de.pdf. 
• Promoting social inclusion through democratic participation and support of legislative authorities31
• Strengthening the rule of law and social justice32
• Reforming the security sector to increase public safety and civilian control33
• Enhancing the public administration’s responsiveness to citizens34
• Providing basic social services to poor and marginalized groups35
• Improving macroeconomic performance for pro-poor growth36
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processes are considered political, development cooperation cannot limit its support to technical assistance 
for state institutions.  
Empirical implications of the 2007 and 2009 strategies 
The 2007 strategy focused on long-term institution-building and emerged in parallel with the ministry’s 
2005 peacebuilding strategy. The 2007 strategy suggested instruments to achieve results in the six above-
mentioned action areas and depending on the governance level and development orientation of a fragile 
state.38  
The 2009 Special extended governance support to non-state actors in fragile states. German development 
cooperation intended to improve governance through better state-society interactions. While remaining 
vague on which specific interventions are supported, the 2009 document clearly committed Germany to 
channelling aid to or via non-state actors in fragile states.  
We derive the following empirical implications from the strategic developments in 2007 and 2009. 
Implication 
4 More aid is channelled to non-state actors in countries with low governance and 
deteriorating development orientation 
5 More aid is committed to the direct delivery of basic services in countries with low 
governance and deteriorating development orientation 
6 Aid supports public institutions, e.g. ministries, national parliaments or local 
governments, in countries with low governance and improving development 
orientation 
7 Financial development cooperation supports the government in its national 
poverty and sectoral strategies in countries with low governance and improving 
development orientation 
8 More aid is allocated in basket funds in countries with low governance and 
constant or improving development orientation 
9 More aid is used to support local governments in countries with low governance 
and constant development orientation 
10 More assistance for crisis prevention is given to relevant regional bodies (regions) 
in countries with low governance and constant development orientation 
11 The relative share of governance aid to non-state actors, e.g. the media, increases 
Summary 
The work on peacebuilding and on institution-building is complementary. While the former establishes the 
methods of engagement and means to address conflict in fragile states, the latter focuses on questions of 
long-term governance. In the BMZ the strategies and resulting instruments exist in parallel, with the peace 
and security division focusing primarily on the former while the governance division is concerned with the 
latter. While at one point the ministry was criticized for not being adequately coordinated at the level of 
operations (Cammack et al., 2006), the BMZ now emphasizes the degree to which the relevant divisions 
work together (see also Federal Government of Germany, 2017). At the same time, the BMZ is of course only 
one of several German actors on fragile states, including the AA, the Ministry of Defence, and even the 
Ministry of Interior (e.g. for police training). 
38 For the detailed recommendations, see online appendix. 
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3.3.2 Responding to the Arab Spring: a new approach to stabilization 
In 2012, the Federal Government released the “Interdepartmental Guidelines for a Coherent Policy of the 
German Federal Government in Fragile States”. These provide the basis for a reform of the BMZ strategy 
towards fragile states, laid out in the 2013 strategy “Development for Peace and Security”.  
The uprisings in MENA countries – the so-called “Arab Spring” – illustrated that the existing approach of 
development cooperation had not led to stabilization, but might even have fuelled instability (Grävingholt, 
2016). The Arab Spring led to a new focus on the countries of the MENA region and brought new issues onto 
the agenda of foreign and development policy-making. This is illustrated, for instance, in the fourth report 
of the Bundestag on the implementation of the 2004 Action Plan (Bundesregierung, 2014). This explicitly 
mentions the political and social upheavals in the Arab world as a trigger for changes in the direction of 
development cooperation. We therefore focus on developments around 2012 as a second critical juncture. 
Contextual factors 
Developments at the national and international levels preceded the second critical juncture in Germany’s 
fragile states policy. These conditioned and influenced the development of the 2012 and 2013 documents. 
The domestic environment 
The creation of a German strategy on fragile states as embodied in the 2004 Action Plan was an important 
step. However, academics and civil society criticized its substance and operationalization. In general, 
observers agree that a lack of political will and organizational resources obstructed the plan’s 
operationalization. 
At the political level, the development of two approaches within the BMZ and the absence of coordination 
with other German actors over fragile states was blamed on the lack of strategic prioritization in the 2004 
Action Plan, which put forward 161 action points without setting any priorities (Beirat Zivile 
Krisenprävention, 2014; Kirschner, 2007). A lack of prioritization is particularly problematic in fragile and 
conflict-affected states because of multiple dilemmas that occur in these contexts and require actors to 
make a trade-off (Faust et al., 2013; Furness, 2014; Schneckener, 2007).  
Moreover, the political dilemma between public demands at home and in recipient countries (Faust et al., 
2013) was not adequately addressed. One proposed means to deal with this shortcoming was investment in 
a dedicated communications strategy about the Action Plan to the German public (Beirat Zivile 
Krisenprävention, 2008; Nachtwei, 2010). 
Furthermore, the absence of political leadership by one ministry (Nachtwei, 2010) and fragmentation 
between coexisting approaches on fragile states created bureaucratic problems. Actors’ and ministries’ 
uncoordinated trade-offs led to incoherencies, a lack of coordination, and even competition between actors, 
e.g. during reconstruction in Kunduz, Afghanistan (Hofmann, 2007).
At the organizational level, the main criticism related to budget allocations, civil society inclusion, and 
shared early warning of crises. While the budget for civilian crisis prevention increased over time, it was 
insufficiently coordinated between ministries. The interdepartmental steering group’s mandate was 
reduced from the allocation of funds to different ministerial activities to non-binding information exchange 
(Nachtwei, 2010; Stengel and Weller, 2008).  
In addition, in its response to the government’s implementation report, the Advisory Board regretted that 
its expertise was not sufficiently taken into account. This was blamed on the operational capacity and 
influence of the steering group (Beirat Zivile Krisenprävention, 2008). By 2010 no shared early warning 
mechanism had been established as announced in the Action Plan and demanded by the Advisory Board 
(Faust, 2011; Faust et al., 2013). 
The international environment 
At the international level, the disappointing results and academic criticism of liberal state-building efforts 
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the DRC (Burgess, 2017; Paris, 2010) increasingly required donors to justify their 
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engagement in fragile contexts (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013; Pospisil and Kühn, 2016). The 2011 “New 
Deal For Engagement in Fragile States” between traditional donor countries and the self-declared g7+ group 
of fragile states served as a legitimizing factor for Western state-building (Hingorani, 2015; Mac Ginty and 
Richmond, 2013; Nussbaum et al., 2012). Its focus on recipient–donor relations and the emphasis on 
legitimacy through local involvement shaped international state-building strategy. The five peace- and 
state-building goals (PSG5) concluded in the New Deal subsequently served as a reference for German 
policies towards fragile states.39 
However, the criticism of Germany’s fragile states agenda was only heard at the decision-making level 
during the Arab Spring. German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle concluded that “for too long regime or 
government stability was confused with state stability”40 (Boldt, 2012).  
The implications were twofold. First, autocratic partner regimes in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula 
were explicitly considered fragile after popular upheaval and erupting conflicts. The popular uprisings had 
been predicted neither by political analysts nor by fragility indices (Buterbaugh et al., 2017; Gause, 2011). 
Second, popular upheavals in autocratically governed partner countries raised questions about how 
Germany could strategically and coherently engage with partner regimes that suffered from serious 
legitimacy deficits (Asseburg, 2011).  
Towards coherent policies: the comprehensive approach and the local turn 
In 2012, the “grand coalition” government released “Interdepartmental Guidelines for a Coherent Policy of 
the German Federal Government in Fragile States”. The BMZ Peace and Security division operationalized 
these guidelines in the 2013 strategy “Development for Peace and Security”. The latter replaced the 
division’s 2005 strategy and is its current reference document for development cooperation in fragile states. 
By explicitly integrating elements from the 2007 BMZ governance strategy, the 2013 strategy seeks to bring 
the two tracks together inside the ministry (BMZ, 2013a, p.4). 
Comprehensive approach 
The 2012 guidelines address the problem of multiple coexisting strategies by introducing the comprehensive 
approach (“Vernetzte Sicherheit”) to German cooperation with fragile partner countries. Introduced in the 
2006 Weißbuch published by the Federal Ministry of Defence, Vernetze Sicherheit treats security as a global 
and multidimensional concept. It is assumed that the military can no longer ensure security on its own. 
Rather, a networked response to crises by various German and international actors is required.41 The 
comprehensive approach builds on the assumption that German development, military, and other actors 
(can) have common goals and methods of engagement and complement each other according to their 
comparative advantage in fragile states (Wittkowsky and Meierjohann, 2011). Put succinctly, civilian and 
military crisis responses should no longer follow different logics and objectives. 
This has implications for development cooperation: while it remains civilian in nature, the comprehensive 
approach extends its mandate beyond crisis prevention. The BMZ strategy requires “the overall portfolio of 
instruments [to be geared] systematically and strategically to the respective development policy objectives” 
(BMZ, 2013b, p.19) and the sequencing of these instruments to be improved. 
The local turn  
The 2012 guidelines also emphasize the importance of supporting endogenous processes and local 
ownership, reflecting the “local turn” in state-building and the importance of “ownership” in development 
39 The five goals are: legitimate politics: foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution; security: establish and strengthen people’s 
security; justice: address injustices and increase people’s access to justice; economic foundations: generate employment and improve livelihoods; 
revenues & services: manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery. 
40 Exact quote in German: “Viel zu lange wurde die Stabilität von Staaten mit der Stabilität von Regierungen verwechselt“.
41 “Sicherheit kann daher weder rein national noch allein durch Streitkräfte gewährleistet werden“ (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2006, 
p.25). 
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cooperation more generally. Accelerated by the g7+ activism, disappointing results of state-building in the 
1990s, and declining enthusiasm for the “War on Terror”, the “local turn” seeks to strengthen inclusive 
bottom-up processes in fragile states (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013; Pospisil and Kühn, 2016). 
The BMZ’s 2013 strategy moves beyond a purely institutionalist understanding of governance. This has led 
some to claim that the 2012 and 2013 publications eclipse the central state (Pospisil and Kühn, 2016). We, 
however, would argue that the strategy rather reflects a changed understanding of the concept of state: it 
remains central but is increasingly understood in relation to wider society and local indigenous (less 
formalized) institutional settings (see Grävingholt et al., 2015). Consequently, development cooperation 
aims to “strengthen states and their societies in terms of their adaptability and resilience to external shocks 
and crises” (BMZ, 2013b, p.10) through political settlement and improved state-society relations. Ideally, 
activities link the central state to the local level, or at least support both.  
Finally, to display a change in donor-recipient relations towards more local ownership in state-building, the 
core areas of action in the 2013 strategy converge with the New Deal’s Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 
Goals (PSG5).  
Empirical implications of the 2013 strategy 
The BMZ’s embracing of the comprehensive approach in 2013 aims to improve civilian-military links, the 
sequencing of instruments, and coordination with other foreign actors in fragile states. Furthermore, the 
2013 strategy  proposes a wide array of instruments in fragile states: technical and financial cooperation, 
private-sector development cooperation, and the Civil Peace Service (BMZ, 2013b).  
Structure-supporting transitional aid (ESÜH) links humanitarian and development efforts. This requires 
coordination with the AA, which is responsible for humanitarian aid. The BMZ 2013 “Strategy on Transitional 
Development Assistance” reforms the instrument (BMZ, 2013c). It is different from development assistance 
and previous transitional aid because support is not limited to BMZ partner countries, but explicitly 
prioritizes fragile, post-conflict, and protracted crisis contexts where cooperation with the recipient 
government is impossible (BMZ, 2013c, p.10). The BMZ’s control of ESÜH extends its competences for 
participating in interventions in crisis situations where development cooperation is not possible. This 
strengthens its role in fragile states beyond governance support and in relation to the AA, though it should 
be noted that previously the BMZ was already in charge of developmental emergency and transitional aid 
(ENÜH).  
Unlike the EU, Germany regards general budgetary support as an inadequate form of aid for fragile states. 
This may somewhat contradict the emphasis on ownership in the New Deal, a reference document for 
Germany’s 2013 strategy, because exiting from budget support can reduce the ownership of partner 
countries (Orth et al., 2018). 
The introduction of the national cross-sectoral FS marker reflects the increased links between civil and 
military crisis management. It labels projects contributing to peace and security objectives, thereby giving 
the FS marker a broader application than the KR marker it replaced. 
In summary, we derive the following empirical implications from the discussion. As above, the empirical 
analysis is limited to those implications that can be tested with data on allocations.  
Implication 
12 Non-partner countries that are affected by armed conflict or in the transition phase receive 
transitional aid 
13 More aid was allocated to conflict prevention programmes 
14 No aid was granted in the form of budgetary support 
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3.3.3 At the crossroads: the 2017 interministerial guidelines “Preventing crises, managing conflicts, 
building peace” 
In 2017, the Federal Government released the interministerial guidelines “Preventing Crises, Managing 
Conflicts, Building Peace”. Unlike the 2012 guidelines, these replaced the 2004 Action Plan. The release of 
the guidelines did not follow a critical juncture. With a view to phasing out German engagement in 
Afghanistan, the Federal Government aimed to preserve its knowledge on engagement in fragile states.  
The 2017 version fulfils the task formulated in the 2012 guidelines to define Germany’s priorities for bilateral 
engagement in fragile states. These priorities should be determined by the immediate threat that the 
situation in a partner country poses to Germany’s and Europe’s domestic security, the international 
community’s expectations of Germany, and Germany’s capacity to contribute to improvements in partner 
countries (Federal Government of Germany, 2017). 
Unlike the EU’s Global Strategy and the 2013 BMZ strategy, the 2017 guidelines do not juxtapose resilience 
and fragility (Wagner and Anholt, 2016). Rather, resilience is portrayed as an objective to strengthen the 
absorption capacities of all countries, irrespective of their fragility. This reflects the SDGs’ principles of 
universality for all UN member states. Resilience can thus be regarded as an umbrella term for sustainable 
long-term stabilization in fragile states beyond military means. It includes and connects conflict prevention 
and post-conflict rehabilitation, which extend over a longer period. Furthermore, unlike previous buzzwords 
in international development – such as “democracy” or “human security” – the malleability of resilience may 
provide an opportunity for networked security. Consequently, resilience may provide common ground for 
actors from different backgrounds with diverging interests, e.g. military and civilian staff, traditional and 
non-traditional donors, humanitarian and development workers, and state and non-state actors (ibid.).42 The 
influence of the resilience discourse in Germany is apparent in the creation in 2015 of a division in the AA 
responsible for “conflict prevention, stabilization and conflict rehabilitation” (Wittkowsky, 2017).  
However, the guidelines are careful not to use resilience as a leitmotif. They seldom mention resilience (nine 
times) compared to stabilization (31 times) and prevention (85 times). This may be related to the fact that 
resilience remains an ambiguous term that leaves room for debate about its aims and implementation 
(Chandler, 2013).  
Efforts to operationalize the 2017 guidelines are currently ongoing across various ministries. In the BMZ, 
different cross-sectoral divisions (Querschnittsreferate) operationalize the guidelines with particular 
attention paid to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In addition, the BMZ participates in theme-
specific interministerial task forces. For example, the BMZ’s Governance division is a member of a newly 
created task force on justice and the rule of law. At present, however, the 2013 strategy “Development for 
Peace and Security” remains the framework of reference for official development cooperation in fragile 
states. 
Summary 
German development cooperation policy towards fragile states has constantly evolved, as evidenced by 
continuous debate and strategic reorientation.  
The understanding of fragility and risks when operating in fragile contexts has improved and taken up 
academic debates on how to define fragility (see Chapter 2). Moreover, policymakers have adjusted 
strategies to changing requirements in the global environment. On the one hand, this refers to international 
developments in states affected by fragility. On the other, strategies have taken into account policy-making 
at the international level. For example, the German Federal Government released the 2004 Action Plan for 
Crisis Prevention and the 2017 guidelines one year after the 2003 EU Security Strategy (ESS) and the 2016 
42 The BRICS and other emerging donor countries refused to sign the 2011 “New Deal on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding” in Busan. In particular,
non-traditional donors accuse the good governance paradigm of interventionism, the promotion of Western concepts of legitimate statehood, 
and stigmatizing aid recipients through the “fragile states” label. 
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EU Global Strategy (EUGS) respectively. Developments in the OECD DAC’s meetings on aid effectiveness 
and the findings from the States of Fragility Report published annually since 2012 also inform German policy. 
Similarly, the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report “Conflict, Security and Development” 
influenced the BMZ’s 2013 strategy. The former reveals a rethinking of legitimacy and the involvement of 
grass-roots actors by emphasizing the importance of citizens’ “institutional trust” and “layered approaches” 
in conflict-affected states.   
Strategies on development cooperation in fragile contexts increasingly incorporate insights from academic 
research. This is particularly true with regard to the conceptualization of state fragility (Paris, 2011). 
Nonetheless, there remain gaps in relation to the operationalization and implementation of academic 
insights (Baranyi and Desrosiers, 2012). In the following section, we put our empirical implications to the 
test. 
3.4 Empirical results 
Table 10 presents the aggregated results of the empirical analysis. All descriptive and inferential results are 
included in the online appendix.43 
Table 10 Results of empirical analysis 
Implication Year Result 
1 More aid is committed to conflict transformation and peacebuilding 2005 ++ 
2 Countries with a German military presence receive more aid on average 2005 ++ 
3 Financial development cooperation for reconstruction increases in post-
conflict countries 
2005 ++ 
4 More aid is channelled to non-state actors in countries with low governance 
and deteriorating development orientation 
2007 - 
5 More aid is committed to the direct delivery of basic services in countries 
with low governance and deteriorating development orientation 
2007 + 
6 Aid supports public institutions, e.g. ministries, national parliaments or 
local governments, in countries with low governance and improving 
development orientation 
2007 ++ 
7 Financial development cooperation supports the government in its national 
poverty and sectoral strategies in countries with low governance and 
improving development orientation 
2007 -- 
8 More aid is allocated in basket funds in countries with low governance and 
constant or improving development orientation 
2007 (0) 
9 More aid is used to support local governments in countries with low 
governance and constant development orientation 
2007 + 
10 More assistance for crisis prevention is given to relevant regional bodies 
(regions) in countries with low governance and constant development 
orientation 
2007 NA 
11 The relative share of governance aid to non-state actors, e.g. the media, 
increases 
2009 - 
43 We cannot test implication 10 since we do not have data on the regional level because it cannot be linked to national data on fragility. We 
nevertheless include the implications in the table for reasons of completeness. 
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Implication Year Result 
12 Non-partner countries that are affected by armed conflict or in the 
transition phase receive transitional aid 
2013 ++ 
13 More aid was allocated to conflict prevention programmes 2013 + 
14 No aid was granted in the form of budgetary support 2013 + 
2005 strategy 
With regard to implication 1, we find strong evidence that allocations to conflict transformation and 
peacebuilding increased. The analytical results show a positive and significant coefficient and thus point in 
the same direction.  
Concerning implication 2, we find steadily increasing total commitments to countries with Bundeswehr 
missions. The relative share of commitments does not show a steadily increasing trend, but rather an overall 
increase. The analytical results show a positive and significant coefficient. Overall, we find strong evidence 
that commitments follow strategic implication 2. 
Tests of the last implication of the 2005 strategy show an increase in financial development cooperation for 
reconstruction in post-conflict countries, particularly after 2009, when taking into account total and relative 
commitments. The econometric approach shows a positive and significant coefficient. Overall, we find 
strong evidence that commitments follow strategic implication 3. 
In summary, we find that allocations follow the 2005 strategy. 
2007 and 2009 strategies 
On implication 4, we find a small increase in total commitments to non-state actors in countries with low 
governance and deteriorating development orientation. The relative share of commitments fluctuates and 
shows no clear trend. The coefficient on the interaction in our inferential approach is negative and 
significant. Overall, we find weak evidence against the implementation of the strategy with regard to 
implication 4.  
Looking at implication 5, we find that total aid committed to the direct delivery of basic services in countries 
with low governance and deteriorating governance orientation increased, whereas the development of 
relative share does not show a clear pattern. The inferential results return a positive but non-significant 
coefficient. We regard this as weak evidence that commitments developed according to implication 5.  
Commitments supporting public institutions in countries with low governance and improving development 
orientation vary greatly from year to year but show an overall increase in respect of total commitments and 
the share of commitments. This result is supported by the inferential analysis. The coefficient is positive but 
not significant. Since all approaches point in the same direction, we rate this as strong evidence that aid 
commitments were allocated according to implication 6. 
With regard to implication 7, we find almost no allocations in the sectors concerned. The statistical analysis 
returns a non-significant positive coefficient, which is probably due to a single project in 2017.44 We regard 
this as strong evidence against implementation of this implication. However, implication 7 was superseded 
by implication 14, which might explain the lack of implementation.  
Implication 8 considers aid commitments in the form of basket funds to countries in the BMZ portfolio with 
low governance and constant or improving development orientation. Since, due to missing data, the first 
observation dates from 2010,45 we do not test the implication statistically. We find no clear trend in respect 
44 The sharp increase in 2017 is due to a single KfW project on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Finance.
45 The use of the CRS Code “Basket Funds/pooled funding” started in 2010. 
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of total commitments or the share of commitments. As the available data show no clear pattern, there is 
uncertainty about implementation of implication 8. 
Implication 9 states that more aid supports local governments in countries with low governance and 
constant development orientation. Neither the total nor the relative commitments show an increase in the 
first years after publication of the strategy. By contrast, the inferential statistic shows a significant positive 
coefficient, although the results are driven by an increase in commitments after 2013, which is seven years 
after publication of the strategy. In summary, we find weak evidence that commitments were allocated in 
accordance with implication 9.  
Implication 10 focuses on aid commitments to relevant regional bodies. Due to missing data on the regional 
level, we cannot test this hypothesis.  
The 2009 strategy states that commitments in the form of governance aid to non-state actors should 
increase. We test this in implication 11. The total commitments show a steady decline after 2006 followed 
by a temporary increase in 2013, 2014, and 2017. The relative share of commitments declines continuously 
after 2007 except for 2013 and 2017. The inferential approach yields a significant negative coefficient. We 
thus find weak evidence against implementation of the 2009 strategy with regard to implication 11. 
2013 strategy 
Total and relative transitional aid commitments to non-partner countries in conflict or transition rose after 
publication of the 2013 strategy. The coefficient of the inferential model is positive and significant. We thus 
conclude that there is strong evidence that allocations are in line with implication 12.  
Conflict prevention programmes in fragile states see an increase in total commitments after 2013, as 
indicated in implication 13. The result for the relative share of aid commitments is less clear. The treatment 
effect from the inferential analysis is negative, but very small and not significant. Overall, we interpret this 
as weak evidence for the implementation of the strategy. 
The descriptive analysis of implication 14 shows a large decline in aid commitments in the form of general 
budgetary support, which started in 2011. We find an increase in 2017, which is due to a single project. 
Treating this project as an exception to an otherwise consistent trend, we interpret our findings as weak 
evidence that aid commitments were allocated according to implication 14. 
Discussion 
Our investigation of patterns of commitment shows that aid allocations broadly follow the strategies. 
Before presenting the results in more detail, we highlight three limitations of the study. First, evidence on 
changes in commitments does not provide direct insights into aid effectiveness. However, in respect of the 
latter, the results in Chapter 5 broadly suggest that the success of projects in fragile contexts is not 
significantly lower than in other contexts. Second, while the statistical study of policy changes after critical 
junctures across cases delivers insights on whether written strategies affect policy-making, it does not 
sufficiently illuminate the causal mechanisms explaining how the written word might or might not shape 
policies in individual cases. We have taken steps in this direction by systematically looking at decision-
making processes. However, this evaluation has not systematically tested the impact of organizational 
features on strategy implementation. Third, we base our findings exclusively on an analysis of commitments. 
Consequently, we do not test all implications derived from the strategies. For instance, we cannot 
adequately test whether the planning and implementation of interventions follows awareness of the “do no 
harm” principle. Future research/evaluations should invest in systematically evaluating the quality of 
interventions in fragile states in terms of principles such as conflict analysis and do no harm. With these 
limitations in mind, the following summarizes our findings.  
With some exceptions, we find significant changes in the distribution of obligations for sectors mentioned 
in the strategies. These results show that allocation patterns are mostly in line with policy recommendations 
as laid out in strategy documents.   
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However, two policy recommendations were not as well implemented. First, although we should be cautious 
due to data limitations, we do not find evidence of an increase in commitments to basket funds (implication 
8). Basket funds, i.e. the joint financing of a specific purpose by multiple donors through a single account, 
have the potential to improve development cooperation in fragile countries. Although evidence on basket 
funds remains scarce (D’Aquino et al., 2019), they promise greater donor coordination and harmonization 
as well as increased ownership (Manuel et al., 2012). Hence, the use of basket funds is in line with the aid 
effectiveness agenda (3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2008; High Level Forum, 2005). Moreover, 
basket funds have the potential to reduce the administrative burden faced by partner countries by reducing 
the need for bilateral coordination with multiple donors and uniform procedures (Commins et al., 2019). This 
can be particularly important in states with low capacity. 
Second, there is weak evidence of decreasing support to non-state actors against implications 4 and 11. 
These findings support the view that German development cooperation prioritizes an active role of the state 
specifically in service delivery, in contrast to donors that favour market-oriented delivery of public services 
such as Canada, the United Kingdom or Scandinavian countries, which often bypass state institutions 
(Dietrich, 2016). This touches upon the question of whether state or non-state actors are suitable partners 
for development cooperation in fragile contexts. Arguably, the use of country systems in fragile states 
entails risks that might be mitigated using a parallel system such as channelling support through non-state 
actors (Manuel et al., 2012). This probably explains the finding that, in general, donors channel development 
cooperation through non-state actors where governance is low (Acht et al., 2015; Dietrich, 2013). Here, 
service delivery through non-state actors might be more efficient. Our result in Chapter 5 that project 
success in the health sector is lower in low-capacity countries also points in this direction. However, in 
authoritarian countries – where the commitment to delivering public goods can be expected to be lower 
than in democracies (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Lieberman, 2018) – bypassing partner countries’ 
governments can reduce incentives to demand policy reforms and accountability, thereby strengthening 
authoritarian regimes (DiLorenzo, 2018). This is important since German development cooperation 
specifically emphasizes the importance of non-state actors to “support a bottom-up approach towards 
democratisation and active political involvement” (BMZ, 2009a, p.29), especially in countries affected by 
crisis where efficient government-to-government aid is not possible. Future research could further 
differentiate the effects of bypass aid for different types of development cooperation, partner countries, 
and non-state partners. In any case, our findings support the observation that “engaging with non-state 
actors and legitimate local organisations to strengthen state-society relations remains a challenge for 
development partners” (OECD, 2011a, p.15).  
3.5 Results and recommendations 
We summarize the analysis of strategies and allocations as follows. First, we discuss the results of the 
analysis of strategic shifts and continuities and link them to the academic debate. Second, we summarize 
the allocation analysis. We conclude each of these with a recommendation.  
Based on an analysis of eight key strategy papers published between 2004 and 2017 by the German Federal 
Government and the BMZ, our analysis has identified important strategic shifts during two critical 
junctures: 9/11 and the Arab Spring. With each of these, new discourses have emerged on how development 
cooperation can be adapted to the challenges arising from fragility. At the same time, Germany has 
constantly revised strategies and concepts based on international and domestic developments. 
Consequently, the approach to fragility has evolved over the years and has seen fundamental changes. 
The Al-Qaeda attacks on 11 September 2001 brought fragile states onto the international agenda. In 
Germany, the 2004 Interministerial Action Plan “Civilian crisis prevention, conflict transformation and 
peace consolidation” can be considered the first joined-up strategy targeting a distinct group of fragile 
states.  
Since then, two approaches have emerged in German development cooperation towards fragile states: 
peacebuilding and institution-building. Although we have seen major innovations within each of these 
approaches and, more recently, attempts to integrate them more closely, they have both maintained a 
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considerable degree of autonomy. This is evidenced by the fact that they are anchored in two different 
divisions – today even in different directorates-general – in the BMZ, draw on different concepts of fragility 
(see Chapter 2), and are represented by different strands of strategy papers. 
The institutional specialization must be considered against the background that the foci of peace- and 
institution-building are distinct but complementary. They are distinct because, on the one hand, 
peacebuilding is about more than building strong and inclusive institutions. For instance, it also includes 
disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration, or the reconstruction of infrastructure. On the other hand, 
institutions affect environmental, economic, and social development and thus go beyond peacebuilding. At 
the same time, peace- and institution-building are complementary (Federal Government of Germany, 2017). 
Political institutions and development orientation are probably among the key determinants of the risk of 
violent conflict escalation. For instance, institutions include or exclude groups from power, wealth, and 
decision-making processes, thereby aggravating or mitigating inequalities in society which in turn can lead 
to conflict (Cederman et al., 2013; Østby, 2008; Stewart, 2008). Moreover, there is evidence that institutional 
quality such as rule of law, low corruption, and bureaucratic quality can reduce the likelihood of the onset 
of civil war (Fjelde, 2009; Taydas et al., 2010), whereas good governance can reduce the likelihood of conflict 
recurring (Hegre and Nygård, 2015). Put more generally, institutions form the structural conditions that 
shape the incentives of societal, economic, and political actors and thereby influence the decision to resort 
to violence or play by the rules as embodied in institutions. For similar reasons, peacebuilding processes 
often centre on the question of shaping institutions. But peace and conflict also affect institutions: 
institutional changes due to violent conflict can render obsolete an assessment of governance and 
development orientation. 
In the light of the distinct nature of peace- and institution-building and the fact that strategies have been 
implemented well, the institutional specialization within the BMZ seems fit for purpose. Moreover, it seems 
advisable to maintain separate concepts for crisis early warning – such as the CEW, overseen by the Peace 
and Conflict division – and governance, such as the Catalogue of Criteria for Assessing Development 
Orientation, overseen by the Governance division (see Chapter 2). 
At the same time, successful development cooperation in fragile states must always take into account 
peace- and institution-building together. A close collaboration among the responsible organizational units 
would ensure complementarity. The joint reflection of development orientation, the level of governance, 
and CEW are a good step in doing justice to the complementary yet distinct nature of peace- and institution-
building.  
The current revision of the CEW and the measurement of the level of governance provides an opportunity 
to further deepen cooperation, develop a uniform understanding of fragility, and eliminate potential 
redundancies by possibly integrating existing approaches (see Recommendation 1). On the one hand, this 
may include more clearly defining and demarcating the objectives of both approaches. On the other, joint 
data collection on shared indicators could increase efficiency and thereby improve assessments. 
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We thus make the following recommendation: 
Recommendation 2 
Based on a systematic conceptual comparison of approaches to defining and measuring fragility, an 
analysis of strategy documents, a review of the structure and processes of the German bilateral 
development cooperation system, and interviews, this evaluation recommends that the BMZ maintain its 
practice of dealing separately with questions of peace and security, and of governance. At the same time, 
the BMZ should ensure coordination and complementarity between the responsible organizational units 
wherever possible. The BMZ should systematically compare concept designs across both divisions with 
the aim of clearly demarcating approaches in order to avoid duplication and redundancy. Where concept 
designs complement one another, a formal mechanism for sharing indicators and data collection efforts 
should be established. 
The investigation of patterns of commitment shows that aid allocations broadly follow the strategies. After 
2005, more aid was committed to conflict transformation and peacebuilding, to fragile countries with a 
German military presence, and to reconstruction in post-conflict countries. After 2007, more aid was 
committed to the direct delivery of basic services in countries with low governance and deteriorating 
development orientation; there were more commitments supporting public institutions in countries with 
low governance and improving development orientation; and more was committed to support local 
governments in countries with low governance and constant development orientation. After 2013, aid 
commitments to non-partner countries in conflict or transition rose, and conflict-prevention programmes 
in fragile states saw an increase in total and relative commitments. We also find that the more general 
strategy of exiting from budgetary support also applies to fragile states.  
Although these results show that allocation patterns are mostly in line with policy recommendations as laid 
down in strategy documents, we also find some strategies to be less well implemented. First, we do not find 
evidence of an increase in commitments to basket funds, an instrument promising greater donor 
coordination and harmonization as well as increased ownership and reduced administrative burden faced 
by partner countries. Second, we find weak evidence of decreasing support to non-state actors, contrary to 
strategic recommendations. Both findings touch upon the question of whether state or non-state actors are 
suitable partners for development cooperation in fragile contexts.  
In summary, one of the main challenges lies in the strategic orientation of German development 
cooperation with regard to the question of what channels of delivery – among them the partner government 
and non-state actors – offer the greatest benefits of development cooperation in fragile contexts. The 
strategies under analysis in this chapter already go a long way in tailoring instruments to the local context 
by making recommendations that are conditional on the fragility, governance, and development orientation 
of partner countries. However, in some cases implementation is falling behind. 
We thus make the following recommendation: 
Recommendation 3 
Based on an analysis of strategy documents and commitments, and a screening of the literature, this 
evaluation recommends that the BMZ ensure the implementation of its strategies specifically with regard 
to the support of non-state actors in fragile contexts. The BMZ should also develop a concrete action plan 
to assess and possibly adapt guiding principles on cooperation with non-state actors in fragile contexts 
based on available evidence. 
Moreover, the BMZ should continue the good practice of constantly adapting strategies to the ever-
improving understanding of successful development cooperation in fragile contexts. The existing practice 
of tailoring strategic recommendations to contextual conditions is likely to do justice to the increasing 
analytical precision of scientific research and the validity of scientific explanations that depend on 
particular background conditions. 
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter takes a meta-evaluation perspective investigating the relationship between fragility and 
evaluation quality. Church and Shouldice (2002) stress the importance of improving the practice and testing 
of theories of change for project success and point out the challenge of doing so in evidence-based ways. 
However, more than half (55%) of the agencies surveyed by Steets et al. (2016) stated that they were “not 
so satisfied” or “not satisfied at all” with monitoring and evaluation of their implementing partners.  
In a recent meta-study, Noltze et al. (2018c) found that the quality of evaluation reports varies across a range 
of factors. The quality of reports is crucial for understanding the success of development cooperation in two 
respects. On the one hand, report quality may be an influencing factor when it comes to assessing project 
success in a context of fragility. On the other hand, evaluation reports are crucial for understanding what 
works in fragile contexts (Winckler Andersen et al., 2014). A negative impact of fragility on evaluation quality 
would impede better knowledge about aid effectiveness, particularly in those contexts where effective 
development cooperation is most needed. 
This chapter examines how fragile contexts might influence the quality of evaluation. We explore the total 
effect of fragility on evaluation quality and examine the explanatory power of individual mechanisms. 
Furthermore, we formulate recommendations concerning strategically and operationally effective 
evaluation in fragile contexts and suggest ways to address potential challenges.  
4.2 Theory: quality determinants 
Fragility may affect evaluation quality through the local context, the characteristics of the project, and the 
nature of the evaluation. This section discusses mechanisms in each of these spheres as derived from 
evaluation guidelines, scientific research papers, and monitoring reports on lessons learnt published by 
international organizations. Figure 4 summarizes the discussion.  
First, context characteristics may impede evaluators’ mobility and/or their access to the population. 
Potential causes are:  
The volatile environment in a fragile country may also influence the planning and implementation of 
evaluations. When under time pressure, compromises are made in terms of baseline data, control groups, 
or other evaluation quality factors. Moreover, a sensitive political climate, security concerns, and lack of 
mutual trust within a society may influence the response behaviour or the willingness of local actors 
(especially the population) to share information (Chapman et al., 2009; Church and Shouldice, 2002; Krueger 
and Sagmeister, 2014). People who are unsure about their personal safety or that of their family, or 
respondents in a societal atmosphere of mistrust, may think twice about whether a particular piece of 
information they might give could have negative consequences. 
Second, fragility can affect development projects. While Steets et al. (2016) mainly see capacity challenges, 
Chapman (2009) and Davenport and Moore (2015) emphasize interests, ownership or “willingness” issues. 
Regarding capacities, M&E systems or indicators might be weak or lacking. This may affect local partners 
and aid agencies alike. Possible causes are the lack of resources in terms of knowledge, time, and funding, 
or high staff turnover due to work pressures and rotation requirements in fragile countries (Chapman, 2009; 
Development Researchers Network, 2011). In terms of “willingness”, reduced motivation to share 
information openly may arise from an “affirmative culture” or perceived pressure to report overly positive 
results (e.g. in order to secure future funding). In addition, concerns about public image, uncooperative work 
atmosphere within the project, and relations with the project donor may affect openness to evaluation 
• Concerns about the personal safety of evaluators and other actors such as interviewees
• Security regulations of international or local agencies limiting movement
• Restricted access to specific areas due to a poor security environment
• Poor infrastructure, e.g. communications and transport (Church and Shouldice, 2002; Steets et al.,
2016; Stoddard and Jillani, 2016).
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(Church and Shouldice, 2002; Davenport and Moore, 2015; HAP - Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, 
2013; Heathershaw, 2012; Ruppert et al., 2016; Stoddard and Jillani, 2016).   
Third, evaluation itself can be challenging in fragile contexts. Fragility may affect: 
Whether these mechanisms are at work in fragile contexts may depend on resources in terms of time and 
money available to evaluators, as well as on the power or dependency relationship with donors, local entities 
and other stakeholders. Moreover, Winckler Andersen et al. (Winckler Andersen et al., 2014) point out that 
evaluation in fragile contexts puts not only the evaluator but also local partners at risk. In addition, the 
evaluator might be confronted with situations requiring particular skills, e.g. building trust and using 
informal spaces, sensitivity and risk of misinterpretation, or reaction to the vulnerability of respondents and 
integrity issues (Chapman et al., 2009; Davenport and Moore, 2015; Davison, 2004; Fassin, 2012; OECD, 
2012). 
In summary, we derive the following hypothetical causes, hereinafter referred to as “mechanisms”, of low 
evaluation quality in fragile contexts from the theoretical review: 
1. The mobility of evaluators reduces their access to the population
2. There is a low level of trust within the population
3. An affirmative culture among project staff causes respondents to report project results too
positively
4. Due to a lack of resources, the monitoring and evaluation capacity within the project evaluated is
low
5. Evaluators – depending as they do on a cooperative environment – work in a tense atmosphere of
power relations and interest constellations, and may be influenced by stakeholders
6. Due to a lack of resources, the monitoring and evaluation capacity of the evaluator or the evaluation
team is low
4.3 Method 
The assessment of evaluation quality is based on Noltze et al. (2018b). They studied a range of evaluation 
criteria derived from the literature on evaluation (Patton, 2008; Scriven, 2009; Stufflebeam, 2001; Widmer, 
2006) and development cooperation (Carlsson and Wohlgemuth, 1996; Hageboeck et al., 2013; Leeuw and 
Cooksy, 2005). Moreover, evaluation guidelines from the GIZ and KfW and other meta-evaluations are taken 
into account (Caspari, 2014; Huber et al., 2014; Raetzell and Krämer, 2013). Noltze et al. (2018b) used 16 
different criteria for the quality of evaluation reports that take on the value 1 if the criterion is fulfilled, and 
0 otherwise. Examples include research design (e.g. whether a control group existed) and robustness (e.g. 
whether data was triangulated) (see Noltze et al. 2018b, Table 4, pp. 74–75).  
To operationalize our main explanatory variables on fragility, we draw on Constellations of State Fragility 
(see Chapter 2) and measure fragility through its three dimensions of authority, capacity and legitimacy 
• The recruitment of evaluators (it may be difficult to enlist qualified personnel for missions in
insecure conditions)
• The conceptual framing (e.g. learning or accountability)
• The choice of evaluation questions, projects to evaluate, interviewees, and data sources (if specific
areas or groups of people are not accessible)
• Resources for the evaluation
• The methods applied
• The sources disclosed (if the security of informants cannot be guaranteed, their identity should not
be revealed by the evaluation)
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separately.46 In order to test the overall effect of fragility, we construct an index of state fragility in which 
we aggregate the three dimensions by calculating their mean. To facilitate interpretation in the descriptive 
graphs (Figure 5) and for the mediation analyses, we also construct a binary measure of fragility which equals 
1 for values of a fragility value larger than 0.5, and 0 otherwise. As such cut-off points always risk being 
arbitrary, we use different cut-off points in the statistical analyses to assess the robustness of our findings.47 
Figure 4 depicts the hypothesized relationship between fragility and evaluation quality via the six proposed 
mechanisms. We also consider different types of fragility (see Chapter 2) in the descriptive quantitative 
analyses.48  
Suitable operationalizations for a quantitative test of potential causal mechanisms exist for three variables: 
mobility, trust among the population, and project M&E. The degree of mobility at country level is expressed 
by the variable “timeliness”, which forms part of the World Bank Logistics Performance Index (Arvis et al., 
2018). This reflects the share of ordered shipments that reach their final destination within the scheduled 
period. To operationalize trust among the population, we use the variable “social capital” consisting of the 
concepts “level of trust” and “civil society activity” from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (Hartmann 
et al., 2018) as a proxy. To measure M&E capacity, we use the binary indicator on whether an evaluation 
included project monitoring data (Noltze et al., 2018c).  
46 Based on feedback from the reference group, we disaggregate fragility in its different dimensions, in addition to using the overall index, as we 
 did in earlier versions of this report. For more details on those dimensions, see Chapter 2. 
47 
The main models in the mediation analyses are run using a 50th percentile cut--offpoint. Values above the cut-off are regarded as high and below 
      as low levels of fragility. Robustness checks are run for the 25th and 75th percentile.  
48 While the multivariate statistical analyses use the disaggregated three dimensions of fragility, they are not run with the different types of fragility 
as we have too few observations for some values of certain types.  
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Figure 4 State fragility and evaluation quality, and possible mechanisms linking them 
Source: own figure. 
In order to test our hypotheses, we employ a mixed-method design combining quantitative and qualitative 
analysis (Creswell, 2014). A quantitative analysis explores if fragility is relevant for the quality of evaluation 
reports. Subsequent expert interviews generate insights on hypotheses that cannot be tested 
quantitatively, and identify challenges and lessons learnt for future evaluation. Triangulation of data and 
methods – comparing the findings across different data sources and methods applied – allows us to estimate 
the validity of statements and findings.  
The sample used in the quantitative analysis consists of 388 evaluation reports by the GIZ and KfW 
submitted to the BMZ between 2006 and 2016.49 It includes project data such as information on monitoring, 
project duration, or success rating according to the five DAC criteria. Moreover, it contains details of the 
evaluation such as the type of evaluation and an assessment of the evaluation quality of each report (Noltze 
et al., 2018b). To this, we add the data on our explanatory variable (fragility) and the variables 
operationalizing the mechanisms (mobility, trust, M&E capacity), as described above. To estimate the 
influence of fragility on evaluation quality, we rely on descriptive and inferential analysis. For the inferential 
analysis we apply linear regression, penalized logistic regression and mediation analysis. 
49 Starting from a dataset of 513 observations, several observations covering more than one country are excluded for this country-level analysis. 
Moreover, some observations are dropped due to the merging processes of different databases and variables. This dataset varies slightly from 
that used in this chapter on project success, since for this analysis we rely on a 50% sample, because only those reports for which information on 
evaluation quality was available could be included. Nevertheless, the source of both datasets is the same (GIZ and KfW evaluations sent to the 
BMZ between 2006 and 2016, see above). For details on population, sampling strategy, and dataset preparation, see Noltze et al., 2018b. 
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The qualitative analysis is based on five semi-structured interviews involving explorative questions. We 
chose interview partners based on two criteria. The first was the role of the institution in the field of 
evaluation and fragility. Our aim was to choose experts covering the perspectives of implementing 
organizations concerned (GIZ and KfW), research (Global Public Policy Institute), and practitioners 
(consultancies: GOPA – Gesellschaft für Organisation, Planung und Ausbildung; and GFA – Gesellschaft für 
Agrarprojekte in Übersee). The second selection criterion was at the personal level: all experts were required 
to have at least five years of experience in the field of evaluation in fragile contexts and/or work with related 
questions on a daily basis. Based on the coding of the interview protocols, we then conducted a content 
analysis (Flick et al., 1995; Kuckartz, 2014). 
The empirical analyses face a number of methodological challenges. First, the quality criteria may not fully 
reflect all facets of evaluation quality in fragile contexts. However, the quality criteria were carefully chosen 
to obtain a valid measure of evaluation quality. Second, the analysis draws on secondary data. We did not 
conduct case studies but included practical experiences through expert interviews. Third, different quality 
criteria might apply for different types of evaluation. To address this issue, only those quality criteria were 
selected that are commonly applied in the respective guidelines for the different evaluation types. Fourth, 
multiple evaluators are used to code evaluation quality. This involves the risk of coders disagreeing on the 
rating. The intercoder reliability analysis revealed strong, though not perfect, consistency (see Landis and 
Koch, 1977) with a Kappa coefficient of 0.63.50 Finally, the sampling strategy originates from a different 
research question, raising the question of representativeness. However, the sample was randomly drawn 
from the population stratified by evaluation type (about half of reports of each evaluation type were 
sampled). 
50 For this analysis, we applied Cohen’s Kappa coefficient. A Kappa value of 0 depicts maximal divergence between evaluators or coders, while a 
value of 1 represents perfect concordance. In addition, we included an external perspective. For this, we compared the quality assessment from 
the meta-evaluations by DEval and GIZ. Results showed that the maximum scores reached were similar. 
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4.4 Empirical results 
This section presents the findings of the quantitative and qualitative analyses. 
Quantitative analysis 
We begin with an inspection of evaluation quality depending on a binary variable fragility status (“high” or 
“low”) and by type of fragility. Findings suggest that the quality of evaluations does not systematically vary 
conditional on the fragility of the country in which the evaluation was conducted.  
Figure 5 Fulfilled quality criteria by high or low fragility context 
Source: own figure. 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the descriptive and univariate results of the analysis. Figure 5 shows no big 
differences in evaluation quality between countries with low and high levels of fragility. Similarly, Figure 6 
does not show large variations in the aggregated quality index between countries of different types of 
fragility. We apply the Kruskal–Wallis test to examine the null hypothesis that the means of all fragility 
types are equal, and find that it could not be rejected at the level of 5% or below.  
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Figure 6 Boxplots depicting the evaluation quality index differentiated by type of fragility 
Source: own figure. 
We now turn to the results from the multivariate regressions. The dependent variables are the different 
quality criteria. Since the dependent variable is a dummy variable of one quality criterion, we run penalized 
logistic regressions (Heinze and Schemper, 2002). We also run linear regressions with the aggregated 
quality index as dependent variable. The key independent variables are different dimensions of state 
fragility (i.e. authority, capacity and legitimacy). We control for sectors where aid could plausibly affect 
fragility levels and the quality of the evaluation simultaneously. We also control for the number of days that 
evaluators spent in the field, as this might influence evaluation quality.  
The results on the aggregated quality index show no clear evidence that fragility is an important 
determinant of evaluation quality. We only find statistically significant associations between the fragility 
dimension of capacity and two evaluation quality criteria when we look at them separately. We find that a 
higher state capacity is negatively associated with the likelihood that indicators were formulated (Q-04) 
and with the likelihood that strengths and limitations were discussed (Q-06). Table 11 summarizes the 
results.51 The regression tables are included in the online appendix. However, we refrain from interpreting 
these results due to multiple hypothesis testing.52 The results lend further robustness to our overall finding 
of no significant relation between fragility and evaluation quality. 
51 We assess the results of all regressions at the 5% significance level (p < 0.05).
52 Given a p-value of 5% or less, the chance of falsely rejecting a true null hypothesis of no effect is 5%.
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Table 11 Summary results from multivariate regression analysis of the effect of fragility on 
evaluation quality 
Source: own figure. 
We also conduct mediation analyses to investigate whether fragility is related to the quality of evaluation 
reports through the three selected potential causal mechanisms. A mediation analysis allows us to assess 
whether fragility affects the quality of evaluation reports through intervening variables, as there might be 
mediation effects even if the direct effect is not significant. Thus, mediation analysis allows indirect effects 
that cancel out each other to be revealed.53 We use proxies to investigate the potential causal mechanisms 
of mobility, trust, and project M&E, as outlined above. Interpretation of mediation analyses is facilitated by 
conceptualizing the treatment variable as binary. Thus, we created binary independent variables for 
authority, capacity, and legitimacy. To assess robustness, we also employ cut-off points at the 25th and 75th 
percentiles. Significant results are summarized in Table 12.54 
Our analyses suggest that the most important mediator of the effect of fragility on evaluation quality is 
mobility. The left-hand column in Table 12 shows the three dimensions of fragility. The second column 
depicts the potential causal mechanisms (mediators), and the third column shows the quality criteria. The 
three columns on the right-hand side differentiate three different cut-off points between the “high” and 
53 See Hayes (2009) and Imai (2011) for more details on mediation analyses.
54 For simplicity, null findings are excluded from the table and are available upon request.
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“low” value of the respective fragility dimension of the first column. The symbols show statistically 
significant effects. Those criteria to which the respective fragility dimension is robustly related are shaded 
in yellow. Regression tables are provided in the online appendix.  
Table 12 Summary results of the mediation analysis 
Source: own figure. 
In respect of authority, we find evidence that higher levels of authority increase the likelihood that the data 
and methodology of evaluations is qualitatively and quantitatively sufficient (“database adequate”) through 
increased mobility.55  
On capacity, we find that higher levels are positively related to the likelihood that conclusions in the 
evaluation report are plausible (Q-15) through mobility. Some 42% of the total effect is mediated through 
mobility.56 Capacity is also positively correlated to Q-14, i.e. whether conclusions were referenced. This 
effect is again mediated through mobility; in fact, 37% of the total effect is mediated through mobility.57 
There is also a conditional effect of capacity on whether the database of an evaluation report is adequate 
(Q-16) through mobility, with some 47% of the total effect being mediated.   
The direction of the relationship between the fragility dimension of legitimacy and different quality criteria 
is not as consistent as is the case for capacity. On the one hand, the effect of legitimacy on evaluation quality 
is positively mediated through our measure of trust among the population. While we find no evidence of a 
direct effect of legitimacy on whether the evaluation methodology was described (Q-05), 67% of the total 
effect is mediated through trust. A higher level of legitimacy is associated with a higher likelihood of 
evaluation criterion Q-05 being fulfilled through higher mobility. There is no evidence of a direct effect of 
legitimacy on whether a before-and-after comparison was undertaken (Q-09); but 58% of the total effect is 
mediated through trust. Interestingly, higher legitimacy seems to reduce the likelihood that the evaluation 
was based on before-and-after comparisons. This might be due to the fact that other rigorous types of 
55 However, this effect is not robust to using the 25th percentile cut-offs for the binary authority variable.
56 While this effect is robust to a number of different model specifications, the mediation effect is not robust to using the cut-off of the 25th
percentile for the binary fragility variable of capacity.  
57 While this effect is robust to a number of different model specifications, the mediation effect is not robust to using the cut-off of the 25th 
percentile for the binary fragility variable of capacity when controls are included in the model.  
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research design are used in such contexts of high trust among the population.58 Legitimacy has a positive 
direct effect on whether the database in an evaluation was considered as adequate (Q-16). In addition, 40% 
of this effect is mediated through mobility. Again, higher values of legitimacy are associated with lower 
quality. 
Qualitative analysis 
The results of the quantitative analysis are complemented by a qualitative analysis of five expert interviews, 
covering all hypotheses. Furthermore, it provided the opportunity to obtain first impressions of best 
practices. However, since we only conducted five interviews, the results must be interpreted with care.   
The hypothetical mechanism on reduced mobility and poor project M&E capacities received the strongest 
support from experts. The main mobility challenges were travel restrictions and poor infrastructure. Project 
M&E is related to various factors such as resource questions – in terms of budget as well as availability and 
competence of staff – leading to lacking or poor-quality indicators and other project data available for 
external evaluators. 
As listed in Figure 4, mechanisms 2 (trust among the population), 3 (affirmative culture) and 5 (evaluator’s 
influencers) reflect power relations, interests, and the motivational situation of the various actors in the 
spheres (the population, the project staff and the evaluator or evaluation team). On the other hand, 
mechanisms 1 (mobility), 4 (project M&E) and 6 (evaluator’s M&E capacity) explore the capacity side of the 
actors, which is closely linked to resource questions.  
All experts confirmed that they expect fragile contexts to have a negative impact on evaluation quality. For 
instance, as external actors, evaluators have specific room for manoeuvre, but they also rely on the 
information provided by the project. This is even more true in the case of travel restrictions, which may even 
prevent evaluators from travelling to the respective country. Mechanism 4, suggesting that evaluation 
quality may be reduced due to a project’s poor M&E systems, was supported by all five experts.59 Mechanism 
1 was also confirmed by all experts. Mechanisms 2, 3 and 6 were predominantly supported. Mechanism 5, on 
the other hand, was supported only by two of the five experts. In contrast to the quantitative analysis, the 
qualitative analysis supported all mechanisms except mechanism 5 as being relevant to evaluation quality 
in fragile contexts. 
The most examples and specific challenges were expressed concerning the realm of project M&E capacities 
and mobility. The other four mechanisms were much less strongly supported by examples. This is in line 
with the findings of the quantitative analysis, suggesting that mobility and trust are relevant determinants 
for evaluation quality. 
As for mechanism 1, most interviewees mentioned travel restrictions imposed by the sending organization 
in Germany. Poor infrastructure in the partner country (such as transportation or communications) was 
mentioned less often. A denial of travel by the headquarters of the German sending institution may result 
in a visit by project staff to a safer neighbouring country or a desktop study in Germany. In the event that 
the evaluator or evaluation team travels to the partner country despite security and infrastructure concerns, 
pragmatic decisions might be taken (e.g. “You visit those schools that are accessible”), or local consultants 
may visit those regions which are not available to international evaluators due to security restrictions.60 On 
the other hand, the cost of implementing security provisions may increase, which may lead to an evaluation 
team deciding not to travel if the costs of making the journey safe exceed the funds available. 
58 It would be plausible for this effect to be driven by evaluation reports that do not fulfil the criterion of before-and-after comparisons having been 
based on control/comparison groups. However, this does not seem to be the case.  
59 For the purpose of this analysis, a hypothesis or mechanism was regarded as confirmed if the interviewee mentioned at least one explaining factor 
or supporting example illustrating the mechanism. 
60 The strategy of sending local staff into a region that is not accessible to the evaluators as planned was mentioned by almost all experts in the 
interviews, but was also controversial, weighing both normative and pragmatic factors. 
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Mechanism 2 focuses on trust issues among the population. If the level of trust in a society is low, the 
population’s response behaviour may be negatively influenced. Experts explained that this could limit 
information-sharing by interviewees, but may also cause a systematic bias, e.g. by pressure to respond 
according to the narrative of the specific group the respondent belongs to, or to follow the conflict logic.  
For mechanism 3, an affirmative project culture was confirmed by the experts, but backed up with fewer 
examples. Experts pointed out that an affirmative project culture may influence what topics are raised and 
what evaluation questions are asked. Moreover, if the evaluation team relies on support from the project 
when organizing the evaluation mission, it might also affect case selection. One explanation mentioned was 
that project staff may see evaluators as controlling inspectors rather than facilitators of a learning process. 
Nevertheless, internal reasons such as incentives/“boni” were also mentioned, exacerbating the situation. 
In addition, project staff may find themselves in insecure situations, e.g. running the risk of being expelled 
from the country. 
The experts put much emphasis on mechanism 4 (project M&E capacity). Among various aspects, they 
mentioned data availability as a core challenge, along with the poor quality of indicators (e.g. they may not 
refer to the project proposal or may not be adapted to the context) and hence low data quality. As possible 
causes, experts mentioned a lack of qualified staff and other resources for M&E tasks in the project, which 
may be caused by funding rivalry between the implementation and evaluation of projects, usually financed 
from the same budget. Moreover, especially in fragile contexts, projects may operate under “high pressure”, 
often coping with a situation of high demands and urgency (e.g. the management of a hospital) and limited 
resources, which impedes the dedication of resources to M&E tasks. In addition, this situation may increase 
turnover among project staff, negatively affecting its level of competence and ownership. Other aspects 
mentioned to a lesser extent were gender-blind staffing, poor leadership support for the evaluation within 
the project, and low M&E orientation among project staff and no follow-up by them. 
Examining mechanism 5 (evaluator’s influencers), internal issues in the institution employing the evaluator 
(e.g. pressure not to be too critical) outweighed local context influences such as corruption.  
On mechanism 6 (evaluator’s M&E capacity), the factor mentioned most often was inadequately qualified 
personnel, followed by lack of knowledge about the context. These observations were usually accompanied 
by remarks about tight resources combined with a demanding environment. This led to another issue 
mentioned: that guidance by the project is crucial for successful evaluation, especially in fragile contexts. 
4.5 Results and recommendations 
This chapter has investigated how fragile contexts may influence evaluation and its quality, how potential 
challenges can be addressed, and how evaluation practices in a fragile context can be improved. The 
following summarizes our findings and concludes with a recommendation.  
In a first examination of the direct correlation between fragility and overall evaluation quality, results show 
that, at a general level, evaluation quality does not vary greatly depending on fragility. The same is true for 
the individual evaluation quality criteria. We can thus conclude from the quantitative analysis that, overall, 
even in dire circumstances evaluators manage to maintain evaluation quality at normal levels. This finding 
is surprising as qualitative findings suggest that fragility may affect evaluation quality in various ways. 
In a second step, we explore the role of different mechanisms as mediators between fragility and evaluation 
(quality). This reveals that low state capacity is associated with reduced mobility and thus indirectly with a 
lower evaluation quality. 
According to the qualitative analysis, the core challenges to fully fledged quality evaluations in fragile 
contexts were: poor data availability and project M&E; limited mobility due to travel restrictions; the image 
of evaluators among the population; adverse internal incentives for project staff and, to a lesser extent, 
evaluators; and issues around the qualifications and contextual knowledge of evaluators. Experts 
furthermore emphasized in the interviews that, apart from these challenges, more pressure at the level of 
both project and evaluation is added by the increasing speed of project implementation and shortened 
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project cycles, as well as an orientation towards outputs rather than outcomes. Consequently, evaluators 
employed different coping strategies, e.g. they adopted expectations and benchmarks. 
The findings of both the quantitative and qualitative analyses show that the mobility of evaluators and their 
(logistical) access to interview partners is a core issue in fragile contexts. We further conclude that, across 
quantitative and qualitative findings, the evidence is mixed concerning the role of societal trust and project 
M&E capacities. While in the quantitative analysis, respective variables are not significantly associated, 
experts emphasized the special importance of M&E systems at the project level. 
Mobility restrictions, and thus access to field data, in fragile states are a challenge for evaluations (see 
OECD, 2006). Often, security challenges mean that mobility and thus access to stakeholders becomes more 
expensive. It is therefore important that monitoring and evaluations are sufficiently, seperately (i.e. from 
project implementation), and securely funded.  
A high M&E capacity of projects ensures availability and quality of project data. A critical review of M&E 
systems could be useful to identify potential to improve data quality and availability. This could include 
reserving sufficient resources for M&E tasks at project/programme level, incentives such as M&E-capacity-
related annual objectives for leadership personnel, or sensitization training specifically for leadership 
personnel. Moreover, the evaluation capacity of local partners could be improved by creating a sustainable 
pool of evaluation experts in partner countries.  
Possible approaches to increase M&E capacity are budgeting and project planning. With regard to 
budgeting, separate budgets for project implementation on the one hand and M&E on the other should limit 
competition for resources. This has already been recently implemented in respect of evaluations. For 
instance, the GIZ has a separate budget for financing evaluations. According to the recent GIZ evaluation 
reform, project evaluations will now be more centralized, being commissioned by the GIZ headquarters 
evaluation department. However, there is room for further improvement. With regard to project monitoring, 
module proposals (Modulvorschläge) for technical development cooperation require reporting of expected 
costs differentiated by output. However, monitoring costs are not separately reported, but either subsumed 
under the respective output or labelled as “overall costs”. Separate reporting of monitoring costs could 
improve the BMZ’s steering capacity in respect of the quality of monitoring and evaluation. For example, 
the share of costs allocated to monitoring and evaluation could be adapted depending on expected 
challenges of M&E in the operating environment. Moreover, implementing organizations would be required 
to inform the BMZ in the event of major budget adjustments.  
Another possible remedy that specifically addresses mobility challenges would be to further strengthen the 
capacity of conducting remote monitoring and evaluation (see Glass and Schönhofen, 2018). Suitable 
approaches to data collection include remote sensing, digital data collection by handheld devices, and 
remote surveys (BMZ and GIZ project Internet and Sustainable Development, 2016; Lech et al., 2017, 2019; 
Steets et al., 2016). To make use of these new types of digital data in decision-making processes, it is 
important to strengthen the capacity to apply and process data (Pawelke et al., 2017).  
Finally, in order to improve the overall quality of evaluations, the BMZ, GIZ and KfW should continue to 
implement the recommendations in DEval’s meta-evaluation on sustainability (Noltze et al., 2018c). 
We thus make the following recommendation: 
Recommendation 4 
Based on qualitative interviews, observational evidence from an evaluation synthesis, and a screening of 
the literature, this evaluation recommends that the BMZ, GIZ, and KfW address mobility restrictions on 
evaluators in fragile contexts and improve M&E at the project level. 
First, we recommend that the BMZ require the GIZ and the KfW to further separate out budgets for project 
implementation on the one hand, and project monitoring and evaluation on the other, to further 
strengthen the prevention of fungibility and competition for resources. 
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Second, this evaluation recommends that the GIZ and the KfW address mobility challenges in fragile 
contexts through the increased use of innovative data-collection methods. This includes strengthening 
capacity in conducting remote evaluation and monitoring using, e.g., geospatial methods, remote surveys, 
and digital data collection. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Fragile contexts are challenging environments for development cooperation. This chapter synthesizes the 
results of 471 digitized evaluation reports on GIZ and KfW projects in 85 countries beween 2006 and 2015 
to compare project ratings across different levels of fragility.  
To assess the success of development cooperation in fragile contexts, we draw on two measures of fragility. 
First, we use the multidimensional yet state-based concept of state fragility by Grävingholt et al. (2018). This 
appears most effective in measuring state fragility, as discussed in Chapter 2. Second, we develop a 
subnational measure of fragility based on violent events in the vicinity of georeferenced locations. Linking 
georeferenced aid projects to violent events provides a clearer picture of subnational variations of fragility. 
We find fragility to be mostly uncorrelated to project success as measured by evaluation ratings. State 
capacity, however, is an exception in that more successful development cooperation projects reside in 
countries with higher levels of capacity.  
5.2 What we know about the success of development cooperation 
There is an extensive literature on the success of development cooperation projects (for an overview, see 
Arndt et al., 2010; Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2009; Faust and Leiderer, 2008). As a rather broad 
phenomenon, state fragility is linked to many factors that have been discussed in terms of the success of 
development cooperation. The following reviews this literature using four groups of factors: 1) relations 
between extending agencies, implementing agencies, and partner countries; 2) donor characteristics; 3) 
characteristics of the partner country; and 4) characteristics of the intervention. 
Relations between extending agencies, implementing agencies, and partner countries 
Development cooperation involves a long chain of delegation. Taxpayers provide funds to governments, 
which engage implementing aid agencies (e.g. GIZ, KfW) that provide instruments of development 
cooperation to partner countries, possibly indirectly through contractors.61 These can be thought of as 
principal–agent relationships (Killick, 1998; Martens et al., 2002).62 
Concerning development cooperation in fragile contexts, relationships between governmental and non-
governmental aid agencies (principals) on the one hand and partner-country governments as well as field 
agents (agents) on the other are of primary interest. Lack of information for taxpayers, the legislative and 
executive branches of government, and the implementing aid agencies allows field agents to pursue their 
own interests. In this scenario, tighter control through monitoring and close management might appear an 
appropriate means to mitigate potential harm from information asymmetry.  
However, greater autonomy of field agents might also have beneficial effects, particularly in fragile 
contexts. Honig (2018) finds that in unpredictable environments tight top-down management of field agents 
is less effective than reduced principal control. He argues that, although fragility has an overall negative 
effect on project success, this can be mitigated by giving field agents greater autonomy of decision-making 
to react more flexibly in volatile environments. 
A second relational characteristic is donor interest (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Dreher et al., 2015; Minoiu and 
Reddy, 2010). Whether allocation decisions are made based on the donors self -interest or on the needs of 
61 In Germany, financial development cooperation usually works through contractors, while technical development cooperation works directly with 
recipients. 
62 Principal–agent theory models hierarchical relations between a delegating entity, i.e. the principal, and a subordinate entity selected to execute 
the delegated tasks, i.e. the agent. Principals and agents are modelled as utility-maximizers under incomplete information. The theory argues that, 
in these circumstances, conflicts of interest and information asymmetry might allow agents to act in their own rather than the principals interest , 
leading to suboptimal results. The respective role of the involved actors depends on the relationship under study. For instance, beneficiaries and 
partner countries might act as principals, e.g. towards aid agencies and contractors, or agents, e.g. in cases of conditionality contracts. 
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the partner countries influences the quality of development cooperation interventions (Knack and Rahman, 
2007). 
Donor characteristics 
A second group of characteristics that might influence project success involves donor countries. Minasyan 
et al. (2017) draw on the index of donor performance from the Center for Global Development to show that 
higher-quality foreign aid – aid maximizing efficiency, fostering institutions, reducing the burden on partner 
countries, and enhancing transparency and learning – leads to income gains in recipient countries 
(Roodman, 2012). In 2014, Germany ranked 14th in the index of donor performance. This index identifies a 
comparatively large share of aid going to well-governed countries as a strength of German ODA. More 
recently, Mitchell and McKee (2018) rank Germany lowest out of 27 state donors and 13 multilateral 
agencies. However, they find development cooperation to well-governed countries to be successful.  
Faust et al. (2016) find that, from a partner perspective, large multilateral donors and small specialized 
bilateral donors tend to be more influential and helpful than large bilateral donors. Findley et al. (2017) argue 
that multilateral and non-state donors are driven less by self-interest and focus more on the needs of partner 
countries. Looking at state donors, Faust (2008) and Dietrich (2016) investigate the effect of domestic 
political and economic institutions in donor countries on the effectiveness of aid. 
Characteristics of the partner country 
A broad strand of the literature argues that good policies in partner countries are decisive for the success 
of development cooperation (Burnside and Dollar, 2000, 2004; Collier, 2008). However, the robustness of 
the results has been questioned (Easterly et al., 2004; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008).  
A similar argument concerns the institutional quality of partner countries (Collier and Dollar, 2002), political 
stability (Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2003), and the type of political regime (Svensson, 1999). With regard to 
the latter, democracy might lead to greater aid effectiveness as democratic leaders have greater incentives 
to create public goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). More recent arguments have advanced the debate 
by using more refined regime typologies (Lührmann et al., 2017). 
Characteristics of the intervention 
Beyond donor and partner-country characteristics, the type of instrument may affect effectiveness. The 
literature differentiates between budget and project support as well as tied and untied aid (Dreher et al., 
2008; Milner, 2006).63 It has moreover investigated the role of the volume (Clemens et al., 2012) and 
fragmentation (Gehring et al., 2017; Knack and Rahman, 2007) of development cooperation.  
When considering success in fragile countries, channels of funding have been identified as crucial. 
Generally, there are two: country systems and non-state systems.64 The use of country systems for ODA 
supports the principles of aid effectiveness and is seen as good practice. However, the use of country 
systems might be risky, particularly in low-capacity states (Manuel et al., 2012). More generally, Manuel et 
al. (2012) and Honig (2018) argue that flexibility of aid instruments allows them to be constantly adapted to 
potentially changing environments, which seems to be crucial in fragile contexts.  
Orth et al. (2017) find that a mix of four different components in budget support programmes (financial 
transfer, policy dialogue, conditionalities, and technical assistance) makes budgetary support more 
successful. Moreover, they argue that the consequent use of country systems improves public financial 
management in partner countries.   
63 In Germany, development cooperation is organizationally divided into technical and financial development cooperation.
64 Manuel et al. (2012) discuss the funding channels of the six categories of ODA instruments according to the OECD’s International Network on 
Conflict and Fragility (INCAF): (1) general budget support (country system); (2) sectoral budget support (country system); (3) government-managed 
pooled funds (country system); (4) jointly managed trust funds (parallel systems); (5) project support (parallel systems); and (6) support through 
and to non-state actors (parallel systems). 
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Besley and Persson (2011) use a game-theory model looking at the influence of types of development 
cooperation on the fragility of partner countries and project success. Their model allows empirical 
expectations to be derived on the role of cash- or non-cash aid as technical, military and post-conflict 
assistance. Cornell (2013) develops a measure of democracy aid to investigate the impact of development 
cooperation on democratization in autocratic regimes.  
In summary, the academic debate finds the success of development projects to be conditional on 1) relations 
between extending agencies, implementing agencies, and partner countries; 2) donor characteristics; 3) 
characteristics of the partner country; and 4) characteristics of the intervention. 
5.3 Data and method 
Data 
To assess the impact of fragility on project success, we rely on evaluation reports from the GIZ and KfW 
starting in 2006. Since then, evaluation draws on the standardized DAC evaluation criteria. To address the 
lack of independence between consecutive reports, we only keep the most recent evaluation for each 
project. Moreover, we exclude projects that span more than one country and projects in countries where no 
data on fragility is available. This leaves us with 471 projects 
conducted in 85 countries between 2006 and 2015.  
Our outcome of interest is project success. We operationalize 
project success as the arithmetical mean of the ratings for the 
five DAC criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, 
and sustainability. Where adequate, we also disaggregate by 
criterion. Thus, we do not investigate whether projects had an 
impact on fragility but look at success in fragile contexts. 
As our main explanatory variable, we employ both a national and 
a subnational measure of fragility. To measure fragility at the 
national level, we draw on the Constellations of State Fragility 
(CSF) by Grävingholt et al. (2018). We include both the 
aggregated type of fragility and the three dimensions of fragility 
(authority, capacity, and legitimacy) as predictors (see Chapter 
2). 
A new measure of subnational fragility 
The level of fragility often varies within states, e.g. between the 
centre and the periphery. The effectiveness of interventions may 
depend to a significant degree on these local conditions. 
The use of macroeconomic indicators or national fragility scores is thus insufficient. Where precise 
geographical information on projects is available through evaluations, indicators assessing contextual 
factors should reflect a comparable level of precision. Most empirical analyses, however, use data that are 
aggregated to the country-year level, thereby losing project-specific information. Spatial disaggregation is 
thus a promising strategy to improve our knowledge of development cooperation in fragile contexts. 
While current approaches to geocoding largely rely on close reading, we rely on text mining. We retrieve 
subnational location information from the evaluation reports through natural language processing. We then 
assign coordinates to each of these locations through Google Maps. This provides us with a clearer picture 
of distributional patterns of aid within partner countries. 
In order to improve the automated process of geocoding, we apply several algorithms to render our results 
more precise. These algorithms draw on (1) the status of a country as a partner for bilateral development 
cooperation, (2) the type of location, and (3) a cluster algorithm based on the distance of each location from 
the centroid of all locations. Moreover, we test for different specifications of our measure. For instance, we 
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include a measure that weighs results by the number of times a certain location is mentioned in the 
document. An illustration of the process is included in the online appendix.  
To measure state fragility subnationally, we combine our data on project locations with data on conflict 
events from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset (UCDP GED) (Sundberg and 
Melander, 2013). We operationalize state authority as the number of battle-related deaths occurring in 
intrastate conflict within a 75-km radius around the location of projects. Due to the skewness of the data, 
we draw on the natural logarithm.  
Figure 7 compares the distribution of the newly developed subnational measure of fragility with the 
authority dimension of the constellations of fragility dataset. The graph shows that, although there is a 
correlation between the two measures, there is great variability of subnational fragility. This indicates that 
our subnational measure can improve our understanding of state fragility. On the one hand, we observe 
many interventions conducted in peaceful local contexts (indicated by low values on the Y-axis) in states 
with low authority (indicated by low values on the X-axis). On the other, we observe interventions in regions 
with high levels of violence in states with comparatively high levels of authority.  
Figure 7 Subnational fragility by CSF authority component 
Source: own figure based on GIZ and KfW evaluation reports and UCDP GED .   
Method 
We combine descriptive and econometric analyses to investigate project success in fragile contexts. The 
descriptive analysis quantitatively synthesizes the ratings from the available evaluation report conditioned 
on various measures of fragility. In addition, we draw on regression analysis to account for the influence of 
possible confounding variables and to address possible imbalances in our sample. For more information, see 
the online appendix.  
Most importantly, we should be cautious in interpreting the following results causally. Selection into the 
sample is not random, and unobserved confounding variables might influence the results. For instance, due 
to the assessment of risk and institutional capacity in the preparation stage preceding project 
implementation, it is likely that projects are tailored to the specific context. Consequently, projects in fragile 
contexts may be comparatively less complex, leading to better ratings in evaluation reports. Moreover, aid 
is not distributed randomly (Briggs, 2018). As we do not yet know enough about the mechanisms of aid 
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allocation, these issues of self-selection might bias the findings of the present analysis. However, the results 
in Chapter 4 suggest that evaluation quality does not vary greatly by type of fragility. Hence, evaluation 
quality does not seem to be a source of systematic bias in our outcome indicators. 
5.4 Empirical results 
Results 
Figure 8 plots project success rating by type of fragility. The horizontal dashed bar shows the arithmetical 
mean of project ratings across all evaluations. The graph indicates that the majority of projects take place 
in countries with low capacity and low legitimacy. Not surprisingly, projects in well-functioning states are 
rare as these states are typically not partner countries. We find no robust relationship between the type of 
fragility and project success. Although the figure shows that project ratings are somewhat lower in low-
capacity states, we do not find robust evidence for lower ratings in our econometric analysis (regression 
results are included in the online appendix). 
We further investigate how much ratings vary. It may be that volatile contexts lead to a greater variance of 
project outcomes. However, a comparison of the standard deviation of project ratings conditional on 
fragility does not show substantial differences. We thus find no evidence that project ratings differ 
according to the fragility of contexts as measured by types of fragility. 
Figure 8 Project ratings by type of fragility 
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Source: own figure based on GIZ and KfW evaluation reports and CSF.   
We can further investigate the relationship between fragility and project ratings by looking at the three 
dimensions of fragility. Figure 9 plots project ratings by authority, capacity, and legitimacy. We find no 
indication of a relationship between authority and legitimacy on the one hand and project ratings on the 
other.  
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Figure 9 Project ratings by fragility component 
Source: own figure based on GIZ and KfW evaluation reports and CSF.   
We can take a closer look at the relationship between authority and project ratings by drawing on our 
subnational measure of fragility. Figure 10 plots project ratings against our geographically disaggregated 
measure of authority. Again, we find no systematic correlation between state authority in the vicinity of 
project locations and the ratings of success.  
Figure 10 Project rating by subnational fragility 
Source: own figure based on GIZ and KfW evaluation reports.
Authority Capacity Legitimacy
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75
1
2
3
4
5
Pr
oj
ec
t R
at
in
g
Fragility component
2
3
4
5
0.0 2.5 5.0
Mean of logged battle-related deaths in 75km radius of project location
7.5 10.0
Pr
oj
ec
t 
Ra
ti
ng
5.  |  Development interventions in fragile contexts    65
In contrast to authority and legitimacy, we find project ratings positively correlated with state capacity. This 
result appears robust in our econometric analysis and for different specifications of capacity such as taking 
state capacity in the last year of the intervention or the mean capacity rating over project time (see online 
appendix for regression results). Moreover, the effect is similar for technical and financial development 
cooperation. 
A closer look at the descriptive data shows that the positive correlation between project ratings and state 
capacity is primarily driven by the ratings for the DAC criteria of effectiveness, impact, and sustainability 
and much less by ratings for efficiency and relevance. 
We can further investigate the variation of project ratings by looking at different sectors. Figure 11 shows 
project ratings by sector according to the capacity dimension of state fragility. Based on the descriptive 
data, we find that the positive relationship between capacity and project rating is strongest for projects in 
the health sector.65 These results should be treated with caution, however, due to a possible problem of 
endogeneity: the authority dimension of CSF includes child mortality as an indicator (see Chapter 2). 
65 Due to the low number of observations in each sector, we only test our results in a reduced regression model controlling for the implementing 
organization, type of evaluation, and other components of fragility. We find positive coefficients for the health, democracy, economy, and water 
sectors, although results are only significant for the health sector. But these results should be treated with caution. For instance, in the health 
sector, we only have 54 observations and, in light of the earlier results, we do not expect a significant effect. Consequently, a regression approach 
would probably be underpowered. 
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Figure 11 Project rating by state capacity in different sectors 
Source: own figure based on GIZ and KfW evaluation reports and CSF.   
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Discussion 
The empirical results show that state capacity correlates with higher project success in terms of 
effectiveness, impact, and sustainability. The correlation between state capacity and project success ratings 
is particularly strong in the health sector. Below we discuss possible implications in respect of state capacity 
development.  
Capacity development is usually understood in rather broad terms encompassing all three dimensions of 
fragility, namely authority, capacity, and legitimacy (GIZ, 2015). The disaggregated approach to fragility in 
this evaluation suggests that capacity development aimed at improving bureaucratic quality and the ability 
of the state to provide public services to its population is key. In the following, capacity development refers 
to this narrower understanding. 
Capacity development takes time (Henning, 2017). Nonetheless, the empirical results in this chapter suggest 
that it does pay off in terms of higher project success ratings. This seems to be particularly true for 
interventions in sectors that rely on high bureaucratic quality and infrastructural strength in the partner 
countries. The ability of states to implement policies based on an efficient administration that works 
throughout the territory thus appears to be decisive for the success of development cooperation. This 
underlines the importance of long-term institution-building in contexts of fragility, where, at the same time, 
the need to achieve results quickly might be particularly important. 
The finding that greater state capacity correlates with greater project success reveals a possible conflict of 
objectives. On the one hand, low-capacity states are probably among those in greatest need of external 
support. On the other, development interventions in countries where state capacity is already high hold out 
the prospect of being more successful. In light of our findings, this conflict of objectives could be resolved 
by prioritizing capacity-building measures in low-capacity partner states as this should increase the success 
of development interventions. One possible approach might be via reform partnerships (BMZ, 2017b). Most 
countries that entered into reform partnerships were classified in 2015 as low-capacity states (Grävingholt 
et al., 2018).66 
The results in this chapter must also be seen in the context of decreasing commitments to non-state actors 
(see Chapter 3). Where states lack capacity, donors are inclined to rely on channels of delivery that bypass 
the state. This in turn might undermine efforts to increase state capacity, possibly threatening the success 
of development cooperation in the long run. At the same time, building state capacity is an endogenous 
process that needs to be conceived as a social relation between the state and society (OECD, 2011b). This 
implies that improving state capacity necessarily links the central state to the local level, or at least supports 
both (see also the discussion on the local turn in Chapter 3.) 
Moreover, we find the correlation of state capacity and success of development cooperation to be sector-
specific. Although we should, as discussed above, be cautious in interpreting these results, they resonate 
well with quantitative and qualitative evidence. Holmberg and Rothstein (2011) find that it is the quality of 
government rather than spending on healthcare that leads to higher life expectancy, higher subjective 
health, and lower child mortality. Based on two case studies, Brieba (2018) argues that better health 
outcomes can be explained by public health systems that are well organized and uniformly distributed 
across a country’s territory. More generally, he suggests that it is specifically bureaucratic quality and 
infrastructural strength that link state capacity to better development outcomes. Our results point in a 
similar direction. Interventions in the health sector in particular seem to achieve better ratings with 
increasing state capacity. For other development outcomes, we find some evidence of a positive relationship 
in the democracy, economy, and water sectors. Interestingly, there is no evidence of a similar positive 
66 The predicted probability of being classified as a low-capacity state in 2015 for the countries that entered reform partnerships was as follows: 
Côte d’Ivoire 99%, Ethiopia 98%, Ghana 80%, Senegal 77%. Morocco and Tunisia, by contrast, are classified as low-legitimacy states with a 
probability of 95% and 56%, respectively.   
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relationship in education, which has traditionally been a sector heavily dependent on state capacity 
(Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2008).  
5.5 Results and recommendations 
This chapter sheds new light on the nexus between fragility and project success by introducing two 
innovative features that should improve our understanding of the role of state fragility. First, the analysis 
draws on a multidimensional measure of state fragility by Grävingholt et al. (2018). Rather than classifying 
states as fragile or non-fragile, this allows six types and three dimensions of fragility to be differentiated 
(see Chapter 2). Second, this chapter employs an innovative geographically disaggregated measure of 
fragility by retrieving information on subnational locations from the evaluation reports through natural 
language processing and linking them to violent conflict events. This approach acknowledges the fact that 
state fragility typically does not affect the whole country to the same extent. In developing countries in 
particular, state fragility varies spatially. Nonetheless, state fragility is often exclusively conceived as a 
measure at the country level. Georeferencing aid projects and assessing the local situation provides a more 
realistic picture of the context in which development cooperation takes place.  
The following summarizes the results, discusses mechanisms and methodological shortcomings that might 
explain these results, and discusses possible implications for the strategic management of development 
cooperation. A single recommendation concludes the section. 
Project success ratings do not vary by type of state fragility 
The empirical analyses based on types of fragility and the subnational measure of fragility do not reveal a 
significant overall effect of fragility on project success. Although we are unable to provide definitive answers 
as our data do not permit the estimation of a credible counterfactual, our findings are in line with earlier 
research showing that ratings for development interventions are no lower in fragile contexts than in 
situations of consolidated statehood (Carvalho, 2006). 
The mechanism behind this perhaps surprising result is not immediately clear. A first possible explanation 
is that projects are well adapted to fragility in terms of programming and design. Our finding in Chapter 3 – 
that strategies on fragility are quite well implemented in German development cooperation – seems to 
point in this direction. Related to this, the goals of interventions in fragile contexts might be set lower, which 
would make them easier to achieve. However, interventions in highly fragile contexts usually have a dual 
objective in that they also aim at stabilization. This might lead to other, but probably not necessarily less 
ambitious, goals. A second possible explanation is that a negative effect of fragility would be offset by a 
positive effect of higher marginal returns. Future analyses should investigate this more closely, based on 
detailed data on the costs and outcomes of interventions. 
Methodological shortcomings might also be in play. One possible explanation is that evaluations come too 
early to witness the adverse effects of fragility on project success. However, the fact that our findings are 
robust across different types of evaluation and that our analysis includes predominantly ex post evaluations 
suggests otherwise. A second methodological explanation for the finding could be that evaluators take 
account of the fragility of the context in their ratings, which would lead to spurious results. There is some 
evidence that conflict and regime type affect project ratings differently than project outcomes pointing in 
this direction (Metzger and Guenther, 2015). In addition, an evaluation by Noltze et al. (2018b) shows that 
only about 60% of evaluation reports contain plausible conclusions that follow from the analysis of the data. 
Project success ratings vary by state capacity 
When looking more closely at the dimensions rather than types of fragility, the evaluation reports in our 
synthesis indicate that project success is conditional on state capacity. We find evidence that the extent to 
which development interventions achieve their objectives inducing sustainable positive change depends on 
the capacity of partner countries. By contrast, whether interventions do so in cost- and time-efficient ways 
and whether they are well adapted to the target group seems to depend less on capacity.  
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This finding supports the results of the evaluation of sustainability by Noltze et al. (2018b). They find the 
role of partner countries to be particularly important in rating sustainability. Thus, the achievement of 
sustainable results seems to be a particular challenge of development interventions in low-capacity states. 
Disaggregating the analyses between different sectors reveals that the correlation between state capacity 
and project ratings is particularly prominent in the health sector. This resonates with existing findings that 
interventions aimed at improving health require efficient and independent bureaucracies as well as an 
efficient infrastructure of service provision across the whole country (Brieba, 2018). However, we should be 
cautious with these results as health outcomes are also included in the measurement of state capacity.  
More generally, the relation between fragility and project success turns out to be context-, sector-, and 
outcome-specific. Tailoring development cooperation to fragile contexts requires a deeper understanding 
of the complex mechanisms that determine project success in different sectors across different contexts. 
Referring back to the discussion in Chapter 2, a multidimensional understanding of fragility is certainly 
helpful in this regard. The findings in this chapter add insights on sector- and outcome-specific effects. 
Although further research and better data are needed, strengthening state capacity seems to be crucial in 
order to create a context in which development cooperation is successful. 
We conclude from our results that it is advisable to continue, and possibly extend, the good practice of 
assessing state capacity in the management of bilateral development cooperation. Differentiating fragility 
profiles (Federal Government of Germany, 2017) and a detailed Peace and Conflict Assessment (BMZ and 
GIZ Sektorvorhaben Frieden und Sicherheit, 2014) is an important step in this direction. The risk assessment 
could also draw on (the successor to) the Governance Criteria Catalogue as well as monitoring and 
evaluations of similar interventions in similar contexts. Moreover, measures of state capacity could be 
further improved by disaggregating capacity between different actors and by taking into account 
subnational variations in state capacity (also see Recommendation 1).  
Furthermore, a higher standardization of evaluations should improve the comparability of evaluation 
reports. From an evaluator’s point of view, validity of indicators with regard to project goals and 
comparability of indicators across different projects are of primary importance. Current efforts by the BMZ, 
GIZ, and KfW in the joint working group “AG Evaluierung” are aimed in this direction and hence should 
improve the quality of observational data analysis across different contexts. 
We thus make the following recommendation: 
Recommendation 5 
Based on weak observational evidence from an evaluation synthesis, a screening of research and 
evaluations, and a review of the structure and processes of the German bilateral development cooperation 
system, this evaluation recommends that the BMZ systematically assess the risks emanating from a lack 
of capacity of partner countries for the success of development projects even more than has hitherto been 
the case. This should include a detailed assessment in module proposals of implementation risks in low-
capacity states. 
Moreover, the analysis points to the added value of improving the quality of, and standardizing, 
monitoring and evaluation. Consequently, the joint BMZ-GIZ-KfW working group “AG Evaluierung” 
should strive to increase comparability across evaluations with a view to enhancing the validity of 
evaluation syntheses and thereby facilitate joint learning. 
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